

A Trainer's Manual on  
**MEASURING CORRUPTION**  
at the Country Level





A Trainer's Manual on  
**MEASURING CORRUPTION**  
at the Country Level



United Nations  
Development  
Programme

A TRAINER'S MANUAL ON MEASURING CORRUPTION AT THE COUNTRY LEVEL

Copyright © 2009 by UNDP. All rights reserved. For information regarding the proper use of this document, contact UNDP Oslo Governance Centre.

Cover photo © United Nations Capital Development Fund; photo by Adam Rogers Country programme: Togo 1999

United Nations Development Programme  
UNDP Oslo Governance Centre  
Borgatta 2B  
N-0650 Oslo, Norway

[www.undp.org/oslocentre](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre)  
[oslo.governance.centre@undp.org](mailto:oslo.governance.centre@undp.org)

FIRST EDITION

First published May 2009.





## Table of Contents

Acknowledgements .....	1
Background information to the training programme .....	2
Using the training programme.....	3
Programme Agenda .....	4
Learning objectives .....	5
Module 1 Introduction to the programme.....	8
<b>PART ONE CORRUPTION INDICATORS .....</b>	<b>13</b>
Module 2 Defining corruption .....	14
Module 3 Why measure corruption? .....	22
Module 4 Composite and original indicators of corruption .....	30
Module 5 The challenges of measuring corruption .....	40
Module 6 Poverty and gender sensitive indicators .....	46
Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators .....	50
Module 8 Developing integrity indicators and indices .....	58
Module 9 Part One summary and feedback.....	66
<b>PART TWO CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS .....</b>	<b>71</b>
Module 10 Systemic corruption diagnostics .....	72
Module 11 Instruments for assessing corruption.....	78
Module 12 Collecting data.....	82
Module 13 Application and reflection .....	90
Module 14 Learning transfer and evaluation .....	96
Facilitation notes .....	100
References .....	104
ANNEXES.....	107
ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption.....	108
ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators.....	137
ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators.....	141
ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices.....	149
ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption.....	159
ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data.....	183
ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection.....	193
ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation.....	199

## **Acknowledgements**

This training manual has been developed in-house at the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre by Noëlle Rancourt, Governance and Learning Consultant, with support from UNDP staff including Marie Laberge, Programme Officer, and Joachim Nahem, Governance Specialist and Coordinator of the Global Programme on Democratic Governance Assessments, Hege Hermansen, Learning Specialist, Ingvild Oia, Research Officer, Claudia Melim-McLeod, Learning and Capacity Development Advisor, Phil Matsheza, Anti-corruption Policy Advisor, Anga Timilsina, Research Analyst, and Fatmir Musa, UNDP Macedonia. The programme has been informed by the valuable contributions of Alexandra Wilde (formerly with UNDP), Finn Heinrich and Marie Chêne (TI Secretariat), Sophie Meingast, Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Enrico Bisogno, and Giovanni Gallo (UNODC), Alessandra Fontana (Chr. Michelsen Institute), and Andrew Preston (DfID). It also benefited from the advice and assistance of Job Ogonda (TI Kenya), Zoran Jachev (author Macedonia RTA Index), Nimesh Jani (DfID), Fred Guwedekko (Anti-Corruption Coalition of Uganda), and Hannes Hechler (Chr. Michelsen Institute). The manual is a living document that is expected to undergo revisions based on feedback from participants and trainers.

April 2009



# Background information to the training programme

The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) came into force on December 14<sup>th</sup> 2005, signalling a pivotal shift in international commitment and cooperation to fighting corruption. This has taken place in a context where governance assessment is increasingly being recognized as an essential feedback mechanism for good governance. The centrality of assessment for effectively combating corruption is recognized by UNCAC, which requires countries to undertake *periodic evaluations of legal and administrative measures put in place to combat corruption* in article 5 (3), among other related provisions.

More and more countries are building their capacities to assess governance in general, and corruption specifically. To do this, they must navigate a crowded field of indices and approaches, and make choices about how to utilise, adapt, or create assessment approaches that best fit their needs. UNDP promotes democratic governance assessments that are anchored in the strategic principles of national ownership, capacity development and harmonization, and which are sensitive to the poor, women and other vulnerable groups, both in process and design. This training programme aims to provide the foundations of corruption measurement, and also to challenge participants to think about how to bring these principles to bear on assessment processes. It is based on the *Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption* (2008) developed by Global Integrity and UNDP.

There is a rising global demand for capacity development in this area. By making this training manual available we hope we can help others respond to such demand when and where it occurs. The two, to two and a half day programme targets government officials, CSOs and other stakeholders involved in designing corruption assessment projects. The ultimate learning goal is for participants of the training to be able to provide advice on undertaking corruption assessments in their home countries. It is not designed to meet the needs of those with advanced knowledge of corruption monitoring and evaluation. It is also not about investigative techniques for the purpose of prosecuting corruption, but rather, about the open and transparent use of information for planning and monitoring corruption interventions. However, even practitioners already engaged in corruption monitoring may find parts of the programme useful, as well as the opportunity to exchange knowledge and experiences with others from different organizational or country backgrounds.

Part One of the programme aims to develop skills for designing corruption indicators, to deepen understanding of the possible objectives and challenges of corruption assessments, and to raise awareness about relevant debates in the area of governance measurement. Part Two provides an overview of systemic corruption diagnostics, and applies critical concepts from the first part of the programme to appraising a selection of existing corruption assessment instruments. It briefly covers the selection of appropriate data collection methods, and ends by asking participants to integrate their learning by analysing and reflecting upon real life scenarios, and by thinking through how they will transfer this learning back to their work. After the training, both participants and trainers can continue learning and networking through the global [Governance Assessment Portal](http://www.gaportal.org) ([www.gaportal.org](http://www.gaportal.org)).

We hope that this training programme can contribute to the aim of helping nations make informed decisions about corruption assessments that are suited to their needs, and that participants and trainers can contribute to strengthening this programme with their feedback, through the evaluation sheets provided.

# Using the training programme

This trainer's manual provides the step-by-step guidance and materials necessary to hold the two to two and a half day programme on *Measuring Corruption at the Country Level*. This is a pilot version, which will undergo further fine-tuning. We would be grateful for feedback from the trainers and participants at the end of the training programme, through the evaluation forms provided.

## *Contextualizing the programme*

An important challenge in the development of the training manual has been to create a programme that has relevance to a global audience. When catering to a global audience, it is impossible to predict the mix of individuals in a training group, and the exact ways that country context, as well as levels of knowledge on the subject will vary within each group. This creates a challenge for the trainer, who will have to assess the needs of each group and make adjustments according to the overall programme both in advance, and throughout the delivery of training.

## *The trainer*

The trainer with the competency to effectively carry out this training programme requires a technical background and experience working with indicators, assessments and research methods, in order to act as a resource for participants. Knowledge of governance in general and corruption specifically is also required. While the trainer does not need a pedagogical background, the training programme assumes a trainer who has excellent communication skills including listening skills and who continuously monitors the learning processes taking place. Other important skills include the ability to manage multiple tasks and to manage time effectively.

## *Navigating the manual*

The manual is organised by **module**, with **reference notes** on content provided at the end of each module. Worksheets and handouts that must be photocopied and/or cut and distributed for activities are also organised by module, but are placed in the **annexes** at the back of the manual. Each module starts with the learning **objectives**, which state what the participants *will be able to do* by the end of each module. This is followed by an estimate of the **time** needed. Each module has an **introduction** which explains what content will be covered and why, which the trainer may consider using for opening new sessions. Activities provide step-by-step instructions directly to the trainer, and for ease of reference, all **discussion questions** are indicated with bullets. On the margins, next to each activity, are icons representing suggested **seating arrangements**. In the back of the manual you will find **facilitation notes** that may be helpful in thinking through the dynamics of classroom and small group management, as well as other useful techniques that will help things run more smoothly, such as ways of involving participants in feedback during the programme. Additional resources, including a discussion forum, can be accessed via the [Governance Assessments Portal](#).

After becoming familiar with the content of the manual, the trainer may find it helpful to get to know the participants in advance, to allow time for making adjustments to the programme. Guidance for carrying out a training needs assessment, as well as for evaluation and follow up can also be found in the facilitation notes section.

Last, but not least, the trainer can make specific queries through the learning and capacity development helpdesk at the UNDP Oslo Governance Centre: [training@oslogovcentre.org](mailto:training@oslogovcentre.org).

Good luck!

Programme Agenda		Time
Module 1	Introduction to the programme	40 mins
<i>Part One: Corruption indicators</i>		
Module 2	Defining corruption	50 mins
Module 3	Why measure corruption?	1 hr
Module 4	Composite and original indicators of corruption	1 hr
Module 5	The challenges of measuring corruption	1 hr
Module 6	Poverty and gender sensitive indicators	1 hr
Module 7	Complementarity in the use of indicators	1 hr 25 mins
Module 8	Developing integrity indicators and indices	2 hrs 10 mins
Module 9	Part One summary and feedback	20 mins
<i>Part Two: Corruption assessments</i>		
Module 10	Systemic corruption diagnostics	50 mins
Module 11	Instruments for assessing corruption	1 hr 30 mins
Module 12	Collecting data	1 hr 15 mins
Module 13	Application and reflection	2 hrs 30 mins
Module 14	Learning transfer and evaluation	30 mins

# Learning objectives

## Learning goal

The goal of the programme is for participants to be able to provide advice to stakeholders undertaking corruption assessment in their home countries.

## Principal learning objectives

By the end of the first part of the programme, participants will be able to:

- ☒ focus the objectives of corruption assessments
- ☒ design three types of indicators for assessing corruption and anti-corruption interventions
- ☒ effectively utilize global composite indicators and original data (both qualitative and quantitative)
- ☒ assess the methodological, political and operational challenges involved in carrying out corruption assessments
- ☒ design indicators that capture the experiences and perspectives of marginalised groups
- ☒ provide advice on developing a national index and develop scales for quantifying integrity indicators
- ☒ select balanced sets of indicators.

By the end of the second part of the programme, participants will be able to:


- ☒ provide advice on the relevance of carrying out a systemic diagnosis of corruption
- ☒ appraise different instruments for assessing corruption and adapting them to country needs
- ☒ select appropriate data collection methods.

Learning objectives
<b>Part One: Corruption Indicators</b>
<p>Module 1 Introduction to the programme</p> <p><i>During this module, the trainer should</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>introduce the objectives of the training programme and invite participant expectations to the training</li> <li>make sure all participants introduce themselves and help create a positive group dynamic</li> <li>prepare participants for the learning methods used in the programme.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 2 Defining corruption</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>explain the need, in measurement, for specifying corrupt practices</li> <li>distinguish administrative corruption from state capture</li> <li>name three types of corruption indicators.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 3 Why measure corruption?</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>explain two general purposes that corruption measurement have been used for</li> <li>provide at least five objectives a country may wish to achieve through corruption assessments</li> <li>identify which functions of corruption assessments are most relevant to their own country context(s)</li> <li>identify the links between national corruption monitoring efforts and the UNCAC self-assessment process.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 4 Composite and original indicators of corruption</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>explain why global composite indicators sometimes rank the same countries differently</li> <li>contrast the strengths and limitations of both global composite indicators and “second generation” measurement approaches</li> <li>identify data that is actionable</li> <li>explain the benefits and limitations of actionable data.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 5 The challenges of measuring corruption</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>identify methodological, political and operational challenges that matter for measuring corruption in their country context.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 6 Poverty and gender sensitive indicators</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>explain the importance of making corruption assessments sensitive to marginalized groups</li> <li>identify at least four ways in which indicators can be tailored to local contexts</li> <li>produce gender and poverty sensitive indicators.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>make the case for using both perception and fact-based data</li> <li>describe the rationale for using complementary indicators to assess a specific anti-corruption intervention</li> <li>match input and output indicators for a given unit of analysis.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 8 Developing integrity indicators and indices</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>develop indicators that measure the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms</li> <li>explain why a national index can be useful, and develop scales for quantifying integrity indicators</li> <li>explain the subjective dimensions of building an index that can benefit from multi-stakeholder input.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 9 Summary and feedback from Part One</p> <p><i>During this module, the trainer should</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>summarise the main learning points of the day, and reassess participant needs so that they inform the following day’s programme.</li> </ul>

Learning objectives
<b>Part Two: Corruption Assessments</b>
<p>Module 10 Systemic corruption diagnostics</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ explain when and why a political economy analysis of corruption can be beneficial to anti-corruption planning</li> <li>▪ describe three different types of surveys used in corruption diagnostics</li> <li>▪ explain how surveys can be used to identify both administrative corruption and state capture</li> <li>▪ relate the value of political economy analyses to understanding corruption in their own country.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 11 Instruments for assessing corruption</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ describe the uses of a selection of corruption assessment methodologies</li> <li>▪ distinguish between methodologies that assess corruption and ones that assess the strength of integrity mechanisms</li> <li>▪ critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of corruption assessment methodologies, and to adapt them to local needs.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 12 Collecting data</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will be able to</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ outline the uses, advantages and disadvantages of different data collection methods</li> <li>▪ select appropriate data collections methods</li> <li>▪ suggest ways of enhancing the poverty and gender sensitivity of data collection.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 13 Application and reflection</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ be able to design balanced baskets of indicators for a real life case</li> <li>▪ have applied and contextualised the knowledge previously gained in the training to a real life case study</li> <li>▪ be able to suggest 'good practices' applicable to measuring and assessing corruption in a national context.</li> </ul>
<p>Module 14 Learning transfer and evaluation</p> <p><i>After this module, participants will</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ have devised a personal plan for implementing lessons learned in the programme</li> <li>▪ have completed an evaluation form in response to the programme.</li> </ul>

## Module 1

### Introduction to the programme



Activity		Time
Activity	Introductions	15 mins
Activity	Expectations and agenda	15 mins
Activity	Learning methods and facilitation team	10 mins

#### Overview

Module 1 of the training programme is about introductions - of the participants and facilitators, of the objectives of the programme, and of the learning methods. The opening session of a training programme is essential for clarifying expectations and for creating a positive group dynamic as it sets the tone for the remainder of the training.

The first two activities are for personal introductions and expectations, followed by a presentation of the agenda. The last activity is to prepare participants for the active learning methods used in the training.

# Module 1 Introduction to the programme

## Objectives

During this module, the trainer should:

- introduce the objectives of the training programme and invite participant expectations to the training
- make sure all participants introduce themselves and help create a positive group dynamic
- prepare participants for the learning methods used in the programme and select the facilitation team.

## Time

40 minutes

## Description

### **Module overview**

Introductions of the participants and facilitators, of the objectives of the programme, and of the learning methods are essential for creating a positive group dynamic as it sets the tone for the remainder of the training. The module is structured as follows:

### **Activity 1 Introductions**

Participants introduce themselves by milling about the room.

### **Activity 2 Expecations and agenda**

Individual reflection on what participants would like to take away, followed by sharing in plenary and the presentation of the agenda by the trainer.

### **Activity 3 Learning methods and facilitation team**

Mini-lecture by trainer on active learning methods. The group decides whether to form a facilitation team to monitor feedback.

---


### **Activity 1      Introductions** **Format            Milling about the room**

Prepare the activity by posting a selection (e.g. 4-6) of the images around the room. The images can be printed from the [Governance Assessment Portal \(GAP\)](#) training resources page. Give participants the following instructions:

- Take a minute to walk around the room and look at the pictures on the wall. Reflect upon an experience you have had with measurements or assessments. Which of these pictures relates to your personal experience? Select an image you feel most closely relates to your experience and go stand next to it.
- Introduce yourself to the others who gathered around the same image (name, organisation, current area of work, country/region)
- Discuss with the others around you their reason for selecting this image.

Ask each group to present their reasons for selecting this image. Note down on the board or flipchart some of the main themes to emerge. Point out similarities and differences between the themes to emerge, and supplement the participant's input with the observations below.

Many connections can be made between these images and assessments. See *Reference Sheet 1: Interpreting the images* at the end of these instructions. (15 mins)








## **Activity 2      Expectations and agenda**

### **Format      Individual reflection, sharing in plenary, presentation**

Ask participants to return to their chairs and to reflect upon their expectations for the training, and then pass around small pieces of paper for each participant, then follow with instructions:

- Write one thing that you would like to take away from the programme. Hold on to this learning objective so that you can check it again at the end of the programme.




After a brief period of reflection, ask participants to volunteer their learning objectives, noting key words onto a flipchart or board.

Next, turn to the programme agenda, which you can present using either *Reference Sheet 2: Agenda* or PowerPoint. At this point you may also find it useful to present the main objectives of the programme, outlined at the start of the manual. (15 mins)

## **Activity 3      Learning methods and facilitation team**

### **Format      Mini-lecture, plenary decision**



Explain to participants that the programme is based on active learning methods, which focus on experiences and problems to enhance relevance and learning transfer. See *Facilitation note 1: Active learning* below.

You may have decided to use an internal facilitation team to report back participant feedback on the training at the end of each day. If so, now will be the time to select volunteers. For suggestions on this and other facilitation tips, see the *Facilitation notes* section. (10 mins)

# Module One Notes

## Reference Sheet 1: Interpreting the images

The point to highlight is that assessments are sensitive processes because often a great deal is at stake, particularly in the area of corruption. It can have a bearing on development aid, investments, reputations, jobs, and budgets to name a few. Questions such as "What to measure?" "Against what criteria?" and "By whom?" can become highly politicized. Questions like these may emerge from the participants.

At the same time, a key message of the programme is that assessments, when carried out in a transparent, rigorous and participatory manner, can in themselves be tools not only for diagnosing problems and monitoring solutions, but for enhancing the legitimacy of government.

Other possible interpretations of the images relating to the use of indicators which may emerge include:

- indicators tell us if progress is being made or not and give us a direction [e.g. national bribery surveys can indicate institutions that have the greatest corruption problems on the basis of citizen interactions, and areas where interventions should be focused]
- assessment is not just about numbers, but also context
- measurement/assessment is influenced by our perspective – whether we are experts or ordinary citizens, whether they take account of facts vs. opinions.

## Reference Sheet 2: Agenda

Module 1 Introduction to the programme

*Part One: Corruption indicators*

Module 2 Defining corruption

Module 3 Why measure corruption?

Module 4 Composite and original indicators of corruption

Module 5 The challenges of measuring corruption

Module 6 Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators

Module 8 Developing integrity indicators and indices

Module 9 Part One summary and feedback

*Part Two: Corruption assessments*

Module 10 Systemic corruption diagnostics

Module 11 Instruments for assessing corruption


Module 12 Collecting data

Module 13 Application and reflection

Module 14 Learning transfer and evaluation

## Facilitation note 1 : Active learning

This programme uses active learning methods to enhance the learning transfer for participants. Adults learn best when reflecting on experience and when they can readily relate new knowledge to the challenges they face in real life. Therefore many of the activities aimed at developing technical and analytical skills are based on simulated problems that represent these real life challenges, which enable participants to plan how they can apply this knowledge to their work. In practice, active learning methods mean a lot of problem-based small group work, reflection and discussion. Participants need to be aware that the success of these methods relies on their full participation, and that the quality of their learning experience will depend on their level of engagement.



# PART ONE

## CORRUPTION INDICATORS

---

### Overview

Part One of the programme provides the foundations of corruption indicators, by introducing principles of sound indicators and encouraging the development of skills for selecting indicators and creating indices. The rationale is that participants can then build on this understanding, and gain a more critical perspective of measurement tools and approaches which are discussed in the second part of the programme.

---

### Learning objectives

By the end of the first part of the programme, participants will be able to:

- ☑ focus the objectives of corruption assessments
- ☑ design three types of indicators for assessing corruption and anti-corruption interventions
- ☑ effectively utilize global composite indicators and original data (both qualitative and quantitative)
- ☑ assess the methodological, political and operational challenges involved in carrying out corruption assessments
- ☑ design indicators that capture the experiences and perspectives of marginalised groups
- ☑ provide advice on developing a national index and develop scales for quantifying integrity indicators
- ☑ select balanced sets of indicators.

---

Modules		Time
Module 2	Defining corruption	50 mins
Module 3	Why measure corruption?	1 hr
Module 4	Composite and original indicators	1 hr
Module 5	The challenges of measuring corruption	1 hr
Module 6	Poverty and gender sensitive indicators	1 hr
Module 7	Complementarity in the use of indicators	1 hr 25 mins
Module 8	Developing integrity indicators and indices	2 hrs 10 mins
Module 9	Part One summary and feedback	20 mins

## Module 2

### Defining corruption

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Introduction by the trainer	5 mins
Activity 2	Examples of corruption	10 mins
Activity 3	Forms of corruption	30 mins
Activity 4	Corruption indicators	5 mins

#### Introduction

The definition of corruption is highly contentious. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has not defined corruption, but rather singles out specific corrupt practices for which criminalization is either mandatory or optional for States Parties (See *Reference Sheet3: Defining corrupt practices in UNCAC*). In practice, the definition of corruption as the *abuse of entrusted power for private gain* has broad usage, including by UNDP.<sup>1</sup>

However, for measurement purposes, a generic definition is too abstract. The concept of corruption needs to be broken down into context-specific practices in order to be operationalized with indicators. Part of what this means is having a clear idea of what kind of corruption is to be measured. It is worth giving this due consideration early on, as a more specific understanding of the type of corruption and its dynamics can facilitate more targeted data collection.

The purpose of this first substantive module of the programme is therefore for the group of participants to move from a broad notion of corruption towards more specific corrupt practices that are measurable. In addition, participants reflect on the usefulness of analytical typologies such as administrative corruption and state capture for understanding corrupt dynamics and to help them think through the implications for measurement.

---

<sup>1</sup> UNDP (2008) Primer on Corruption and Development

## Module 2 Defining corruption

### Objective

After this module, participants will be able to:

- Explain the need, in measurement, for specifying corrupt practices
- Distinguish administrative corruption from state capture
- Name three types of corruption indicators

### Time

50 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

Participants begin the substantive training by moving from a broad notion of corruption towards more specific corrupt practices, which are measurable. In addition, participants reflect on the usefulness of analytical typologies such as administrative corruption and state capture for understanding corrupt dynamics and to help them think through the implications for measurement. The module is structured as follows:

#### **Activity 1 Introduction by the trainer**

The trainer refers to the overview on the previous page to provide context for the activities.

#### **Activity 2 Examples of corruption**

Participants brainstorm specific examples of corruption.


#### **Activity 3 Forms of corruption**

In small groups, participants use the typologies of grand corruption, state capture, administrative and/or petty corruption to distinguish between the above examples of corruption. Followed by plenary discussion reflecting on the implications of these different types of corruption for measurement.

#### **Activity 4 Corruption indicators**

Mini-lecture introduces three main types of corruption indicators.

Further reading: *The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A primer for development practitioners*, U4 Brief by Jessical Schultz



---

#### **Activity 1 Introduction by the trainer**

##### **Format Mini-lecture**

The trainer introduces the session with the information provided in the Introduction (page 16), to provide the context for the activities, which focus on defining corruption.  
(5 mins)

#### **Activity 2 Examples of corruption**


##### **Format Brainstorm in small groups**

After providing the above introduction to the module, present the focus question and the instructions:

- What are common examples of corruption in your country?


Ask participants to form small groups and to brainstorm and note down as many specific examples of corruption from their own countries and from across society as possible in the time allotted. To make sure they are being specific enough, ask them to think of examples from a role-based perspective, in terms of:

- a. Who asks for or offers payment?
- b. Who benefits from the rents?



(7 minutes)

Distribute *Reference sheet 4: Examples of corruption* to groups for them to contrast their answers. (3 minutes)




### Activity 3 Forms of corruption

#### Format Small groups, plenary discussion

Ask groups to consider a new question in relation to these corruption examples:

- Of these examples, which are of administrative corruption? Which are of state capture?
- Which examples do not fit this typology but are important to measure?

Ask participants to work with their groups to consider the differences between these forms of corruption, by categorizing the examples. Group should note down important aspects distinguishing the forms of corruption. (5 minutes)



Ask a group to volunteer an explanation of the distinction, and for other groups to correct or enhance the definition. Only after this discussion, provide the definitions of administrative corruption and state capture, on *Reference Sheet 5: Forms of corruption* for individuals to read. Invite groups to problematize these definitions:


- In what ways might this distinction be helpful for measurement?
- In what ways might it be inadequate for your context?

(20 minutes)

To debrief, explain that most corruption assessments measure administrative corruption. Ask them to think about why this might be:

- Why do corruption assessments tend to focus on administrative or petty corruption?

See *Reference Sheet 6: Why is petty corruption easier to measure?* for some discussion points on this discussion. (5 minutes)



### Activity 4 Corruption indicators

#### Format Mini-lecture

Present the information on *Reference Sheet 7: Corruption indicators*. The purpose of the mini-lecture is to explain the basic types of corruption indicators and how they relate to the problem above of obtaining hard data of corruption.

Tell participants that this framework will be referred to again later in the programme. (5 minutes)

## Module Two Notes

### Reference sheet 3: Defining corrupt practices in UNCAC

UNCAC makes mandatory the criminalization of the following offences:

- Bribery of national public officials (A.15)
- Bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations (A.16)
- Embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official (A.17)
- Laundering of proceeds of crime (A.23)
- Obstruction of justice (A.25)

Criminalization of the following acts is optional:

- Trading in influence (A.18)
- Abuse of functions (A.19)
- Illicit enrichment (A.20)
- Bribery in the private sector (A.21)
- Embezzlement of property in the private sector (A.22)
- Concealment (A.24)

### Reference sheet 4: Examples of corruption

- Civil servants pay to get access to “wet” jobs – these are jobs that have the greatest extortion possibilities
- Development programmes are “projectized” i.e. disaggregated into projects so that there is always the need for a project officer and administrative budgets to enable the project to be implemented – posts that are often unnecessary
- Fictitious projects are inserted into annual budgets
- Judges take bribes to make favourable judgements or favourable rulings on punishment
- Police earn money from tie-ins with criminal gangs
- The Attorney General’s office extorts money from plaintiffs
- Banks ignore banking regulations to make unsafe loans in return for a share of the loan
- The government bribes MPs in order to get them to pass bills that will allow government officials to receive corrupt income
- Local Government officials bribe MPs to approve their annual accountability report to Parliament so that they can continue with their corrupt practices
- Political parties demand contributions from businesses
- Political parties accept bribes in consideration of their willingness to offer favourable measures once elected
- People pay political parties to allow them to be candidates and thus get access to extortion possibilities
- Local bye-laws in local government areas are for sale
- Taxes and levies legally approved by local government are stolen by the collecting officials and never reach government
- Public service foundations are changed into holding accounts for political parties
- State owned enterprises are used as cash cows for political parties
- Auditors require those being audited to pay for the costs of the audit
- Universities that require bribes to grant degrees
- Schools that require bribes to move children into the next year
- State capture, whereby government officials pass laws that will continue to offer them corrupt possibilities, sanctified by law
- “slush funds” are passed into law by Parliaments
- Stealing of pension funds from workers



- Creation of sham anti-corruption commissions that do not have the interest, the budget, or the legal authority to actually investigate and prosecute corruption.<sup>2</sup>
- A supplier spreads a rumour that there is a shortage in a country of a certain type of good that he/she supplies, in order to receive more money.
- A person chooses to engage her former husband's company in order to make good an old debt from their divorce.
- A cousin is hired despite the fact that he has lower qualifications than other candidates.
- An official is threatened with prosecution for a fabricated crime if he/she does not authorise payments for goods that have not been supplied<sup>3</sup>
- Police demand bribes for minor infractions, or to extort cash from citizens.
- Civil servants demand bribes for routine services.

## Reference sheet 5: Forms of corruption

*The following definitions from the U4 Corruption glossary explain the commonly referred to distinction between petty and grand corruption:*

**"Petty" corruption** (also called administrative or bureaucratic corruption) is the everyday corruption that takes place where bureaucrats meet the public directly. Petty corruption is also described as "survival" corruption ("corruption of need"): a form of corruption which is pursued by junior or mid-level agents who may be grossly underpaid and who depend on relatively small but illegal rents to feed and house their families and pay for their children's education. Although petty corruption usually involves much smaller sums than those that change hands in acts of "grand" or political corruption, the amounts are not "petty" for the individuals adversely affected. Petty corruption disproportionately hurts the poorest members of society, who may experience requests for bribes regularly in their encounters with public administration and services like hospitals, schools, local licensing authorities, police, taxing authorities and so on.<sup>4</sup>

High level or **"grand" corruption** takes place at the policy formulation end of politics. It refers not so much to the amount of money involved as to the level at which it occurs - where policies and rules may be unjustly influenced. The kinds of transactions that attract grand corruption are usually large in scale - and therefore involve more money than bureaucratic or "petty" corruption. Grand corruption is sometimes used synonymously with political corruption.<sup>5</sup>

*For measurement purposes, the more specific analytical distinction between administrative corruption and state capture can be useful for thinking about the actors and dynamics involved in a corrupt transaction.*

**Administrative corruption** is the extent to which firms make illicit and non-transparent payments to public officials in order to alter the prescribed *implementation* of administrative regulations placed by the state on the firm's activities. Through administrative corruption, rents deriving from the discretionary capacity of the state to regulate activities accrue primarily to corrupt public officials.<sup>6</sup>

**State capture** is the extent to which outside interests (firms, mafia networks, others etc.) make illicit and non-transparent private payments to public officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or decrees by state institutions.<sup>7</sup> Alternatively, some firms may have influence they can leverage to obtain favourable rules.<sup>8</sup> The notion of state capture deviates from traditional concepts of corruption, in which a bureaucrat might extort bribes from powerless

<sup>2</sup> Holloway, Richard. *NGO Corruption Fighter' Resource Book – How NGOs can use monitoring and advocacy to fight corruption*

<sup>3</sup> Sida, *Examples of Corruption*, [http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=439&a=1444&language=en\\_US](http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=439&a=1444&language=en_US)

<sup>4</sup> U4 Corruption Glossary, <http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm>

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Hellman et.al (2000) *"Seize the State, Seize the Day" State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition*, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank/European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, p.5

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p.5

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p.6

individuals or companies or politicians themselves steal state assets. State capture is recognised as a most destructive and intractable corruption problem, above all in transition economies with incomplete or distorted processes of democratic consolidation and insecure property rights.<sup>9</sup> Through state capture, rents deriving from the capacity of firms to encode private advantages in the rules of the game as a result of bribes to public officials are shared by firms and the corrupt officials.<sup>10</sup>

*However corrupt practices are context-specific, and while the administrative corruption and state capture distinction may encompass the main corrupt practices, others, such as embezzlement and extortion, may be less easily categorized. This is to say that while the above distinction may add a useful component for analyzing corruption dynamics, countries should use distinctions that are most useful to understanding the nature of corruption in their context.*

*What is important to note is that breaking corruption down to the level of actors and dynamics is necessary in order to think through how best to measure specific practices and their impacts.*

#### Reference sheet 6: Why is administrative corruption easier to measure?

Most perception-based corruption assessments measure primarily administrative corruption.<sup>11</sup>

For various reasons, petty and administrative corruption tend to be easier to observe:

- The power of the bribe payer varies in petty corruption. In one situation he/she may be able to leverage money or influence to speed up a services for instance, while in another he/she may be the victim of extortion. To a greater or lesser extent, both situations involve a level of victimization as opposed to profiteering, which may be easier to ask people about.
- Petty corruption is normally more frequent, based on people's interaction with frontline services. There are more opportunities in a bureaucracy to distort rules than to shape them.
- State capture requires collusion for profit sharing which gives benefiting parties an incentive to cover up for each other. It also can happen almost entirely within the state, further removed from public scrutiny.
- State capture, because it involves generating access to rents which continue to be profitable over time, tends to involve large scale transactions; whereas administrative or petty corruption tends to involve smaller sums. Given what is at stake, there are likely to be greater efforts at concealment.

It is important to be aware of this fact and to avoid the trap of measuring things because they are easy to measure. Collecting data on state capture is covered in Part Two of the programme.

---

<sup>9</sup> U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Glossary <http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm#statecapture>

<sup>10</sup> Hellman et.al (2000) "Seize the State, Seize the Day" *State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition*, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank/European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, p.6

<sup>11</sup> Knack, Stephen. (2006) *Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross Country Indicators*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968, p.3

## Reference sheet 7: Corruption indicators

A governance indicator (or in this case, a corruption indicator) is a quantitative or qualitative measure of performance that is used to demonstrate change, and which details the extent to which results are being or have been achieved.<sup>12</sup> Broader measures, such as statistics on the number of women in parliament, are well suited to hypothesis testing. For anti-corruption planning, narrower measures are needed to track progress over time.<sup>13</sup>

Corruption indicators normally assess one of three aspects:<sup>14</sup>

1. The incidence of corrupt transactions
2. The impact of corruption
3. The existence and effectiveness of integrity mechanisms believed to affect the prevalence of those transactions

Take for example the situation of a police officer demanding a bribe. Possible indicators for this case could include:

1. The frequency of bribe payments
2. The value of bribe payments of individuals in poor neighbourhoods as a proportion of their weekly income
3. The existence of safe reporting mechanisms, in addition to evidence of the proportion of sanctions or prosecutions in relation to registered complaints

---

<sup>12</sup> International Network on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, *Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Indicators Glossary*  
<http://www.inece.org/indicators/glossary/glossary2.php?cat=k>


<sup>13</sup> Knack, Stephen. (2006) *Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross Country Indicators*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968, p.12-13

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p.11



## Module 3

### Why measure corruption?



Activities		Time
Activity 1	Introduction by the trainer	5 mins
Activity 2	Uses of corruption assessments	30 mins
Activity 3	Monitoring compliance with UNCAC	15 mins
Activity 4	Implications for national corruption assessments	20 mins

---

**Introduction and overview**

---

Few would disagree on the ultimate goal of assessing corruption - to inform efforts to combat it. Uncertainties over how best to assess corruption are to some extent driven by the vast diversity of approaches that exist, and the different purposes they serve.

Assessment anxiety has been complicated in some cases by the addition of an UNCAC reporting mechanism which itself asks countries to explain the systems used for evaluating their compliance. The UNCAC *self-assessment checklist* that States Parties are obliged to complete is intended to help countries to assess their own progress and technical assistance needs. Many countries are now grappling with how best to link the processes of nationally led assessments and UNCAC reporting, in order to maximize their corruption and anti-corruption assessment capacities.

A reasonable point of departure can be for countries to clarify how they intend to use corruption assessments, since this affects their choice of methods. This module explores some of the possible uses of corruption assessments and asks participants to relate these to their own context.

## Module 3 Why measure corruption?

### Objective

After this module, participants will be able to:

- explain two general purposes that corruption measurement have been used for
- provide at least five objectives a country may wish to achieve through corruption assessments
- identify which functions of corruption assessments are most relevant to their own country context(s)
- identify the links between national corruption monitoring efforts and the UNCAC self-assessment process.

### Time

1 hour 10 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

In this module, participants consider the different purposes that corruption assessments can serve. This is followed by a discussion on the UNCAC self-assessment process. The module is structured as follows:

#### **Activity 1 Introduction**

The trainer introduces the module.

#### **Activity 2 Uses of corruption assessments**

Participants brainstorm this question in small groups, and discuss which purpose corruption assessments serve (past or future) in their country.


#### **Activity 3 Monitoring compliance with UNCAC**

The trainer delivers a mini-lecture on the UNCAC review mechanism, focusing on the self-assessment tool.

#### **Activity 4 Implications for national corruption assessments**

Plenary discussion whereby participants reflect on the extent to which corruption monitoring efforts in their country link to wider anti-corruption strategies or processes, such as the UNCAC self-assessment.

Further reading:  
[United Nations Convention Against Corruption \(UNCAC\)](#)




---

#### **Activity 1 Introduction**

##### **Format Mini-lecture**

The trainer introduces the session with the information provided in the Introduction (page 23), to provide the context for the activities, which focus on the different purposes that corruption assessments can serve.  
(5 mins)




#### **Activity 2 Uses of corruption assessments**

##### **Format Brainstorm in small groups, plenary discussion**


Begin by explaining the rationale for this module, using the above introduction, then start the activity by presenting the focus question:

- What are corruption assessments used for?

Ask participants to get into small groups and brainstorm for no more than five minutes, recording their responses on paper. See *Facilitation note 8: Brainstorming*.



In plenary, take up suggestions, one idea from each group, until there is nothing new to add. Supplement the ideas from the participants with the following thoughts, on PowerPoint or in a handout. See *Reference Sheet 8: Uses of corruption assessments*. (15 mins)



Ask a follow up question in plenary:

- Which of these uses of corruption assessments is most important in your country's context? Why?

Discuss in group, encouraging each participant to contribute information on their country background (if from different countries). This may lead to debate that you can probe and facilitate if all are from the same country. (15 mins)

### Activity 3 Monitoring compliance with UNCAC

#### Format Mini-lecture

Begin by taking a poll of the number of participants in the room either:

- a. whose country has ratified the UNCAC and has completed or is in the process of self-assessing its compliance
- b. who have direct experience with the UNCAC the self-assessment tool specifically



Ask any members with familiarity to elaborate on their country's experience, and invite them again to add their perspective after the mini-lecture. Use *Reference Sheet 9: The UNCAC self-assessment process* to give a mini-lecture. (15 mins)

### Activity 4 Implications for national corruption assessments


#### Format Plenary discussion

Wrap up the module by facilitating a group discussion about what this new reporting commitment means for existing and new corruption monitoring efforts.

Ask the following questions:

- What corruption monitoring efforts have taken place or regularly take place in your country? To what extent are they linked to an overarching strategy to combat corruption?
- How is corruption monitoring harmonized with the UNCAC self-assessment checklist or wider review mechanism in your country? For example, do these monitoring practices currently feed into the UNCAC self-assessment checklist? Has the UNCAC self-assessment highlighted any gaps in the area of monitoring which should be prioritised?

Listen to participants, noting and summing up the main similarities and differences in challenges and approaches in relation to monitoring UNCAC. Note that discussions on national corruption diagnostics will continue in Module 10. (20 mins)



## Module Three Notes

### Reference Sheet 8: The uses of corruption assessments

At the broadest level, a distinction between corruption assessment tools can be made between ones which are used for global or regional benchmarking and ones which are tailored to a specific context.

Reasons for setting trans-national benchmarks (although this is of course done at the sub-national level), tend to relate ranking performance. Ranking has been used to identify change over time, in order to achieve the following objectives:

- Naming and shaming governments and actors seen to be the worst corruption offenders
- Identifying good practices
- Praising good performance and promoting a virtuous cycle of competition
- Informing decisions about aid allocations
- Informing investment decisions

For national corruption fighting purposes, context-specific information is required. At the national or sub-national levels, corruption assessments may be used for:

- Understanding the drivers of corruption and the blockages to reform (e.g. political economies)
- Assessing the functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms
- Understanding the factors underlying well-functioning accountability policies, mechanisms and practices
- Developing anti-corruption strategies and coordinated policies
- Identifying capacity gaps
- Strengthening existing monitoring systems
- Understanding the impact of corruption, for example on marginalised groups, and on business

So while the long-term goal of measurement in the area of corruption is ultimately to combat it, there many complementary objectives along the way. In the coming modules we consider the implications these purposes have for selecting assessment methods.



## Reference Sheet 9: The UNCAC self-assessment process

The *UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)* was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 31 October 2003, and entered into force on 14 December 2005. To date, it has been signed by 140 countries and ratified by 132 State Parties.

The UNCAC breaks new ground in the fight against corruption, as the first global legally binding anti-corruption instrument. The Convention provides common standards for national policies, institutions and practices in the areas of preventing corruption and criminalization and law enforcement. Recognizing the transnational nature of corruption, it provides a framework for international cooperation and asset recovery. It also enshrines need for capacity development to meet these standards, through technical assistance and information exchange.

The Convention does not provide a definition of corruption due to the difficulty of reaching agreement on what the concept covers. The decision was therefore made to focus instead on specific actions that are seen as corrupt everywhere, such as embezzlement and bribery. Although not all actions are considered mandatory for criminalization, it obliges states to criminalize active bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation and diversion of property, money laundering and obstruction of justice (Art.15-17, 23, 25).

The UNCAC is not only a technical guide for targeted anti-corruption measures, but a comprehensive development and governance framework, because it links corruption to sustainable development, national stability, human security, democracy and the rule of law.

The *Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption (COSP)* is the body named by the Convention to improve the capacity of and cooperation between States parties to achieve the objectives set forth in the convention, focusing on periodic reviews, and to make recommendations for improvement (art. 63, paras. 1 and 4 (e) and (f)). While the Convention has established the principle of Review, the COSP is mandated to decide the means to best achieve this.

At its first module in December 2006 in Jordan, States parties outlined key principles and considerations for the establishment of a *Review Mechanism*:

- Transparent and efficient
- Non-intrusive, inclusive and impartial
- Should not produce any form of ranking
- Should provide opportunities to share good practices and challenges
- Should complement existing international and regional review mechanisms in order that the Conference may, as appropriate, cooperate with them and avoid duplication of effort.<sup>15</sup>

Civil society has also made recommendations to the review mechanism, calling for the active participation of non-state stakeholders in the review mechanism. Article 13 of UNCAC, which promotes civil society participation in anti-corruption efforts, should equally apply to monitoring of implementation; although civil society can also play a role outside the formal review process through shadow reporting on state progress.<sup>16</sup>

The review mechanism must therefore overcome both strategic and operational challenges. It must balance concerns for sovereignty and state ownership and political acceptability across a broad range of parties, and a meaningful role for civil society; as well as meeting the need for adequate and sustained funding and technical assistance, a mechanism that is simple and cost-effective and which avoids duplication with other reporting mechanisms.<sup>17</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> *Resolution 1/1 of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption*, UNODC, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session1-resolutions.html>

<sup>16</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> *ibid.*

Possible methods for review mechanism are being tested by 28 countries in a Pilot Review Programme, from which the following monitoring options emerged:

- A self-assessment covering all mandatory and non-mandatory provisions contained in the UNODC checklist
- A review by an expert group, emphasizing dialogue between reviewed countries and the group of experts
- Elements of peer review to foster regional dialogue and to provide benchmarks for comparable contexts
- Country visits by experts to validate findings, subject to agreement of countries under review
- Full discretion ensured throughout the entire process, justified by its voluntary nature<sup>18</sup>

#### *Monitoring the corruption monitoring systems*

The Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption has yet to decide on the exact parameters of the review mechanism. It will monitor progress at the macro level against the standards contained within the Convention, but clearly, it will not be a substitute for a government's internal monitoring system. Furthermore, part of what will be monitored by the eventual review mechanism processes is the effectiveness of national corruption assessment and monitoring capacities.

The Convention itself is concerned with the existence and functioning of systems for assessing the effectiveness of individual provisions. Article 5 of the UNCAC explicitly acknowledges the need for capacity to monitor corruption interventions by mandating countries to undertake *periodic evaluations of legal and administrative measures put in place to combat corruption* (A.5; 3). Related provisions (art. 61) also assert the need for technical assistance and information exchange in this area.

#### *The Self-Assessment Checklist*

While the exact features of the review mechanism have yet to be finalised, the self-assessment checklist will likely remain at the heart of the process. It consists of a set of questions for every UNCAC provision under review and is completed through a computer-based tool.

While the UNCAC self-assessment checklist launched in 2007 was limited to asking about compliance with certain provisions of the Convention, UNODC is in the process of developing an Omnibus Survey Software designed to cover all substantive provisions of UNCAC, the UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) and the Protocols thereto. Its concern is with overall compliance, and it therefore investigates capacity gaps, by asking responding countries about their experience in implementation and outstanding needs. The software asks about compliance with individual provisions. When prompted by a positive response, it follows up by requesting successful examples of implementation and criteria for assessment. Therefore, part of what the enhanced self-assessment checklist will do is to “monitor the monitoring systems”, by prompting the user to explain how their country assesses the effectiveness of measures taken to implement the provision under revision. Furthermore, it already probes about challenges faced in implementing individual provisions and needs for technical assistance. In this way, the software is seen to be an integral tool for learning and capacity development within and between countries that is seen as pivotal to implementing UNCAC.

#### *What does UNCAC mean for the way countries assess corruption?*

One of the challenges countries face in implementing the UNCAC framework is knowing where to begin. Often, the case is such that it would not be feasible to progress in all areas simultaneously. The temptation can be strong to undertake too many disconnected anti-corruption reforms at once, rather than prioritising and sequencing reforms as part of an overarching strategy.<sup>19</sup> Country-led assessments of the environment enabling corruption or integrity can mitigate this pitfall by providing the in-depth and contextualised evidence needed to make these strategic decisions. (Discussed in Module 10).

---

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> U4. *Anti-corruption policy making in practice: Implications for implementing UNCAC*, CMI Brief, January 2008, <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/72915=anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice>

In addition, many tools and instruments exist which can provide the more focused assessments needed for individual sectors and institutions and for monitoring the experiences and perceptions of the public. These approaches can be highly valuable references when devising nationally and locally relevant indicators. The challenge is for individual countries to consider how best to utilise these resources and to integrate them into overall UNCAC reporting.



## Module 4

### Composite and original indicators of corruption

Activities		Time
<i>Part A</i>	<i>What do composite indices measure?</i>	
Activity 1	Discrepancies in ranking	10 mins
Activity 2	Disaggregation exercise	20 mins
Activity 3	Component indicators	10 mins
Activity 4	Composite and original indicators	5 mins
<i>Part B</i>	<i>Actionable indicators</i>	
Activity 5	The need for actionable indicators	10 mins
Activity 6	Identifying actionable indicators	20 mins
Activity 7	Action-worthy indicators	20 mins
Activity 8	Determining what is action-worthy	10 mins

#### Background

Multi-country measurement tools have sometimes been treated as an overly accurate reflection of corruption levels within a country, whether by donors in making decisions about aid, by international corporations making risk assessments for investment, or by governments wanting to improve their rankings.

For governments, the logical question after receiving a low ranking becomes “Why did we get this particular score and what do we need to do to improve levels of corruption?” But these questions are not so easily answered by these indices, because scores are calculated on the basis of so many types of second-hand information sources, many of which change from year to year.

A major problem for understanding scores is that composite indicators combine multiple data sources. Some, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the World Bank’s Governance Matters index mix as many as 14 and 25 data sources respectively – data sources which themselves are often composites. So while such indices are useful in signalling worsening corruption situations or reflecting overall improvements over long periods of time, they are limited in their usefulness to national actors as planning tools. For countries to combat the problem of corruption, they need much more information than a single indicator - information they need to obtain by undertaking their own regular assessments based on indicators that are not only actionable but action-worthy.

This module challenges participants to find out for themselves the uses and limitations of global datasets, and to begin to think through the implications the objectives discussed in the previous module have for their country assessment needs.

## Module 4

## Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- explain why global composite indicators sometimes rank the same countries differently
- contrast the strengths and limitations of both global composite indicators and “second generation” measurement approaches
- identify data that is actionable
- explain the benefits and limitations of actionable data.

### Time

1 hour 45 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

This module challenges participants to find out for themselves the uses and limitations of global datasets, and makes the case for countries to generate their own data. In **Part A** participants examine the reasons why there are sometimes discrepancies between country rankings on indices purporting to measure the same thing, and discuss the different uses of composite and original data. In **Part B** participants observe the difference between actionable and non-actionable data and discuss the additional criterion for data to be action-worthy. This is a packed module which requires highly organized facilitation from the trainer.

#### ***Part A What do composite corruption indices measure?***

##### **Activity 1 Discrepancies in ranking**

This is observed in a warmer in small groups, which is followed by an input session by the trainer, explaining why these discrepancies happen.

##### **Activity 2 Disaggregation exercise**

Participants work in small groups to find out what different indices actually measure, and discuss in plenary.

##### **Activity 3 Component indicators**

The trainer delivers an illustrative mini-lecture on the component indicators of the CPI. Plenary reflection on questions to ask in order to better understand composite indicators.

##### **Activity 4 Composite and original indicators**

In small groups, participants reflect on the uses and limitations of composite indicators. They then read a short summary on “first and second generation indicators” which forms the basis of a plenary discussion.

#### ***Part B Actionable indicators***

##### **Activity 5 The need for actionable indicators**

Participants discuss in plenary how corruption indicators actually get used in their country/ies, and reflect on what makes them more or less useful in policy making and anti-corruption planning. Illustrates the advantages of “actionable” indicators.

##### **Activity 6 Identifying actionable indicators**

Exercise done in pairs and taken up in plenary.

##### **Activity 7 Action-worthy indicators**

Brief poll taken in plenary, followed by a discussion in small groups questioning the limitations of the notion of actionable indicators, and introduces the buzzword of “action-worthy”. Ends with large group discussion.

##### **Activity 8 Determining what is action-worthy**

Further Reading: “What makes a good governance indicator?” from *How to do country-led governance assessments* on UNDP’s [Governance Assessments Portal](#)

Discussion in small groups about how to determine and monitor action-worthy interventions.


---

## **Part A What do composite corruption indices measure?**

### **Activity 1 Discrepancies in ranking**

#### **Format Warmer in small groups, trainer input**

Explain the purpose of the exercise, which for now is just to observe. Give the instructions before asking participants to execute them.




Ask participants to get into small groups, and give each group a set of worksheets (*Annex 1*) containing three global ranking indicator sets related to corruption (2007):

- 1) the World Bank's *Worldwide Corruption Indicators* on 'Control of Corruption',
- 2) Transparency International's *Corruption Perceptions Index* (CPI), and
- 3) the Global Integrity Index.

Ask participants the following question:

- Note the position of China, Thailand and India on each index. What do you observe?

Groups should agree that the rankings differ from index to index. (10 minutes)



Continue with the PowerPoint slides to make this discrepancy explicit with visual illustrations (see *Annex 1* for talking points). After the PowerPoint presentation, ask groups to brainstorm on the following question:

- Why might China rank differently on these corruption indices?

Ask each group to summarize in one sentence its feedback to the group. (10 mins)

### **Activity 2 Disaggregation exercise**



#### **Format Small groups, sharing in plenary**

Participants can now dig a little deeper into this puzzle by observing the component indicators and data sources for each ranking. Distribute the worksheets containing this information (*Annex 1*).

Ask participants to review this material and to find an explanation for why China ranks differently on the 3 indices. Some questions can be introduced to guide the investigation:

- What is each index measuring? What types of indicators make up the composite score for each index? What types of data make up each component indicator?

Note the main points of feedback on a flipchart. Ask the group as a whole to volunteer some plausible explanations – there is no need to cover all possibilities comprehensively, just to get a few ideas from the floor. (20 mins)




### **Activity 3 Component indicators**


#### **Format Mini-lecture, short plenary discussion**

Deliver a mini-lecture illustrating with the CPI the component sources and indicators of the index, and exploring the methodological weak spots (See *Annex 1* for PowerPoint talking points). (10 minutes)

End the lecture with a question to the group:

- What lesson or advice can you take from this disaggregation? Phrase your advice as questions that users should ask themselves.






Take suggestions from the group and note them on a board or flipchart. Add that there is consensus that *no single indicator can completely summarize the state of corruption in a country*. See *Reference Sheet 10: Advice for understanding indicators* for a list of potential questions to supplement those generated by participants. (10 minutes)

#### Activity 4 Composite and original indicators

##### Format Small groups, individual reading, plenary discussion

Explain to groups that while they have now observed one of the puzzles that composite indicators produce, but that these types of indicators were devised to respond to several methodological and practical problems and continue to be useful in these purposes.




Ask small groups to brainstorm the following two questions:

- What are the advantages and the disadvantages of composite indicators?
- What are the alternatives to indices?

Ask groups to note their responses. (5 minutes)

After the group brainstorm, distribute *Reference Sheet 11: First and second generation measurement tools* to each participant. Ask participants to read the summary, and to contrast this information with the thinking of their group. Participants may wish to remain in small groups to read, to continue discussing afterwards. (10 minutes)



To summarize, in plenary, ask volunteers to give answers to the following:

- What are the main advantages of composite indicators?
- What are the main advantages of original indicators?
- What are alternatives to quantitative assessments?

(5 minutes)

#### Part B Actionable indicators


##### Activity 5 The need for actionable indicators

##### Format Warmer in plenary, continued discussion

Ask participants to think about how they or others use corruption data in their work:

- How are corruption indicators used in your country? (e.g. for policy making in a specific sector)

List the different examples that participants provide on a flipchart. Observe, for example, to what extent they are used in policy or programming, or whether they are more important in relation to determining aid allocations. (5 minutes)




Continue the discussion by asking them:

- What makes an indicator useful for each of these purposes? In your experience, are some indicators more or less useful than others?

Continue to note ideas down, and to point out summarize the views of participants. After participants have exhausted new ideas, use *Reference Sheet 12: The need for actionable indicators* to define (and possibly to introduce) the term "actionable indicators". (10 minutes)





## Activity 6 Identifying actionable indicators

### Format Pair work, sharing in plenary

Distribute the worksheet for this activity (*Annex 1*). Explain that these are indicators that have been drawn from the component sources of the three global corruption indices examined in the first part of the module. Ask participants to look at the indicators on the sheet and to consider the following questions:

- Which, if any, of these indicators is actionable? (In the sense that it is possible to use this information to inform policy or programme changes.)

Invite participants to relate their views to their own experiences. Participants can discuss in pairs or with those people sitting immediately nearby.

In plenary, elicit answers. Refer to *Annex 1* for the answer sheet. (20 mins)

## Activity 7 Action-worthy indicators

### Format Plenary discussion, small groups, sharing in plenary

Before ending the module, participants need a chance to problematize the idea of actionable indicators. Begin by discussing the following question:

- Do you find the concept of actionable indicators useful? To what extent is it already a feature of corruption assessments in your country?

After collecting feedback from volunteers, encourage a more critical discussion by asking them to reflect on part of a quotation by Albert Einstein:




- "Not everything that can be counted counts."

Take a moment to check whether participants understand the literal meaning of the phrase. [e.g. the word "to count" has a double meaning, including *to matter*. If something "counts" it is significant.] Once the meaning is clear, consider how the statement relates to the concept of actionable indicators.

Continue the discussion, if need be, with the following question:

- What are the pitfalls of actionable indicators?

Allow participants to reflect or discuss in small groups if need be. In plenary, note the main discussion points to emerge from each group on the board, and supplement with the points in *Reference Sheet 13: Action-worthy indicators*. (20 minutes)



## Activity 8 Determining what is action-worthy

### Format Small groups, sharing in plenary

Ask participants to continue working in their small groups and to consider their thoughts on the following two questions:

- How does a country determine what is action-worthy?
- Are there limitations on the ability to know whether a given initiative is worthy of new or continued action?

Ask groups to note their feedback on flipchart paper and to explain two most important thoughts on each point. See *Reference Sheet 14: Determining what is action-worthy*. (10 minutes)

## Session Four Notes

### Reference Sheet 10: Advice for understanding indicators

The key to using indicators correctly is to understand the methodology behind the index. There is no shortcut, it requires reading the boring background documents, and even contacting the authors of the index. Here are some questions to ask yourself:

- What aspect of corruption is being measured?
- What is the component data that makes up this indicator?
- How many sources are used?
- When and how was the data collected?
- What are the sources of information? (e.g. local experts? International business people? public opinion?)
- How many countries are ranked year by year?
- What is the data coverage for each country?
- Was the same method followed each year?

Remember, no single indicator can adequately summarize all aspects of a country's performance in fighting corruption!

## Reference Sheet 11: First and second generation measurement tools

Efforts to measure corruption began to take off in the late 1990s. This followed the consensus agreed at Monterrey (1996) to prioritize anti-corruption and good governance for achieving the Millennium Development Goals, by attaching country performance in these areas to aid allocation.<sup>20</sup> Transparency International had released its groundbreaking Corruption Perceptions index in 1995, ranking “180 countries by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys.”<sup>21</sup> Its main aim was to raise alarm on the worst corruption offenders, and in this it has had great success. The World Bank Institute followed with its Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which produced multiple composite indices (which it calls “indicators”) that summarize performance on different aspects of governance, including on Control of Corruption.

Both the CPI and the WGI are composite indicators, meaning they combine already existing indicators into a single index. There are several reasons why indicators are aggregated into composite indices. First, some data sources, such as surveys that focus on corrupt transactions between business people and government officials, on their own may cast the conceptual net too narrowly. Second, this is a way of reducing measurement error, which the error that occurs when, for example, survey responses do not reflect reality for the wider population. It can be random, or it can reflect a systematic bias.<sup>22</sup> The rationale here is, assuming that errors in measurement are independent across sources (e.g. they don’t consult the same sources), that combining various data sources can cancel out these random errors. Third, combining data sources for different regions makes it possible to widen country coverage, where for instance the purpose is to generate global comparisons.<sup>23</sup>

However, as the disaggregation exercise revealed, composite indicators have their limits. A major problem is understanding what these indicators mean, which is rooted in their aggregation of sources. Some indices, such as Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators combine as many as 14 and 25 data sources respectively – data sources which themselves are often composites. By combining sources that cover different aspects of corruption, their conceptual clarity is reduced. Corruption gets defined implicitly through operationalization, based on what measures are available to include in the conceptual basket. Furthermore, because not all data sources cover all of the same countries, definitions of corruption are inconsistent across countries. Second, the issue of inconsistent data coverage makes it difficult to compare country ratings without also comparing the underlying data sources. It also makes comparability over time difficult, because some data sources are discontinued and new ones become available. Even if one were to deconstruct the data to compare countries for each overlapping source, this would be difficult because the underlying sources are not available in all cases.<sup>24</sup> Third, the assumption that by aggregating sources, measurement error is reduced is misleading because it is not unusual for component indicators to refer to the same sources. This reduces the confidence in inferences that can be made about a country’s improved performance, because sources need to be independent for confirmatory results to be valid.<sup>25</sup> A fundamental criticism of composite indicators is that their reliance on third-party data, all focusing on various aspects of governance and corruption, reduces the conceptual clarity of what is actually being measured.<sup>26</sup> And while the authors of these instruments provide thorough explanations of their methods, making sense of ratings would be a costly and time consuming exercise that requires fully disaggregating the data. As red flags and as tools for aid allocation that make broad comparisons they are useful, but they were not designed for informing policy.

---

<sup>20</sup> Heller, Nathaniel. (2008) *Defining and measuring corruption: where have we come from, where are we, and what matters for the future?* Conference paper, p.1 <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/hotsites/seges/clad/documentos/hellern.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> Transparency International, TI Corruption Perceptions Index, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi)

<sup>22</sup> OECD Statistics Glossary, <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/search.asp>

<sup>23</sup> Knack, Stephen. (2006) *Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross Country Indicators*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968, p.15

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p.18

<sup>25</sup> Ibid p.20-21

<sup>26</sup> Heller, Nathaniel. (2008) *Defining and measuring corruption: where have we come from, where are we, and what matters for the future?* Conference paper, p.3 <http://www.planejamento.gov.br/hotsites/seges/clad/documentos/hellern.pdf>

A “second generation”<sup>27</sup> of measurement tools was developed to respond to these methodological problems, and importantly, that of making corruption measurements useful to local stakeholders. These tools had in common that they “explicitly avoided trying to measure corruption itself and instead sought to measure its opposite: good governance, anti-corruption, and accountability mechanisms.”<sup>28</sup> They also tended to consult local experts and to use original data, rather than to refer to third-party sources. Among these were purely qualitative political economy analyses of anti-corruption systems such as Transparency International’s National Integrity Systems, sector specific approaches such as Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS), as well as sector focused indices, such as the Open Budget Index; approaches such as the Global Integrity country assessments and Index, which combined qualitative and quantitative approaches; as well as household and business surveys of experiences with corruption such as the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) by the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.<sup>29</sup>

In contrast to composite indicators of corruption, original indicators can provide data that can easily be disaggregated and used by local stakeholders. However, the trade-off is that a high degree of contextualization makes cross-country comparisons difficult. Furthermore, comparability over time necessitates consistent repetition of methods which can be prohibitively costly.

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.3

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.3

## Reference Sheet 12: The need for actionable indicators

**An actionable indicator** is one in which data allows disaggregation to pinpoint bottlenecks and inefficiencies within the public administration and within wider systems of accountability and indicate the need for corrective action. Data needs to be specific and localised, including locally-generated, and regularly collected to be actionable for policymaking and planning. In addition data should be able to correctly attribute change to policy initiatives and tell to what extent observed changes are the results of government actions, or caused by external factors. In practice, this means these indicators tend to measure "specific things under the control of policymakers," such as the statutory rules governing the business environment, measures of civil service recruitment and turnover practices, and specifics of budget procedures.<sup>30</sup>

### *The need for locally generated original data*

A significant challenge for planning and monitoring for combating corruption is accessing relevant measures. Research carried out for UNDP and Global Integrity's *Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption* found that policymakers around the world have expressed frustration over the limited usefulness of global composite indicators in making decisions on anti-corruption interventions.<sup>31</sup> And, as we have discussed, most (global) composite indicators have not been designed for this purpose. Their frequent reliance on external expert or investor opinion lacks local perspective and specificity that is needed for national benchmarking and monitoring. In other words, measurements that do not tell us what needs to be fixed can only be of limited value to countries seeking to combat corruption.

Some indices however, such as those conducted for Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer, that are drawn from national information sources, naturally provide more detailed information for basing policy and programming decisions and for tracking progress and identifying setbacks. This underscores the need for countries to have a clear overview of, and access to, existing and regularly generated local data that can be used for policymaking and programme planning. However, even where such sources exist they are not always fit for purpose.

The ability to realize the need for actionable indicators therefore requires locally generated, original data (e.g. collected by field researchers) that is tailored to national corruption assessment priorities.

## Reference Sheet 13: Action-worthy indicators

For all the benefits that actionable indicators offer in terms of policymaking and correcting, they are no panacea for corruption measurement. But they can be extremely useful, bearing in mind several important caveats, best summarized by Kaufmann:

"Simply because something can be measured does not mean that it is an important constraint on good governance. In short, not all "actionable" indicators need also be "action-worthy". To illustrate, one can measure whether or not a country has an independent anticorruption commission, but we know that this is no guarantee that in any particular country the creation of such a commission would help to reduce corruption. Alternatively, we can in principle measure the speed of judicial proceedings, but it is not clear that increasing the speed will lead to greater justice being done.

A further risk of highly specific actionable indicators is one of "teaching to the test", or worse, "reform illusion". The particular things that governments or aid agencies choose to measure might be areas amenable to quick action. But these actions may not be mirrored in other –rather important– areas not specifically covered by such "actionable" indicators, and thus such partial actions, while subject to "actionable" measurement, may not end up making a significant difference on outcomes.

<sup>30</sup> Kaufmann and Kraay. (2007) On Measuring Governance: Framing the Issues for Debate. Issues paper for Roundtable on Measuring Governance Hosted by the World Bank Institute and the Development Economics Vice-Presidency of The World Bank, p.6, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=961624](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961624)

<sup>31</sup> Global Integrity/UNDP. (2008) *A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption*, [http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users\\_guide\\_measuring\\_corruption.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users_guide_measuring_corruption.pdf)

Thus, there is a need to focus on 'action-worthy' indicators instead, ensuring not only that the indicator refers to actions that are likely to really matter, but also that the set is sufficiently comprehensive to avoid 'tunnel vision' focusing on easy actions ('low hanging fruits') -- leaving pending many difficult reforms which are crucial for impact."<sup>32</sup>

#### Reference Sheet 14: Determining what is what is action-worthy

How does a country determine what is action-worthy?

Action-worthy indicators are based on interventions that are known to be beneficial. This means first identifying anti-corruption interventions that are considered to be important, and which have clear standards.

The other side of actionability is attribution. When indicators register improvement or back stepping in performance, this should in theory be easy to trace back to policy inputs. Attributing improvements to a specific intervention helps to decide whether the given intervention is indeed worthy of further investment. Policymaking and planning needs to be guided by these two forward and backward looking processes.

In practice, tracking action-worthy interventions with indicators involves first identifying what is action-worthy, and providing sustained resourcing to systematically track progress over time.

- Prior research: How do we know what actions are worthy? The ability to select and design indicators that are action-worthy assumes knowledge of what causes corruption, and what determines successful anti-corruption interventions for a specific context. This requires a different kind of research that looks how political institutions and processes and economic system influence each other. For example, setting up an anti-corruption commission may help fight corruption in some cases, but may hinder reform in others. So designing related performance indicators only makes sense if the intervention is deemed appropriate for the country in the first place. Countries that wish to monitor and evaluate specific anti-corruption interventions may need to undertake systemic diagnostic assessments first [See Module 10].
- Sustained resourcing: The behavioural, organizational and social changes that anti-corruption reforms seek to nourish take time. In addition, action-worthy indicators are useless if data is not collected regularly and systematically, to enable baselines to be established and progress or regress to be detected through monitoring. Countries need therefore to allocate sufficient resources for diagnostics as well as for ongoing monitoring when planning corruption assessments.

It is important to appreciate that there are limitations on the ability to attribute positive or negative changes to specific policy or project inputs, and therefore to ascertain with full confidence the worth of these interventions. However, despite the difficulty of isolating the impact of individual interventions from the vast range of factors that influence corruption, other factors, such as a change in leadership, donor pressure, additional financial or human resources, need to be considered.

---

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. pg. 6

## Module 5

### The challenges of measuring corruption

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Measuring corruption brainstorm	40 mins
Activity 2	The challenges of measuring corruption	20 mins

#### Overview

The last module made the case for assessments that are useful for planning and policymaking, by gathering local actionable and action-worthy data. The current module turns to the practical challenges associated with assessing corruption. For example, how does one go about measuring a phenomenon that is by its very nature hidden? The group now reflects on the general methodological, political and operational obstacles to assessing corruption. Tips are offered for overcoming some these challenges now and later in the programme, but mostly participants use the module to discuss with peers options for addressing these challenges in the shorter and longer term.

## Module 5

## The challenges of measuring corruption

### Objective

After this module, participants will be able to:

- identify methodological, political and operational challenges that matter for measuring corruption in their country context.

### Time

1 hour

### Description

#### **Overview**



In this module the group reflects on the general methodological, political and operational obstacles to assessing corruption.

#### **Activity 1 Measuring corruption brainstorm**

Participants consider the challenges of measuring corruption, first on their own, then comparing within a small group, and finally in plenary, where ideas are consolidated.

#### **Activity 2 The challenges of measuring corruption**

Individual reading of a brief summary of the challenges. Participants reflect on the challenges that are most relevant to their context, and discuss in small groups ways of addressing these. Brief plenary discussion to wrap up.



#### **Activity 1 Measuring corruption brainstorm**

##### **Format Grouping exercise (individual, small group, plenary)**

Set the context with the above introduction, and present the focus question:

- What challenges are involved in measuring corruption?

Give individuals 3 minutes to reflect on their knowledge and experiences and to write their own lists. (3 minutes)

Next, ask participants to get into small groups and to share their lists. They can do this by taking turns to read their top two challenges, until their ideas are exhausted. As they read off their lists, they should write each example onto a small sheet of paper provided by the facilitator (e.g. large enough to be seen on a wall). After they have finished writing their examples, ask groups to consider:

- Of the challenges you have listed, which do you consider to be the most important? Stack the papers in order of importance. (7 minutes)

The third stage is consolidating the ideas of all the groups on the wall. Rather than asking each group to post all of its ideas on the wall, ask each group to post two cards. Similar ideas should be posted close together. Take turns asking each group, and allowing new clusters of ideas to form on the board. Take your instruction from the participants on grouping and re-grouping, and allow them to add new ideas. Along the way, encourage reflection by asking participants why cards are placed into groups. (15 minutes)

The fourth stage of the exercise is to allow participants to think of a name for each category on which everyone agrees, to clarify the focus of each cluster. (5 minutes)

After this is finished, encourage participants to talk about their work together with a new question of importance, such as:



- Which of these is the most challenging in your context? Why?
- The next activity will serve as a debrief. (10 minutes)

## **Activity 2      The challenges of measuring corruption**

### **Format      Individual reading, small groups, sharing in plenary**

Explain that you will now distribute a handout which lists common challenges in assessing corruption (*Reference Sheet 15: Challenges in monitoring corruption*). Ask them to bear in mind the following two questions as they read:

- Focus on the challenges that matters most in your context. Are any points of advice offered for dealing with this issue? If so, in what ways is it helpful or inadequate?


(10 minutes)




Ask participants to form small groups that share the same challenge and to discuss the above questions, and add an additional question:

- What other ways can this challenge be addressed in the short and longer term?

Ask groups to note their feedback on paper. (5 minutes)



In plenary, ask groups to prioritize two key feedback contributions. Note key points on a board and draw out similarities and differences in positions. Explain that there are no ready-made solutions to any of these problems, and that while this programme is more focused on methodological issues, participants will have the time to discuss aspects of the other challenges at other points in the programme. (5 minutes)



## Module Five Notes

### Reference Sheet 15: Challenges in monitoring corruption<sup>33</sup>

Some of the main challenges in monitoring corruption. Did you think of any others?

#### Methodological challenges

- The term corruption is highly contested. The UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) avoids defining corruption. Instead, it outlines specific acts which states are obligated to criminalize, and others that are optional. This reflects the fact that although there is broad agreement on specific forms of corruption, many are disputed.<sup>34</sup> In assessments, corruption as a concept is defined by the measures attributed to it. It is therefore crucial to defining the specific type of corruption (or anti-corruption) to be measured.
- Many methodological challenges stem from the invisible nature of corrupt transactions, which means that corruption cannot easily be observed empirically. Most measures do not assess corruption directly, but are imperfect proxies that infer the existence of corruption (e.g. diverted funds), or that measuring the opposite, such as the presence of accountability mechanisms (e.g. existence and functioning of transparent procurement systems).
- Lack of factual evidence leads many stakeholders to rely on perception data. However, perception and experiences of corruption-related victimization can diverge widely, such that using perception to understand realities of corruption is not reliable.<sup>35</sup> In addition, perceptions can be influenced by other factors. Media, depending on critical distance from, or control by, the government can play a role in magnifying or minimizing the problem of corruption in public perception. Even when hard "de jure" data exists, they often describe the existence of laws and mechanisms, rather than their functioning in practice.
- Attributing performance scores on corruption indices to policy inputs can only be done through estimation. Identifying baselines of perceived or actual corruption in theory enable the evaluation of anti-corruption interventions, allowing for other factors that are specific to the context (e.g. political will, donor pressure, leadership). But tracking and attributing performance this requires consistent replication of methods over time. In practice such replications are not always carried out, let alone with the required consistency.

#### Political challenges

- The lag time between policy and implementation is not reflected in corruption assessments. Some indices rely on data gathered one or several years before their findings are published, which exacerbates the gap between perceptions of corruption and actual reform efforts. The political problems stemming from this gap are well explained in a U4 Expert answer, "As corruption indicators may not reflect the impact of policy reforms in the short term, there is a risk that they may be misleading for the various stakeholders and could even potentially adversely affect support for reform at the country level. Anti-corruption reforms are usually politically costly. Apparent lack of progress is likely to frustrate any government committed to fight against corruption and may erode their political capital as well as undermine domestic support for reform. Policy makers can potentially overcome this issue by carefully selecting the time horizon to conduct the assessment and monitor progress. On the other hand, this 'progress takes time' argument may also be misused by governments who are not genuinely committed to the fight against corruption."<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This section is based primarily on a U4 Expert Answer, (2008) "Assessing Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures in Burkina Faso" <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=158>

<sup>34</sup> OECD, *Assessing Trends in Corruption and Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures*, The Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies 6<sup>th</sup> General Meeting, pg. 4, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/50/37330934.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> Swiss Agency for Development. (2008) *Challenging Common Assumptions on Corruption and Democratisation: Key recommendations and guiding principles*, [http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource\\_en\\_170422.pdf](http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_170422.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> U4. (2008) "Assessing Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures in Burkina Faso", Expert Answer, pg. 2, <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=158>

- “There is a growing consensus within the international community that successful anti-corruption initiatives need to be grounded in local ownership. Anti-corruption targets and standards of government performance should ideally be set through nationally driven processes to ensure engagement and commitment of local stakeholders. For the sake of sustainability, they should also ideally be assessed and monitored through nationally owned processes.”<sup>37</sup>
- In highly polarized contexts, governments may be reluctant or unwilling to make use of perception data, and may mistakenly assume all sources based on public opinion to be biased. This can have consequences for assessments of effectiveness. Such bias can be reduced through survey techniques which, for example, focus on experiences, and which provide common reference frames, as well as by complementing quantitative with qualitative data.
- In contexts where the relationship between government and civil society is characterized by mistrust, there may be reluctance on the part of government to give civil society actors a meaningful role in corruption assessment processes, or to take up their findings into policy processes. Equally, civil society may have reasons to doubt the legitimacy of assessments which they perceive to lack independence.
- In divided societies, it is all the more important that assessment processes involve broad stakeholder participation, and that they are unimpeachably transparent and rigorous in their methods, in order for the results to be regarded as legitimate by all stakeholders, and to be acted upon.

#### Operational challenges

“Any corruption monitoring efforts are also limited by resource constraints, local capacity deficits, as well as the need to be realistic on what data can be systematically collected and compared over time:

- Corruption assessments are costly. Adequate resources must be secured to be able to repeat the exercise using a consistent methodology on a regular basis to monitor trends over time in a sustained manner.
- Corruption assessments are complex exercises and require sufficient technical expertise and capacity to address the above mentioned methodological challenges.
- Another key challenge relates to the accessibility and availability of relevant data on corruption from reliable sources.
- Last but not least, the institution collecting the data and making the corruption assessment is crucial to ensure quality, integrity, trust, credibility, ownership and usability of the findings. Various actors have their comparative advantages in this process. Factors to consider in this regard are the level of expertise and technical capacity, method and access to data, credibility, territorial focus and desired impact of the exercise.”<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. pg.3

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. pg. 3



## Module 6

### Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Introduction and warmer	20 mins
Activity 2	Pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators	5 mins
Activity 3	Tailoring indicators	10 mins
Activity 4	Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators	30 mins

#### Introduction and overview

Corruption exacts a higher price on the poor, whether in the form of bribes, as an invisible additional “tax”, or by lowering the quality of the services they are entitled to. Other forms and dimensions are gendered, for example sexual corruption, and the fact that men more often tend to be in positions of power, and therefore to be the beneficiaries of corruption. It is essential therefore that assessments of corruption be sensitive to the impact of corruption on marginalised groups, and to the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms for these particular groups – rather than to be altogether blind, as is all too often the case.

As discussed in the previous module, global corruption indices are not easily disaggregated, let alone by income and sex, and so cannot be used to guide planning and monitoring that is sensitive to impact on women and the poor.

There is a lack of indicators – notably in the area of corruption – that highlight the experiences and perspectives of poor and marginalised groups. Such indicators may be easier to generate at the macro level or at the interface of delivery of services (e.g. % of poor population or women reporting corruption related cases). Nonetheless, it is the challenge of those implementing and monitoring integrity reforms to assess whether there are important gender and poverty dimensions to be captured.

This module introduces techniques for creating pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators.

## Module 6

## Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- explain the importance of making corruption assessments sensitive to marginalized groups
- identify at least four ways in which indicators can be tailored to local contexts
- produce gender and poverty sensitive indicators.

### Time

1 hour

### Description

#### **Overview**

This module sets out the rationale for being sensitive to gender and poverty dimensions of corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms, and introduces techniques for creating pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators.

#### **Activity 1 Introduction and warmer**

Trainer introduces topic and participants first reflect in the large group on how indicators of corruption can be poverty and gender sensitive.

#### **Activity 2 Pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators**

Mini-lecture illustrating 4 ways of adapting indicators, with examples.

#### **Activity 3 Tailoring indicators**

In plenary, participants reflect on other vulnerable groups or criteria for contextualizing indicators.

#### **Activity 4 Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators**

Individual reading of a case study, followed by small group work to develop appropriate pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators.

---

#### **Activity 1 Introduction and warmer**

##### **Format Warmer in plenary**

Start this module by explaining the rationale for integrating a poverty and gender sensitive focus in assessments, and the general deficit of this type of information (refer to the Introduction, page 45). (5 minutes)

Then, ask participants to brainstorm ideas around the following question with a neighbour:



- What makes indicators pro-poor or gender sensitive?


Take voluntary suggestions from the group. (15 mins)

#### **Activity 2 Pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators**

##### **Format Mini-lecture**

Using the PowerPoint presentation or Reference Sheet, explain the framework for selecting pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators and provide examples. See *Reference Sheet 16: Designing gender and poverty sensitive indicators*. (5 mins)





### Activity 3 Tailoring indicators

#### Format Plenary brainstorm

It is not only the poor and women who are marginalised in society. Ask the group to reflect on the marginalised groups in their own contexts and to generate ideas for other ways that indicators can be tailored:

- What other groups or attributes might be important to capture using these techniques?


Note responses on a board as they come up, and supplement with the suggestions in the box below. See *Reference Sheet 17: Other marginalised groups*. (10 mins)



### Activity 4 Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators

#### Format Individual reading, analysis in small groups

In this activity, participants read about the case of a director who is not satisfied with the performance assessment of his province's newly established network of complaints offices. The report says they are working, but he is sceptical that they are working for everyone (*Annex 2*). They are then asked to apply what they have learned on poverty and gender sensitive indicators, to help the director's staff members to create suitable indicators.



Start by explaining the rules before asking participants to form small groups and distributing the case to each participant. Ask participants to read the case individually.

Wait until individuals have read the case to distribute the worksheet. Participants can either work collectively or individually to complete their worksheets. Groups that have finished the exercise can compare answers with the answer sheet. Circulate during the exercise and get a sense of what the groups are creating –it could be fruitful (time allowing) to have them compare answers with each other first? (30 mins)

## Module Six Notes

### Reference Sheet 16: Designing gender and poverty sensitive indicators

#### *Problem:*

- Lack of data on vulnerable groups such as the poor, women, the disabled or other groups makes it difficult to see how they are affected by corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms.

#### *4 ways of making indicators sensitive to vulnerable groups*

- Disaggregating by poverty/gender
  - ❖ The proportion of poor households using public services who experienced corruption directly in the last 12 months in comparison to non-poor households.
  - ❖ The proportion of citizens and/or women earning the median yearly income who can afford to bring a legal suit.
  - ❖ The proportion of lower to higher income people who are able to successfully access information on political party finance.
- Specific to the poor/women
  - ❖ Percentage of reported corruption cases in public agencies serving low-income communities in comparison to those in higher income areas, e.g. education (schools), health (clinics, hospitals), the police.
  - ❖ Existence of anti-sex discrimination laws and equal opportunities policies in the civil service and evidence of their enforcement and implementation.
- Implicitly poverty/gender sensitive
  - ❖ The percentage of small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.
  - ❖ The proportion of public agencies for which public expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) are regularly conducted. (PETS benefit the poor the most).
  - ❖ Number of reported cases of sexual corruption.
- Chosen by the poor/women
  - ❖ Level of satisfaction with public services expressed by women in poor households in comparison to men.
  - ❖ Agencies perceived to be corrupt by low-income households in contrast to higher income households.
  - ❖ Percentage of citizens who can use a given access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.

### Reference Sheet 17: Other marginalised groups

#### *Alternative units of analysis for developing indicators*

#### *Groups:*

- Vulnerable groups such as women, the poor, marginalized ethnic groups and tribes, the disabled, HIV sufferers, children and youth, the unemployed, sex workers
- Occupation based groups such as police officers, government officials, health workers, taxi drivers, teachers and principals, traditional authorities, mayors and local councillors, small business owners

#### *Geographically based:*

- Rural, urban, regional, national, provincial/district, municipalities, chiefdoms, communities



## Module 7

### Complementarity in the use of indicators

Activities		Time
<i>Part A</i>		
Activity 1	<i>Measuring experiences versus perceptions</i> The need for perception-based data	25 mins
<i>Part B</i>		
Activity 2	<i>The principle of complementarity</i> Complementarity in selecting indicators	20 mins
Activity 3	Grouping exercise	10 mins
Activity 4	Matching input and output indicators	15 mins

#### Overview

This module suggests ways of enhancing the validity of measurements that monitor corruption and integrity reforms, by encouraging the development of balanced indicator sets.

The first part of the module is devoted the question of whether to measure corruption by facts, perception or some combination of both. This issue is controversial in some political contexts, where perception is seen to be biased against the status quo or because inflated perceptions of corruption can adversely affect how countries score on global indices. But the link between perception and reality is an important source of information in itself for combating corruption and improving governance. Furthermore the choice of fact-based data is rarely made in complete absence of subjective considerations. Participants contrast the strengths and weaknesses of perception data and problematize claims of objectivity in indicator selection.

The second part of the module introduces the principle of complementarity in choosing indicators. Effective and appropriate action is not taken on the basis of a single indicator or information source, and different indicators reveal different dimensions of a situation. Participants practice a technique for obtaining more holistic assessments of anti-corruption interventions by matching complementary types of indicators for what we call “balanced baskets of indicators”. Complementarity is applied by combining and balancing data types. Some examples include input and output indicators, perception and fact based indicators, and composite and original indicators, and of course gender and poverty sensitive indicators where relevant.

## Module 7      Complementarity in the use of indicators

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- make the case for using both perception and fact-based data
- describe the rationale for using complementary indicators to assess a specific anti-corruption intervention
- match input and output indicators for a given unit of analysis.

### Time

1 hour 25 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

This module is concerned with developing indicator sets that are holistic and balanced. **Part A** is devoted the question of whether to measure corruption by facts, perception or some combination of both. **Part B** introduces the principle of complementarity in choosing indicators, which is applied by combining and balancing data types.

#### ***Part A Measuring experiences versus perceptions***

##### **Activity 1 The need for perception-based data**

Mini-lecture presents a puzzle – why is there a gap between perception and experience? Discussion in plenary on what affects perception, and the role of perception and experience-based data in corruption assessments.

#### ***Part B The principle of complementarity***

##### **Activity 2 Complementarity in selecting indicators**

Individual reading of a brief case study, and small group discussion to elicit the principle of complementarity.

##### **Activity 3 Grouping exercise**

In plenary, matching characteristics of input and output based indicators.

##### **Activity 4 Matching input and output indicators**

Participants physically match input and output cards in small groups, and mill about the room to compare answers.

---

#### ***Part A    Measuring experiences versus perceptions***


##### **Activity 1      The need for perception-based data**


###### **Format            Trainer presentation, plenary discussion**

Using Powerpoint, project the graph on *Reference Sheet 18* onto a wall, showing the discrepancy between perception and victimisation levels. Let participants take in the graph before raising the question:

- Why is there such a difference between perception and victimisation? What other factors might influence public perception of corruption?

Take suggestions from the floor and highlight the points outlined in *Reference Sheet 18: What affects perceptions of corruption?* (15 mins)





Continue the conversation by probing attitudes towards the use of corruption perception data in the room. Are there opposing viewpoints in the room?

- How can perception data help or hinder corruption monitoring?
- What role does perception data play in practice in your country?
- Is there such a thing as objective data?

Note participant input on the wall, summarizing the advantages and disadvantages of perception/subjective and fact-based/objective data. Use *Reference Sheet 19: fact and perception based data* to highlight contrasting arguments. (25 mins)

## **Part B The principle of complementarity**

### **Activity 2 Complementarity in selecting indicators**

**Format Individual reading, small groups**

Using Powerpoint or *Reference Sheet 20: The director's findings – inputs and outputs*, read the continuation of the case about the provincial director of the national anti-corruption commission, on the findings his staff made. Ask groups to consider the following while reading:

- What general lesson or principle can be extracted from this experience, in terms of designing indicators?

In plenary, note ideas on flipchart and complement with input from *Reference Sheet 21: Lessons from the director's findings*. Debrief by explaining that in this module the group will practice developing balanced baskets of indicators, putting into practice the principle of complementarity. (20 mins)

### **Activity 3 Grouping exercise**

**Format Plenary**

Explain that this exercise is to create a common understanding of indicator terms, which will be used later in the programme. Write or project the following two terms (input-based/*de jure* indicators, and output-based/*de facto* indicators) and their definitions onto a board or wall. Explain that everyone will work together to match common measurement terms and their definitions.

Allow participants a chance to read before soliciting matches from different participants and effecting the changes. See *Facilitation note 2: Grouping exercise*, and *Reference Sheet 22: Input and output indicators*. (10 mins)






### **Activity 4 Matching input and output indicators**

**Format Small groups, milling about**

Note that the trainer must prepare the cards for this exercise in advance (*Annex 3*).

Introduce the activity. In this exercise, participants will practice matching input and output indicators. Each table should have a stack of cards which contain examples of corruption indicators which can either be classified as input or output. For an added challenge, tell groups this is a race. When the time is up, have groups walk around to the other tables to compare indicator pairs.


Debrief the module by explaining that while the group has just looked at complementarity at the indicator level, it is a principle which should also be applied more generally, in the selection of assessment methods. This will be discussed in Part Two of the programme. (15 mins)



## Module Seven Notes

### Reference Sheet 18: What affects perceptions of corruption?

Notice the discrepancy between perception and victimisation of corruption. What other hidden factors might affect perception?



An analysis of data from the 2000 International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) reveals that experiences of victimisation are only a small part of what affects people's perceptions about corruption, and therefore asking about people's experiences is not an effective proxy for actual levels of corruption. Other individual and social factors influence perceptions.<sup>39</sup> According to this research, respondents more likely to perceive corruption tend to:

- fall between the ages of 20 and 34
- have incomes above the median
- be men
- feel unsafe
- have been victims of other offences (e.g. theft, assault)
- have secondary or university-level education
- be professionally active
- live in neighbourhoods with low levels of solidarity and social cohesion

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

*Example fact-based question:*

In some areas there is a problem of corruption among government or public officials. During 1999, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his service?

1. yes
2. no
3. don't know

*Example perception-based question:*

It is known that in some countries the problem of corruption among government or public officials is highly perceived by citizens. Imagine a person who needs something that is entitled to him/her by law. Is it *likely* or *not likely* that this person would have to offer money, a present or a favour (e.g. more than the official charge) to get help from:

1. Member of Parliament
2. Officials in the Ministries
3. Elected municipal councillors
4. Customs officials
5. Police officers
6. Tax/revenues officials
7. Inspectors
8. Teachers/Professors
9. Courts officials
10. Private sector

---

Policymakers are normally more comfortable with “objective” or fact-based data. There is a common belief that observable facts reduce the scope for disputes around the validity of results that tend to follow arguments built upon subjective data. This is especially the case where there is a polarized political climate, and where the media is seen to have undue influence in magnifying public perceptions of corruption, with implications for levels of development assistance. Excluding subjective data has therefore been a primary factor in the design of certain measurement instruments, particularly survey data on public perceptions.

However there are tradeoffs involved in setting aside subjective data from the corruption assessment framework.

- High perceptions of corruption are correlated with low perceptions of state legitimacy
- High perceptions of corruption can also in themselves fuel corrupt practices, by encouraging people to believe they must pay bribes, and create a culture of impunity by reducing public trust in law enforcement and public administration officials and thereby, the likelihood of citizens turning to them to report complaints and finding justice. Conversely, high perceptions of corruption may enable bribery by leading those with power to believe that there is nothing wrong with accepting bribes.
- The gap between perception and reality can itself be a strong indicator of needed action. Perhaps anti-corruption efforts are not being adequately communicated and government needs to focus on awareness raising efforts. Moreover, one implication of this gap is that targeting victimisation will not necessarily cause perceptions to decline linearly<sup>40</sup>.
- Facts are never truly objective, either by their selection or by their meaning. The fact of the existence of an anti-corruption commission does not tell anything about its independence or the quality of its work. Fact-based data may be favoured because it is easier to measure.

Ideally, a balanced assessment of corruption should take account of both types of data.

---

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.



## Reference Sheet 20: The director's findings – inputs and outputs

If you recall from the case, the provincial director of the national anti-corruption commission whom you met in the previous module had received, with scepticism, the report on the functioning of the provincial network of anti-corruption offices. The report had tracked a decreasing number of complaints filed each month, but had taken this to reflect the effectiveness of the country's overall strategy in combating corruption, and a decreasing number of actual corruption-related incidences. Yet there continued to be frequent reports of corruption in the media.

*What might be plausible reasons for this discrepancy?*

While the director is confident of the existence and quality of the necessary legal framework to guarantee the institution is functioning in accordance with requirements of political independence and neutrality stipulated by UNCAC, and has in addition subscribed to the code of ethics of the International Ombudsman Association, he was less certain about the functioning of the offices *in practice*. To find out, he commissioned his staff to design a framework of indicators with which to apprehend the actual accessibility of services from the perspective of the public, and marginalised groups specifically, as well as the capacity of the offices to adequately and expeditiously deal with the caseload.

His staff acted upon this request, and conducted a general survey in which they made the following major findings:

- The new anti-corruption offices were far easier to access physically and relatively well resourced, but -
- Many respondents from the lowest-income areas did not know about the process for filing reports, and assumed they would not be able to afford the process
- The majority of respondents did not expect their cases would receive a fair investigation anyway, and had little faith in the institution of the anti-corruption commission as a whole

Taking account of this new information, the director realises the need to raise public awareness about the work of the offices, the internal checks and balances to ensure fairness and professionalism, as well as the process for registering complaints, and that such public information must also target the marginalised groups identified by the survey.

## Reference Sheet 21: Lessons from the director's findings

***What lessons can be drawn from this experience in terms of designing indicators?***

- The reality of governance and corruption reforms is that they are extremely complex operations. The idea that one indicator or assessment will respond fully to a user's need is unrealistic in most cases.
- Complex assessments require *balanced* baskets of indicators, which take account of action-worthy input-based indicators (e.g. focusing on the legal and institutional framework), as well as output-based indicators, (e.g. data on the objective experiences and subjective opinions of those accessing the reporting mechanism).

## Facilitation note 2: Grouping exercise

**Manually:** Write the following terms at the top of the board. A flipchart may be too small for this exercise, forming 2 columns:

input-based/*de jure* indicators

output-based/*de facto* indicators

Next, in random order, write the definition points onto the wall. Allow one, or several participants to come to the board and connect the definitions to the terms by drawing lines. Circulate the Reference Sheet as a handout afterwards for participants to have a record.

Alternatively, you can re-write individual points onto pieces of A4 paper, and allow participants to physically move them and glue them to the board in the correct column (e.g. using tape or blue-tack). This requires advance preparation.

**Powerpoint:** A handy way of handling the logistics of the grouping exercise is to project the screen onto a whiteboard, and to use a marker to physically connect definitions and terms with a coloured line, as prompted by participants. Afterwards, flip to the next slide to show the definitions in the correct columns.

## Reference Sheet 22: Input and output indicators

### Input-based/*de jure* indicators:

- Refer to the existence and quality of formal rules found in documents, laws, regulations and the constitution
- Answer the question "What has been done?"
- Are more naturally actionable by governments, citizens and donors (e.g. Can't choose to lower a crime rate (desired effect), but can put more police on the streets (causal factor))
- Say nothing about actual progress
- In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference.
- Should track only action-worthy reforms

### Output-based/*de facto* indicators:

- Assess the governance system's deliverables to citizens in a country
- Answer the question: "Are citizens benefiting from specific institutions and policies?"
- Measure the actual improved governance, have potential to measure true progress in the long-term
- Lack of actionability
- In practice, the anti-corruption agency makes regular public reports.
- In practice, the public feel informed about the activities and services of the anti-corruption agency.





## Module 8

### Developing integrity indicators and indices

Activities		Time
<i>Part A</i>		
<i>Designing actionable indicators</i>		
Activity 1	Integrity indicators	20 mins
Activity 2	Developing integrity indicators	30 mins
<i>Part B</i>		
<i>Producing indices</i>		
Activity 3	Why produce an index?	30 mins
Activity 4	How to quantify?	10 mins
Activity 3	Developing indicator scales	20 mins
Activity 4	Why weight?	20 mins

#### Introduction and overview

Indicators that assess integrity tend to be actionable simply because they focus on the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms, which are within the control of policy makers. For example, in the area of political party financing, one anti-corruption mechanism that can reduce opportunities for corruption is the disclosure of party finance. The CRINIS Project has developed an index composed of 10 dimensions of transparency in political party funding that are based on international standards. Each dimension is broken down into indicators. Performance that is judged to be low against these standards for any given indicator therefore indicates a needed adjustment to party policy or practice within one of these dimensions.

This module demonstrates one way these types of indicators can be designed, and considers their ability to capture the poverty and gendered experiences of corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms, which tend to be rather limited. It also looks at the step from indicators to index, and reasons why producing an index can be constructive.

## Module 8

## Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- develop indicators that measure the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms
- explain why a national index can be useful, and develop scales for quantifying integrity indicators
- explain the subjective dimensions of building an index that can benefit from multi-stakeholder input.

### Time

2 hours 10 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

Indicators that assess integrity tend to be actionable simply because they focus on the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms, which are within the control of policy makers. This module demonstrates one way these types of indicators can be designed, and considers their ability to capture the poverty and gendered experiences of corruption and anti-corruption mechanisms. In **Part A** of this Module participants practice designing these actionable types of indicators, and also note their inadequacies, when used alone, for capturing information about marginalised groups. **Part B** explores reasons for creating a sub-national index, and demonstrates several typical ways that different indicators can be standardised and transformed into the components of an index.

#### ***Part A Designing actionable indicators***

##### **Activity 1 Integrity indicators**

Introduction to the module, followed by mini-lecture on integrity indicators, using the example of Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) index.

##### **Activity 2 Developing integrity indicators**

Technique applied in small groups, with plenary discussion.

#### ***Part B Producing indices***

##### **Activity 3 Why produce an index?**

Discussed in small groups, with plenary discussion and input by trainer.

##### **Activity 4 How to quantify?**

Demonstrated in a mini-lecture.

##### **Activity 5 Developing indicator scales**

Worksheet completed in pairs, checking answers and taking up selected issues in plenary.

##### **Activity 6 Why weight?**

Plenary discussion on assigning the weight to indicators that compose a single index score, and the implications this has for transparency of the overall index.

---

## Part A Designing actionable indicators

### Activity 1 Integrity indicators

#### Format Mini-lecture

Begin by introducing the module with the information from the Introduction on page 56. (5 mins)




Next, present the mini-lecture on developing integrity indicators. This mini-lecture demonstrates the method used in Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index, in which corruption hot spots are matched with anti-corruption mechanisms, and indicators are developed on the basis of the mechanisms that ought to be in place. See *Reference Sheet 23: Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index*. (15 mins)

### Activity 2 Developing integrity indicators

#### Format Small groups, plenary discussion


Explain that participants will now practice designing these indicators, and give the instructions. A selection of corruption hot spots for a given sector is supplied on a worksheet (*Annex 4*). Participants must create anti-corruption mechanisms and corresponding indicators to match these hot spots, and write these onto the blank spaces provided on the worksheet.



The worksheets are completed individually, but participants should consult each other in small groups of 3-4. Remind groups that each mechanism may have more than one indicator. Within each group, ask participants to consider:

- What are the similarities and differences between proposed indicators?

Distribute the answer sheet after groups have completed their worksheets. (20 mins)



In plenary, ask groups whether they have any reflections on the usefulness or otherwise of this method for designing indicators:

- How useful is this technique?
- Can you think of any other ways of identifying corruption hot spots?
- Is it an approach that is currently used in any of their countries?

(10 mins)



## Part B Producing indices

### Activity 3 Why produce an index?


#### Format Small groups, trainer input

Ask participants to return to small groups. If participants are from different countries, make sure each group has a mix. Give them the following questions to answer:

- Does your country have any sub/national indices related to corruption?
- If not, would it be useful to produce one? What, in your opinion, would be most useful to rank?
- What are the advantages of producing an index? When might an index not be appropriate?



Each group member can share the relevance or otherwise of producing indices in their particular country context, or if they are from the same country, can jointly discuss the pros and cons of developing a national index. Groups can conclude their discussion by listing several reasons when an index is and isn't appropriate on flipchart paper. Use *Reference Sheet 24: Why produce an index?* to provide additional points to consider. (30 mins)



#### **Activity 4      How to quantify?**

##### **Format          Mini-lecture**

After having discussed why an index might be useful, this follow-on activity aims to demystify what happens to indicators after the data is collected and the questions get answered. In other words, how do the answers to yes/no questions become transformed into scores and indices, and why is it important to grasp the basics?

Using *Reference Sheet 25: Scoring indicators* or Powerpoint, present the basics of scoring data. Be sure to grasp any opportunities for audience participation, by throwing questions back at the participants before demonstrating the answers. (10 mins)




#### **Activity 5      Developing indicator scales**

##### **Format          Pair activity**

Now that participants know what scaling is, and why it is important, they can practice it for themselves. Explain that individuals will receive a worksheet containing a number of qualitative indicators, and that they must create their own indicator scales (*Annex 4*). They can do this activity in pairs, or individually.

Allow participants to check their answers with each other before circulating some answer sheets (*Annex 4*). Take up any recurring questions or problems in plenary. (20 mins)



#### **Activity 6      Why weight?**

##### **Format          Plenary discussion, trainer input**

Returning to the theme of subjectivity in the quantification process, conclude the module with a final reflection about the weighting of indicators when building an index. Start the activity with the following question:

- We saw that developing scales for indicators is a subjective aspect of the quantification process. Can you think of any other aspect of developing an index that might be subjective?

As much as possible, elicit the concept of weighting indicators from the participants. Probe uncertain responses by asking whether all indicators making up an index matter equally. Provide an example using *Reference Sheet 26: Why weight?* Then ask the next question:

- What does this subjective dimension mean for the overall legitimacy of an index?
- What can be done to enhance the legitimacy of an index?

Note answers on the flipchart, contrasting viewpoints and probing responses. Use the Reference Sheet to fill in any gaps. (20 mins)



## Module Eight Notes

### Reference Sheet 23: Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index<sup>41</sup>

The RTA Index is a sub-national ranking of municipalities, which measures their progress in combating corruption in the areas of public procurement, local planning and financial management and property. The index is part of a programme to enhance capacity for combating corruption at the local level.

It has been developed in the framework of the UNDP'S Good Governance & Decentralization programmes. The framework identifies the most vulnerable points to corruption in FYR Macedonia and provides mechanisms on how to address these vulnerabilities.

The methodology was designed to meet the needs of a very polarized political climate, in which there is little trust in perception based indicators of corruption. As such, and in order to generate buy-in from stakeholders, it was deemed necessary that any instrument for assessing the state of corruption be clear and generate indisputable results, simple to administer to the non-expert, and impartial.

Qualitative data obtained through administrative data sources and interviews feeds into questionnaires and is converted into quantitative scores for the index, in a 4-part process:

1. defining corruption hot-spots (see process flow chart below)
2. matching anti-corruption mechanisms and hot-spots
3. assessing the existence and functioning in practice of those mechanisms
4. quantification

Integral to the methodology is the stakeholder involvement. Three categories of stakeholders (local self-government representative, institutions in charge of their work, and users of municipality services) were interviewed about their perceptions and experiences of corruption challenges concerning units of local self-government, to define the hot spots within each process. Anti-corruption mechanisms were defined with institutions in charge of coordinating and monitoring the work of local self-governments. Finally, a team of local stakeholders including NGO and media representatives are trained to implement the instrument. People's inputs are therefore used to inform the design of the instrument, but the instrument itself measures factual data only.

#### **Example: urban planning hot spot → indicator**

Hot spot:

Creating an impression of complexity of the procedure for obtaining a construction permit, to allow possibility of extorting a bribe.



Anti-corruption mechanism:

All interested parties must be clearly and precisely informed of the course and duration of the procedure for obtaining a permit and the documents required.




Indicator:

Existence of a system for informing parties through written notices posted up or obtainable at the window from a clerk.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (2008) *Methodology For measuring the Index of Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability at local level*. <http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/show/E0665B63-F203-1EE9-B2237737A3E4BC48>

### Finding the hot spots

Hot spots located through interviews and other sources can be mapped out on process flow charts, such as this one,<sup>42</sup> to structure the process of indicator development.



### Reference Sheet 24: Why produce an index?

- Ranking indices enable comparison: over time, geographically, across institutions
- Sub-national ranking can promote a cycle of virtuous competition between municipalities, for example, particularly when embedded in a capacity development project
- Indices that are based on actionable indicators can be disaggregated to pinpoint the weakest points and areas for improvement
- Indices can be used to highlight worst offenders (e.g. Kenya Bribery Index 2008, the police) and to trigger public debate and demand for accountability
- Indices can be a source of contention if the methodology is unclear or if seen as illegitimate in the eyes of those who are directly or indirectly being assessed
- In some cases, other methods such as the case study may be more relevant to understanding a complex problem or success story in rich detail and context.

<sup>42</sup> Loughborough University/DFID. (2007) *A note on Research Methodology for Combating Corruption*, Water, Engineering and Development Centre, <http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/details.php?book=978-1-84380-120-7&keyword=%methodology%&subject=0&sort=TITLE>

***How do you quantify indicators? The basics.***

Indicators normally start out as questions. Some of these can be answered instantly, by counting (e.g. what percentage of the population has experienced a bribe demand in the past 6 months?). Others are answered by yes/no qualitative statements which must first be converted into numbers, and then be entered into an index formula. But how would you give a numerical value to an indicator question such as “in practice, is the independent redress mechanism for civil service effective?”

The most simple way to quantify indicators is to use a **scale**. A scale is a set of numerical values assigned to certain criteria (e.g. certain behaviours, certain timeframes, etc.) for the purpose of quantifying qualitative indicators. In other words, a scale measures the degree to which an individual or mechanism possesses the characteristic of interest based on agreed upon benchmarks. This way, the subjectivity of answers is reduced, and validity of results is enhanced (e.g. by ensuring that respondents all mean the same thing when selecting a “1” score or a “3” score).

**Example indicator 1:**

How responsive was X Ministry in disclosing requested information?

Highly responsive (within 1 week).....3 points  
Somewhat responsive (within 2 months).....2 points  
Somewhat unresponsive (more than 6 months).....1 point  
Very unresponsive (1 year or no response).....0 point

**Example indicator 2:**

Existence of a system for informing parties through written notices posted up or obtainable at the window from a clerk.

Information for the parties is visibly posted or easily obtainable.....2 points  
Information upon request of the party.....1 point  
No system of informing the parties.....0 point

***That's very interesting. But why do I need to know?  
Can't I get an expert to deal with the numbers?***

You *can* leave it to statisticians, but it might get messy. What you need to know is that part of the number crunching is subjective, and therefore, it has the potential to be a sensitive issue. Both developing a scale and assigning scores involve subjective decisions that should receive input from all stakeholders, and which warrant the utmost transparency. With indicators, as goes the saying, “the devil is in the detail” (mistakes can happen when we don't pay enough attention to the detail).

***OK, I'm convinced. Continue.***

***How can one move beyond a basic 'yes' or 'no' answer?***

The above examples defined a scale on the basis of clear-cut, observable characteristics, and are therefore relatively easy to benchmark. In contrast, other types of scales are needed for quantifying more qualitative aspects of governance and anti-corruption. These are typically 'yes/no' indicators that are not easily broken down into discrete components. How, then, to move beyond a basis 'yes/no' indicator to a quantifiable indicator with well-defined benchmarks?

**Example indicator (Global Integrity Scorecard):**

*"In practice, national-level judges are protected from political interference."*

A possible "scale" for quantifying this indicator beyond a mere 'yes/no' answer could be the following:

Coding 100	National level judges operate independently of the political process, without incentive or pressure to render favourable judgments in politically sensitive cases. Judges never comment on political debates. Individual judgments are rarely praised or criticized by political figures.
Coding 50	National level judges are typically independent, yet are sometimes influenced in their judgments by negative or positive political incentives. This may include favourable or unfavourable treatment by the government or public criticism. Some judges may be demoted or relocated in retaliation for unfavourable decisions.
Coding 0	National level judges are commonly influenced by politics and personal biases or incentives. This may include conflicting family relationships, professional partnerships, or other personal loyalties. Negative incentives may include demotion, pay cuts, relocation, threats or harassment.

For added clarity, some instruments, such as Global Integrity's scorecard, also include a narrative statement explaining the justification for assigned scores for each indicator. This is particularly useful where answers are provided by individual experts.

## Reference Sheet 26: Why weight?

### *Weighting indicators when building an index*

As mentioned earlier, many corruption assessments report their results in the form of a composite index. The construction of an index requires that individual indicator scores be aggregated into one 'total score'. This process raises an important question: is each indicator equally important in determining the concept/phenomenon being measured? Or are there some indicators that are more 'significant' than others?

For instance, some indicators might measure phenomena that are particularly worrying to those conducting the assessment, and/or occurring more frequently than others. Other indicators might be deemed particularly significant because they reflect values and principles that are important to those conducting the assessment (from the example above: participation by the public in the budget preparation process might be deemed more important as a democratic mechanism to prevent corruption than the existence of a logbook recording signatures approving the issuance of construction permits.)

In these cases, indicators can be weighted to reflect their level of significance in relation to the other indicators making up the index. The weighting process is ultimately a very subjective, value-based process which can greatly influence the final index score. It is therefore critically important that decisions regarding individual indicator weights are made in a highly transparent and consultative manner. Specifically, the rationales for assigning a given weight to an indicator should be transparent, and subject to broad stakeholder consultation. Consultations could focus on determining how various groups of stakeholders rank indicators, and on reaching a common ground on those indicators which ought to carry greater or lesser weight in the index. One potential way of doing this could be to have two different numerical scales: a larger scale for more significant indicators (e.g. 1 to 5 points), and a smaller scale for less significant indicators (e.g. 1 to 3 points).

Moreover, it is equally important when releasing the index score that the methodology behind it, including individual indicator weights, is fully disclosed and presented with clarity, in order for the public to understand which components of the index were most significant in determining the final score.



## Module 9

### Part One summary and feedback



Activities		Time
Activity 1	Draw your learning highlight	10 mins
Activity 2	Review	10 mins

#### Review

This module marks the end of Part One of the programme, which covers basics of corruption indicators, and principles for exercising critical judgement in selecting indicators. We have covered the need to understand the nature of corruption in specific contexts, and to define corrupt practices. We have discussed the many motivations a country may have for assessing corruption, and how this affects the scope of an assessment project. Participants have had the opportunity to reflect upon how their national measurement activities are linked to wider anti-corruption strategies, and UNCAC reporting. We have covered the importance of understanding what is beneath the labels of composite indicators, and of their appropriate use. We have covered the need for systematically generating original data, in order to monitor change over time, and to enhance the possibility of attribution to specific policies. Actionability has been established as a key factor in the selection and design of indicators, but above this is the need for action-worthy indicators. Perhaps most importantly in terms of future guidance, we discussed the strength of complementarity in using indicators; of monitoring outputs as well as inputs, and combining these with broader impact statistics; of considering perception as well as fact-based data; and of systematically analysing the impact of corruption and its antidotes to vulnerable groups. We then covered a technique for developing and quantifying integrity indicators and discussed aspects of this process which should be part of a wider consultative process.

This module is an opportunity to briefly review these main learning points, and to assess how the needs of participants may have changed in the course of the training and to make adjustments accordingly.

## Module 9

## Part One summary and feedback

### Objective

During this module, the trainer should:

- summarise the main learning points of the day, and reassess participant needs so that they inform the following day's programme.

### Timing

20 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

This module is an opportunity to briefly review these main learning points, and to assess how the needs of participants may have changed in the course of the training and to make adjustments accordingly.

#### **Activity 1 Draw your learning highlight**

Individual illustration, followed by plenary sharing.

#### **Activity 2 Review**

Mini-lecture by trainer reviewing main points covered, followed by individual reflection assessing extent to which participants feel able to execute the learning objectives. Ends with presentation of Part Two of the programme.

---

#### **Activity 1 Draw your learning highlight**

##### **Format Individual illustration, plenary sharing**

Before reviewing the main lessons of the first part of the training, participants have a chance to reflect on what they have learned.




Ask participants to draw a diagram representing one lesson which they found to be useful and which they would like to practice applying. Distribute small pieces of to each participant by sending them round the horseshoe.

Go around in a circle asking each participant to explain their main "take-away" drawing. (10 mins)

#### **Activity 2 Review**

##### **Format Mini-lecture, individual reflection**

Use the above review text on page 64 to provide a broad overview of the issues discussed. Where possible, link these points back to the original objectives discussed with participants, especially if certain agenda items were given greater or lesser attention based on participant interests. (5 mins)



Next, ask participants to reflect on learning gains and gaps up to now, by asking them to mentally self-assess their ability to meet the minimum objectives of the individual modules:

- Looking at each module we have covered, reflect on the extent to which you feel confident about your ability to do the following [see *Reference Sheet 27 : Part One objectives*]. Are there any areas you feel the need to improve upon which are listed?

To do this, briefly list, or alternatively, distribute the objectives covered in Part

One of the programme using *Reference Sheet 27 : Part One objectives*. Participants may wish to note down their particular strengths and weaknesses or knowledge gaps they would like to work on in the future.

End by presenting the agenda for Part Two of the programme. Refer back to *Reference Sheet 2: Agenda*. (5 mins)

# Module Nine Notes

## Reference Sheet 27: Part One objectives

To what extent do you feel confident about your ability to do the following?

1. *Defining corruption*
  - Explain the need, in measurement, for specifying corrupt practices
  - Distinguish administrative corruption from state capture
  - Name three types of corruption indicators
2. *Why measure corruption?*
  - explain two main purposes that corruption measurement has served
  - provide at least five objectives a country may wish to achieve through corruption assessments
  - identify which functions of corruption assessments are most relevant to their own country context(s)
  - identify the links between national corruption monitoring efforts and the UNCAC self-assessment process.
3. *Composite and original indicators of corruption*
  - contrast how different global composite indicators define and operationalize corruption
  - contrast the strengths and limitations of composite and original indicators
  - identify data that is actionable
  - explain the benefits of actionable data, and the associated caveats
4. *The challenges of measuring corruption*
  - identify methodological, political and operational challenges that matter for measuring corruption in their country context
5. *Poverty and gender sensitive indicators*
  - explain the relevance of poverty and gender sensitive indicators to assessing corruption at country level
  - identify at least four ways in which indicators can be tailored to local contexts
  - produce gender and poverty sensitive indicators
6. *Complementarity in the use of indicators*
  - weigh up the advantages and disadvantages of using subjective and objective data
  - describe the rationale for using complementary indicators to assess a specific anti-corruption intervention
  - match input and output indicators for a given unit of analysis.
7. *Application and reflection*
  - have applied and contextualised the knowledge previously gained in the training to a real life case study
  - be able to explain 'good practices' applicable to measuring and assessing corruption in a national context



# PART TWO

## CORRUPTION ASSESSMENTS

---

### Overview

In Part One of the programme we discussed and applied normative and methodological principles for developing balanced indicator sets. In Part Two, participants apply these principles to appraise and enhance assessment methodologies and templates, as well as to indicator design, and discuss the basics of selecting appropriate data collection methods.

---

### Learning objectives

By the end of the second part of the programme, participants will be able to:

- ☑ provide advice on the relevance of carrying out a systemic diagnosis of corruption
- ☑ appraise different instruments for assessing corruption and adapting them to country needs
- ☑ select appropriate data collection methods.

---

Modules		Time
Module 10	Systemic corruption diagnostics	50 mins
Module 11	Instruments for assessing corruption	1 hr 30 mins
Module 12	Collecting data	1 hr 15 mins
Module 13	Application and reflection	2 hrs 30 mins
Module 14	Learning transfer and evaluation	30 mins

## Module 10

### Systemic corruption diagnostics

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Pros and cons of a comprehensive analysis of corruption	15 mins
Activity 2	Systemic corruption diagnostics	35 mins

#### Introduction and overview

Countries are mandated by Article 5 of the UNCAC to adopt coordinated anti-corruption policies. However, studies have found that in many cases anti-corruption strategies have not been overly successful. Part of the problem has been their failure to prioritize and sequence reforms, which in some cases belies inadequacies of anti-corruption diagnostics.

Recent approaches to corruption diagnostics have emphasized the importance of going beyond institution-focused approaches and understanding the political, economic and cultural factors underlying corruption, and the determinants of reform. Survey design techniques have been refined to reinforce this focus, and to assist with the process of understanding corruption in specific contexts.

This module asks participants to reflect upon the kind of information that is gathered in national corruption diagnostics.

## Module 10 Systemic corruption diagnostics

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- explain when and why a political economy analysis of corruption can be beneficial to anti-corruption planning
- describe three different types of surveys used in corruption diagnostics
- explain how surveys can be used to identify both administrative corruption and state capture
- relate the value of political economy analyses to understanding corruption in their own country.

### Time

50 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**



This module looks systemic approaches to studying corruption risks and the determinants of reform, and considers their uses and limitations. It also touches upon how such information is collected through surveys.

#### **Activity 1 Pros and cons of a comprehensive analysis of corruption**

Poll of countries which have undertaken comprehensive analyses of corruption, followed by a discussion of when such studies are appropriate.

#### **Activity 2 Systemic corruption diagnostics**

Small groups reflect on what such studies reveal, and of how such information might be collected before reading about them individually and then discussing in plenary.



---

#### **Activity 1 Pros and cons of a comprehensive analysis of corruption**

##### **Format Warmer in plenary, small groups**

If participants come from different countries, begin by taking a poll:


- Which of countries represented have anti-corruption strategies or national policies?
- In any cases, were these strategies informed by a systemic analysis of corruption?

Ask small groups to brainstorm answers to the following question.

- When is a (national) comprehensive analysis of corruption appropriate? (5 minutes)

In plenary, take suggestions from the groups, refer to *Reference Sheet 28: Comprehensive corruption diagnostics* for discussion issues. (10 minutes)





## Activity 2 Systemic corruption diagnostics


**Format** Plenary, small groups, individual reading, plenary discussion

Call again upon participants from countries that have carried out national corruption diagnostics. Ask them to elaborate on the methods used.

Ask participants to reflect on the following question, and to take a moment to write down some answers:

- What type of information could such a study reveal?

Take up suggestions, and ask participants to keep these in mind during this exercise.




Next, ask participants, in small groups, to think back to the definitions of administrative corruption and state capture discussed in the first module. Ask them to discuss how they might obtain the following information in small groups of three or four:

- How might you obtain information about administrative corruption?
- About state capture?

Groups may consider methods, information sources and questions asked. Ask groups to note their feedback on flipchart paper. (15 minutes)



Take up two main points from each group, before distributing *Reference Sheet 29: National surveys and political economy studies* to participants for individual reading.



Open up a large group discussion with the following question:

- What have/could political economy approaches contribute(d) to the understanding of corruption in your country/ or within a specific sector or institution?
- To what extent have/could corruption diagnostics contribute(d) to a national debate about corruption in your country?

Facilitate the group discussion, probing, noting and helping the group to define important themes and questions. (20 minutes)

# Module Ten Notes

## Reference sheet 28: Systemic corruption diagnostics

By systemic corruption diagnostics, we refer to those approaches that comprehensively analyze corruption risks and anti-corruption capacities across or within the governance systems of a country.

In addition to mandating *periodic evaluations of legal and administrative measures put in place to combat corruption* (A.5; 3), Article 5 of the UNCAC implies a need for more systemic corruption assessments that can help determine strategic priorities for fighting corruption, through its obligation that countries develop *coordinated anti-corruption policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, transparency and accountability* (1).

*When is a systemic corruption diagnostics exercise appropriate?*

- Comprehensive corruption diagnostics may be used to help with strategic priority setting and sequencing that is involved in planning national anti-corruption strategies. A study by the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre of six countries that pursued national anti-corruption strategies or policies found that this approach was not overly successful due to a range of factors. Among other findings, strategies suffered from inadequate priority setting, they lacked sustained high level political will and ownership by the implementers and non-state actors, and monitoring and evaluation had been almost entirely ignored.<sup>43</sup> Lessons learned show that the success of NACS's has been linked to national ownership, comprehensive analysis and understanding of the local situation, stakeholder participation, priority-setting and sequencing, effective coordination, and monitoring and evaluation.<sup>44</sup>
- Evidence shows that stand-alone anti-corruption interventions and "isolated islands of integrity" that do not sufficiently take account of wider corruption dynamics are unsustainable, and can even be damaging. For example, in some contexts, lack of political will to attack corruption at the top can lead to complacency and even cynicism that further erodes trust in the state and "weakens the pressure that civil society places on politicians and bureaucrats".<sup>45</sup>
- At the same time, comprehensive assessments of corruption are resource-intensive exercises and may not always be feasible. In some contexts, for example in countries where the source of corruption is known to be concentrated in one sector, it may be more strategic to focus resources on in-depth sector studies.
- Building strategically on achievements with "targeted, focused approaches may be better than broad strategies lacking in implementation and staying power."<sup>46</sup>

<sup>43</sup> Hussmann & Hechler. (2008) *Anti-corruption policy making in practice: Implications for implementing UNCAC*. U4 Brief.

<http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2915=anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice>

<sup>44</sup> Chêne & Hodess. (2008) *Drafting a National Anti-Corruption Strategy for Vietnam*, U4 Expert Answer. <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=182>

<sup>45</sup> World Bank. (2000) *Diagnosing and Combating Corruption: A Framework with Application to Transition Economies*, p.60, <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/Designing-effective-anticorruption-strategies.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> ADB/DFID/UNDP/UNODC/WB (2007) *Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A roadmap for strategy and action*, Discussion Paper, p.1 [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti\\_corruption\\_roadmap.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf)

### *Political economy analysis*

The use of political economy analysis in the area of anti-corruption began as donors have increasingly come to realize that direct support of institutions has failed to generate expected results due to a lack of political will.<sup>47</sup> Increasingly, there is recognition of the importance of moving beyond institutional approaches and understanding the wider political, economic, and cultural dimensions of policy making.<sup>48</sup> The "major contribution has been to go beyond the assessment of performance and effectiveness and provide a more comprehensive and in-depth analysis of the factors explaining the success or failure of specific anti-corruption reforms."<sup>49</sup> Political economy analysis has been applied both at the national level, and to for in-depth understanding of specific sectors and institutions.

Donors have developed their own diagnostics methodologies such as DfID's Drivers of Change and SIDA's Power Analysis, to help understand the determinants and inhibitors of reform. Political economy analysis "is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals; and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time." Studies therefore seek to understand the informal as well as formal political and economic processes, in order to identify the factors affecting political will or its absence.

The scope of research varies, with some donor approaches, such as the World Bank's, involving fieldwork and others utilizing desk studies and local consultants. However, all approaches combine qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and share key units of analysis. Most approaches include a mapping of stakeholders, their influence on policy processes and support or opposition to reform; an analysis of the broad political context, including history of state formation, sources of revenues, social and economic structures; an analysis of the local formal and informal institutions that affect the quality of governance; and risk assessment, focusing on the impact of reforms on various groups of society.<sup>50</sup>

### *National surveys*

Despite the difficulties of design and implementation, national surveys are an essential tool for diagnosing the pervasiveness, degree and impact of corruption and for identifying priorities for reform. In addition, repeating surveys over time makes it possible to establish a baseline and to monitor progress; where they are implemented by local independent NGOs surveys can give voice to local communities, and publishing their results can raise public awareness, generate debate and to galvanize action.

The World Bank has advocated an approach to designing anti-corruption strategies that diagnoses the combination of administrative corruption and state capture in a country, with a view to identifying key challenges, priorities for reform, and potential risks for backstepping. Using this typology, four types were identified in Europe and Central Asia, depending on the combination of "medium" or "high" levels of administrative corruption and state capture. Factors influencing these proportions include the relative concentration or dispersion of economic power and competition, the capacity of the state bureaucracy, and the relative strength or fragmentation of civil society. A concentration of economic power and private political interests being the hallmark of state capture. Countries with higher levels of administrative corruption tended not only to have weak administrative structures, but also to have a greater dispersion of economic power. Reforms need to consider the links between the two types of corruption, as corruption in one area can lead to

---

<sup>47</sup> Collinson, cited in Chêne & Hodess. (2009) Political Economy Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms. U4 Expert Answer. P.2 <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=187>

<sup>48</sup> Chêne & Hodess. (2009) Political Economy Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms. U4 Expert Answer. <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=187>

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p. 4

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.3

increases in the other. For example, processes of unregulated liberalization of former communist economies can create opportunities for state capture, while a high level drain of resources can cause corruption to multiply down through lower levels.<sup>51</sup>

Despite the covert nature of corrupt transactions, survey techniques have been developed for detecting both administrative corruption and state capture. Certain categories of individuals can be surveyed effectively, including individuals who regard themselves as victims of corruption and extortion, rather than willing conspirators.<sup>52</sup> This applies to international and local businesses that may be in collusion with politicians, as well as to citizens. Questions are phrased to avoid implicating respondents in wrongdoing.<sup>53</sup>

Bribery surveys for example can indicate the extent of petty corruption. By asking individuals about interactions with different organizations and encounters of bribery-demand situations, it is possible to generate indicators about the incidence, prevalence, frequency, cost, size and severity of non-payment of bribes demanded by various frontline public services and private organizations.<sup>54</sup> Citizens can be asked more generally about their experiences and perceptions of both corruption and anti-corruption reforms as users of public services.

Surveys of the private sector such as the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) have been used to obtain information about the impact of corruption as well as the extent to which businesses pay to influence the administration of existing regulations (e.g. to obtain licenses) and to shape laws. Firms are asked about how the business environment affects them, and about their knowledge of “unofficial payments”.<sup>55</sup> The data are used to construct an index of state capture, using information about six types of activities that impact business, including the sale of Parliamentary votes on laws to private interests, the sale of Presidential decrees to private interests, Central Bank mishandling of funds, the sale of court decisions in criminal and commercial cases, and illicit contributions paid by private interests to political parties and election campaigns.<sup>56</sup>

A third target group of national surveys is public officials. Civil servants can be asked about their level of knowledge of corruption, bribery demand situations they may have witnessed, sectors and upper and lower ranks of government which they perceive to be most corrupt, or their opinion on most common forms of corruption as well as reasons motivating, and solutions for managing corruption. Hypothetical questions about the acceptability of certain behaviours is a less direct way of gauging corruption.<sup>57</sup>

The World Bank, through its Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Diagnostics methodology, combines surveys targeting public officials, business enterprises, NGOs and households in order “to unbundle the meaning of corruption to see what the problem is, to identify weak and strong institutions to see where the problem is, to assess the costs of corruption for different stakeholders, and to identify concrete and measurable ways to reduce those costs through targeted reforms”.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>51</sup> World Bank. (2000) “Diagnosing and Combating Corruption: A Framework with Application to Transition Economies.” Chapter 5, *Anti-Corruption in Transition: A contribution to the policy debate*. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/contribution.pdf>

<sup>52</sup> Pope. (2000) *TI Sourcebook, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System*, Transparency International p.288-289 <http://www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook>

<sup>53</sup> Reinikka & Svensson. (2003) Survey Techniques to Measure and Explain Corruption. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3071. p.9

<sup>54</sup> Kenya Bribery Index 2008, p.3-4 <http://www.tikenya.org/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> BEEPS Questionnaire (2005) <http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm>

<sup>56</sup> Hellman et.al (2000) “Seize the State, Seize the Day” *State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition*, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank/European Bank of Reconstruction and Development, p.8

<sup>57</sup> Afghan Civil Servant Corruption Survey questionnaire (2007)

<sup>58</sup> World Bank GAC Diagnostics

<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html>

## Module 11

### Instruments for assessing corruption

Activities		Time
Activity 1	What do you want to measure?	10 mins
Activity 2	Appraising assessment methodologies	50 mins
Activity 3	Methodology classification	30 mins

#### Overview

There is no point in reinventing the wheel. The many existing corruption assessment methodologies and templates can provide a foundation for determining a research focus, design and selecting indicators. In this module participants get an overview of some of these main corruption assessment methodologies and consider their various purposes, and their strengths and weaknesses.

## Module 11

## Instruments for assessing corruption

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- describe the uses of a selection of corruption assessment methodologies
- distinguish between methodologies that assess corruption and ones that assess the strength of integrity mechanisms
- critically assess the strengths and weaknesses of corruption assessment methodologies, and to adapt them to local needs.

### Time

1 hour 30 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

In this module participants get an overview of some of these main corruption assessment methodologies and consider their various purposes, and their strengths and weaknesses.

#### **Activity 1 What do you want to measure?**

Plenary warmer where participants reflect upon and share what they consider to be a priority focus for an assessment in their country.


#### **Activity 2 Appraising assessment methodologies**

In small groups, participants select and appraise corruption assessment instruments.

#### **Activity 3 Methodology classification**

The same small groups then consider broad distinctions between the approaches.

---




#### **Activity 1 What do you want to measure?**

##### **Format Warmer in plenary**

Participants should begin this activity by discussing what it is they would like to measure in their country. Ask participants the following:

- Think for a moment about corruption in your country. If you had to choose one area to focus monitoring, what area would that be?

Go around the circle while each participant shares his/her view. Otherwise, if participants are from the same country and/or are likely to share their area of focus, just name it and continue. (10 mins)



#### **Activity 2 Appraising assessment methodologies**

##### **Format Small groups**

Explain the purpose of the activity, which is to allow participants to become acquainted with the main features of a selection of corruption assessment tools, and to appraise them using what was covered in Part One of the programme.

Participants should form small groups of about six. Each participant then selects one of the summaries prepared for the assessment methodologies to appraise on the basis of actionability, complementarity, poverty and gender sensitivity, as well as practicality and feasibility. Participants can use these guiding questions:

1. Actionability - To what extent does the information collected by this tool translate into indicators that are actionable?

2. Complementarity - To what extent does it balance change in law and procedure with change in practice? Inputs with outcomes?
3. Poverty and gender sensitivity - To what extent does it capture the experiences and perceptions of marginalised groups?
4. Practicality and feasibility – in terms of time and cost

After participants have read and assessed their summary, the trainer can distribute the answer sheets for each summary (*Annex 5*). Note: summary sheets do not currently include item 4, but participants can still usefully discuss issues of practicality and feasibility in preparation for the next session on data collection methods. (10 mins)

Participants then present their instruments, after which groups can discuss the following question:

- For your country, which instrument is the most appropriate? Are there certain features from other instruments that are particularly useful? Would it strengthen the research design to combine (parts of) assessments?

The above question can either be taken individually, or as a group. (40 mins)

### Activity 3 Methodology classification

**Format Small groups, plenary discussion**

Ask participants to consider the differences between the types of assessment methodologies that were covered.

- How can we broadly categorise these different assessment methodologies?

Ask participants to group similar methods together into piles as they see fit.



Taking instruction from the floor, the trainer can then begin to group these sheets onto a wall. (Alternatively, with advance preparation, it could be useful to write the names of the assessment methodologies on pieces of A4 paper, so that they will be visible to everyone). This may require some grouping and re-grouping with debates in between. After participants are generally satisfied, ask them to find names for these categories.

Contrast this with the corruption assessment tools matrix, which classifies tools according to “assessing corruption” or “assessing integrity” (*Annex 5*). This is another way of thinking of these tools which might be useful.

Some of the questions which may arise during the course of this activity are:

- When might the different methods be useful?
- Could these different types of methods be usefully combined?

See *Reference Sheet 30: Combining corruption assessment instruments* for some possible responses to these questions. (30 mins)



## Module Eleven Notes

### Reference Sheet 30: Combining corruption assessment instruments

- We have already seen how corruption diagnostic tools, such as national bribery surveys can help to locate pockets of corruption, while other more holistic approaches, such as Transparency International's National Integrity Studies and DFID's Drivers of Change (DoC) approach analyse the causes of weak governance and corruption by exploring the inter-linkages between political-economic structures and power relationships.
- When corruption-fighting priorities are known, more specific sectoral and institutional studies can be carried out.
- Instruments measure integrity and accountability inputs may provide a useful entry point in situations where it is difficult or sensitive to obtain information on corruption prevalence, or perception-based information, because they tend to rely on facts and can be designed to generate indisputable results (e.g. Macedonia's *Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability Index*).
- Ideally input-focused methods should be combined with methods that measure outputs and impact of reforms, if not already built into these instruments. Surveys can be repeated down the road to see whether *de jure* progress through regulatory and administrative reform is reflected in public experience and opinion, although it is important to note the lag between policy reform and felt impact.



## Module 12

### Collecting data

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Data collection methods	20 mins
Activity 2	Selecting data collection methods	20 mins
Activity 3	Application	20 mins
Activity 4	Poverty and gender sensitivity	15 mins

#### Overview

While there are many different types of governance and corruption assessment instruments, they draw on a finite pool of data collection methods and methodologies. In this module participants get an overview of these potential methods and their strengths and weaknesses, then consider application to their own context.

## Module 12

## Collecting data

### Objectives

After this module, participants will be able to:

- outline the uses, advantages and disadvantages of different data collection methods
- select appropriate data collections methods for specific assessment purposes

### Time

1 hour 15 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**

In this module participants get an overview of potential data collection methods and their strengths and weaknesses, then consider application to their own context.

#### **Activity 1 Data collection methods**

Brainstorm in small groups of different possible methods, followed by trainer input.

#### **Activity 2 Selecting data collection methods**



Completion of activity worksheet in small groups, with brief plenary to take up any issues that arise across groups.

#### **Activity 3 Application**

Individual reflection on methods that would suit the purpose discussed in the previous Module 11.

#### **Activity 4 Poverty and gender sensitivity**

Plenary discussion on how poverty and gender sensitivity can be integrated into data collection methods.



---

#### **Activity 1 Data collection methods**


##### **Format Brainstorm in small groups, trainer input**

Ask participants to get into small groups and to brainstorm as many different methods and techniques for collecting data as they can in 2 minutes:

- What kind of data collection methods can you think of?
- What are their strengths and weaknesses?

Take down group suggestions onto the board. Participants should refer to generic methods, rather than branded names of instruments (e.g. surveys). (10 mins)

Using either PowerPoint or *Reference Sheet 31: Research methods*, the trainer or a resource person presents a mini-lecture giving an overview of the different potential data collection methods. Distribute a handout of content below to all participants to compare information as well as sample templates used for these methods (*Annex 6*). (10 mins)



## **Activity 2      Selecting data collection methods**

### **Format          Small groups**

In this exercise, participants must decide on the appropriate data collection method for various short cases and discuss and justify their answers with group members. Distribute *Reference Sheet 32: Data collection instruments matching exercise* for each participant to use as a worksheet. (15 minutes)

Only a very brief plenary is needed to take up responses and discuss the different rationale when recommended data collection methods vary for a given situation. (5 minutes)




## **Activity 3      Application**

### **Format          Individual reflection**

Ask participants, individually, to relate these methods to a priority assessment focus within their home country, and to record their answers.

- Reflect on a priority assessment focus within your home country. Which of these methods would you use to collect data and why?
- Outline a research plan for your assessment.

Give participants time to obtain and provide input into their research plans with a neighbour. (20 mins)



## **Activity 4      Poverty and gender sensitivity**

### **Format          Plenary discussion, trainer input**

This module refers back to Module 8 on integrity indicators as the basis for a large group discussion on making assessment processes sensitive to vulnerable groups.

Refer to the answer sheet *Annex 4, Activity 2*, highlighting several examples, or alternatively, referring participants to the sheet if they have it from before. Allow participants a few moments to recall the indicators before asking them this question:

- Which, if any, of the indicators generated by the group in the last module are gender or poverty sensitive? If few or none are, why might that be?
- How can pro-poor and gender sensitive dimensions be integrated into similar research designs?

Note ideas onto a flipchart, pointing out similarities and differences. Then compare these responses with the information on *Reference Sheet 33: Making integrity assessment methods more gender and poverty sensitive*, or using PowerPoint. End with a question to participants:

- Would you make any alterations to your research design?

(15 mins)

# Module Twelve Notes

## Reference Sheet 31: Research methods

In general, qualitative data are comprised of words, and are useful for explaining phenomena, while quantitative data are comprised of numbers and statistics and are better for measuring and testing presumed relationships between variables. It is possible to modify and transform qualitative data into quantitative data. Likewise, qualitative data provides the needed context and dynamics, including the perceptions and experiences of target populations, for designing quantitative data collection tools and for focusing statistical analysis on relevant issues. Rather than choose between qualitative and quantitative methods, it is best to integrate elements of both into the research design.

### *Surveys and questionnaires*

Surveys and questionnaires produce quantitative data. Household survey data are almost always based on a random sample of a population or sub-population; in contrast, a census attempts to collect data from an entire population. Both surveys and censuses can be focused on capturing factual data or perceptions and opinions. Survey data is particularly important for monitoring the effectiveness of governance reforms, because it can capture the experience, perceptions and attitudes of individuals who are providing or receiving public services. Surveys make it easy to identify trends and patterns, and is relatively easy to disaggregate by including appropriate questions in the survey from the start.

If random samples are used, estimates are precise and inferences can be made about the target population. But sample sizes are often small and do not allow for representative data to be collected. Methods can be costly, especially if the target population is hard to reach, and sampling frames are not always available, the use of structured interviews and questionnaires can sometimes hinder a detailed exploration of the reasons behind specific actions or decisions. Also, being based on categories created by the researcher, surveys cannot explain underlying dynamics and motivations, but are better suited to testing out hypotheses about relationships. Face-to-face surveys in particular can be time consuming and costly to administer.

### *Interviews<sup>59</sup>*

Interviews are essentially qualitative and are potentially very useful for measurement exercises in their preliminary and exploratory phases. They produce rich contextualized and explanatory data and are usually helpful for explaining complex experiences, perceptions and meanings, identifying causes and effects and so on. Interviews also reduce researcher bias and allow informants more control over what they discuss and for how long, and as a result often uncover new issues.

Interviews are also likely to involve more time in data collection, transcription and analysis. A major limitation of interviews is that they use small sample sizes and therefore can't claim representativeness on their own and be generalised. The interviewer must also be well trained and have a good understanding of research. It is also usually best if the interview is carried out by the same person who designed the research and goes on to analyse the data.

Expert interviews can usefully complement existing information in cases where household survey data are sparse or fragmentary. Numerous governance indicators available in international databases are constructed from the assessment of experts, but the relevance of indicators based on the opinion of "experts" has to be assessed in relation to those based on surveys conducted among individuals and households.

---

<sup>59</sup> Taken from *A note on Research Methodology for Combating Corruption*, Water, Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University/DFID, 2007, page 8 <http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/details.php?book=978-1-84380-120-7&keyword=%methodology%&subject=0&sort=TITLE>

### *Focus groups<sup>60</sup>*

Focus groups may be made up of a random sample from a target population, or individuals may be pre-selected. They are a quick way of getting in-depth information from a group of people. They can be used to get both an approximate understanding of key issues and more in-depth understandings. They allow for a range of views on an issue and are also cost and time-effective, as there is no need for extensive preparation, training or analysis.

On the downside, they may be affected by issues of intimidation and domination by elites, and there may be bias in sampling of groups. There is a need for a clear purpose and agenda, and skilled facilitation so that all issues are addressed and within time.

### *Observation (direct or participatory)*

Observation can be direct, or participatory, and should be guided by a checklist. Observing people or infrastructure in context might mean greater insight or accuracy. However, the presence of a researcher is likely to cause people to act or respond differently. Observation will also be based on the researcher's interpretation and may therefore be biased. The amount of time can vary, but it is cheap to carry out and requires little training for analysis. There is a need to be aware of bias in observation.

### *Field tests*

Field tests are an innovative way of determining the effectiveness of certain governance processes and reforms, by actually testing services from the position of the user. For example, this method has been used by the CRINIS Project and Transparency International to establish the effectiveness in practice of citizen access to information by contrasting the ability of trained research teams and groups of local volunteers to access the same information by actors with different backgrounds and levels of know how.<sup>61</sup>

### *Document and article review*

Desk studies are necessary at the beginning stage of research to determine what data is already available and to understand the issues and background context.

In many countries, high quality data have already been collected by the government in pursuit of its administrative duties. For example, data are collected from citizens when they pay taxes, or when they register for social security and medical benefits. Though such data are not primarily collected to inform policies, they may be used for this purpose. Disaggregating administrative data is much more difficult than with survey data because the forms used to collect the data typically use categories that are too broad for analysis. Proxies may be necessary to disaggregate data, for example neighbourhood may be a good proxy for income.

Events based data are another important source, and consist of recorded events. Such data include newspaper articles, and other news sources, individual records collected by NGOs (testimonies ect), specialised private or public bodies, and information collected by independent researchers. However, one of the main limits associated with this type of data is that findings are usually based on individual records, such as a report of a human rights violation before a Human Rights Commission, and, since they are not based on representative samples, cannot be generalised to the entire population. Further, events based data can suffer from problems of under or over-reporting.

---

<sup>60</sup> Ibid., page 8

<sup>61</sup> Transparency International/Carter Centre. (2007) CRINIS Project Report: Money in politics – everyone's concern, page 81  
[http://www.transparency.org/regional\\_pages/americas/crinis](http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/americas/crinis)

## Reference Sheet 32: Data collection instruments matching exercise

For each of the following situations, please indicate the most appropriate data collection instrument. Answers can be used more than once.

- |                                       |                          |
|---------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| A. business survey                    | F. observation           |
| B. focus group                        | G. interviews            |
| C. household survey                   | H. administrative data   |
| D. field tests                        | I. administrative survey |
| E. public expenditure tracking survey |                          |

- Despite a substantial increase in public spending on education, official reports show no increase in primary enrolment. The hypothesis is that actual service delivery, as proxied by primary enrolment, is worse than budgetary allocations imply because public funds are subject to capture by central and local politicians and do not reach schools. Public accounts on actual spending are not available.

☐
- A study of attendance of health sector workers has established the number of workers in different geographical locations and health facilities using government payroll data. The next step is to determine absentee rates among medical professionals.

☐
- The media have uncovered a scandal involving a monopoly by politically connected businesspeople on the purchase and sale of strategic grain reserves. The national anti-corruption coalition would like to discover the extent of collusion between politicians and private sector interests across other sectors.

☐
- A community has for decades been affected by unsafe and environmentally damaging mining practices by foreign owned companies, but revenues have failed to deliver the expected socio-economic benefits. An independent enquiry into a situation of unrest which turned violent when police shot a protester resulted in recommendations for participatory development to enhance the downward accountability of local traditional authorities and companies. The government would like to review the effectiveness of these recommendations since their implementation started, a year ago.

☐
- The upcoming national census is held only once every four years. The statistics office has been asked to incorporate a governance module in order to track public perception on the effectiveness of the country's anti-corruption strategy.

☐
- New legislation has been enacted which requires political parties to disclose all sources and amounts of funding, however there remains a gap between what is mandated by the law and what information is available in practice. An independent research group has the task of diagnosing the responsiveness of parties to public requests for information.

☐
- An independent corruption vulnerability study of the police is commissioned, with a view to identifying factors influencing corruption in human resource management focusing on recruitment/selection, promotion and lateral entry; whistleblowing, internal reporting of grievances, summary dismissal, pre-charge investigation and summary hearing; and interface with the external environment, particularly on issuance of clearances, licenses and permits for motor vehicles, fire arms, explosives and security operations.

☐
- As part of a study on the impact of corruption on women, information is needed on the average wage of women in the civil service and private sector as a proportion of the average wage of men in the civil service and private sector.

☐
- A country recovering from a devastating civil conflict has a highly fragmented civil society, a weak formal economy and a thriving drug and small arms trade. The heavily aid-dependent government is the main source of employment, and political factions vie for key posts. Many of the problems of corruption are seen as stemming from the weakness of the state and therefore a significant part of reform efforts is focused on changing the bureaucratic culture. Government and donors need to evaluate the impact of capacity development programming on the prevalence and acceptability of corruption within the civil service.

☐

## Reference Sheet 33: Making integrity assessment methods more gender and poverty sensitive

Indicators that measure integrity (as opposed to level or impact of corruption) can all too easily become poverty and gender blind. Because their primary concern is the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms in law and in practice, they tend to focus on the inputs and outputs of interventions.

The approach can easily become focused on documentation, regulation and expert opinion (e.g. Global Integrity's Integrity Scorecards, for example, which are completed by national experts and journalists), rather than on the experiences and perceptions of ordinary and in particular, marginalised citizens. In addition, because they can be highly narrow in their focus on a specific intervention, they can easily overlook wider impacts. Of course, the further one zooms in to the micro level of a process (e.g. the proportion of contracts which are publicly advertised within a public procurement system) the links to gender and poverty can appear tenuous. But as part of linking the fight against corruption to wider development goals, it is important to check whether such links exist, rather than to be altogether blind (e.g. the proportion of contracts that are advertised on the radio, in areas where there is low newspaper circulation or literacy rates).

One way to enhance the likelihood of poverty and gender sensitive indicators is to involve advocates from these areas in the design of research methods. Take the Macedonia RTA index for example [see Module 8], where the identification of "hot spots" is done by gathering the input from all stakeholders through interviews (e.g. representatives from local self-government, the overseeing institutions, and users of municipal services). In these interviews, stakeholders were asked about their perceptions and experiences with corruption concerning local units of self-government. Interview data was cross-referenced with an analysis of the laws, regulations and organizational structures by researchers.<sup>62</sup> This is a process which could be easily adapted to integrate the input of marginalised groups.

An additional check can be to complement instruments that focus on mechanisms with ones that focus on citizens/clients. Following up integrity studies with complementary analyses of end-user experiences can therefore provide a way of monitoring the effect these changes have on gendered and income-based experiences of corruption.

Other ways of capturing the experiences of marginalised groups include:

- involving poor communities and marginalised groups in the research objective, design and including in the selection, scaling, and weighting of indicators, where an index is being constructed
- targeting these groups in case studies which look at the impact of corruption on livelihoods and the functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms
- focusing studies on services and institutions that are used by these groups
- involving them in data collection
- disaggregating survey data by groups (e.g. by gender, poor communities, age, sexual orientation, ethnicity, language ect).

---

<sup>62</sup> UNDP, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (2008) *Methodology For measuring the Index of Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability at local level*. <http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/show/E0665B63-F203-1EE9-B2237737A3E4BC48>





## Module 13

### Application and reflection

#### Activities

Activity 1	Case analysis and indicator creation	50 mins
Activity 2	Case study reflection	1 hr 20 mins
Activity 3	Good practices checklist	25 mins

#### Time

#### Overview

Up to now we have introduced a number of analytical frameworks for producing indicators, including: two types of corruption, corruption, input (ideally action-worthy), output, and impact indicators, fact and perception based indicators, and gender and poverty sensitive indicators. In addition, we touched on some of the wider diagnostic approaches and more specific instruments for measuring both corruption and integrity. In Part One we also covered the methodological, political and operational dimensions of assessment processes. In this module participants can pull these strands together and apply them to real life cases.

## Module 13 Application and reflection

### Objectives

After this module, participants will:

- be able to design balanced baskets of indicators for a real life case
- have applied and contextualised the knowledge previously gained in the training to a real life case study
- be able to suggest 'good practices' applicable to measuring and assessing corruption in a national context.

### Time

2 hours 30 minutes

### Description

#### Introduction

In this module participants can pull these strands together and apply them to real life cases.

#### Activity 1 Case analysis and indicator creation

Participants select an issues brief which gives an overview of a complex corruption issue which they read individually (possibly in advance). They then work with their small groups to analyze the types of corruption involved, and to design appropriate indicators. Groups can compare answers to the different cases by milling about.


#### Activity 2 Case study reflection

In small groups, participants focus on the more process-oriented challenges of corruption assessments through a fictitious narrative case, in which they analyse the challenges and reflect upon possible courses of action from the perspective of a government official. Groups go back and forth between reading and discussing new parts of the case.

#### Activity 3 Good practices checklist

Produced in small groups, followed by milling about between groups to compare answers, and trainer input.

Further reading:  
"Good Practices &  
Case Studies", Chapter  
3 from *A User's Guide  
to Measuring  
Corruption*



---

#### Activity 1 Case analysis and indicator creation

##### Format Individual reading (or in advance), small groups, milling about

After providing the above introduction, explain that in this activity groups will apply the framework of 4 types of corruption indicators which was outlined in Module 2 to a real life corruption issue. Participants may select a corruption issue of their choice to work on in groups. Their assignment is to do the following:

1. Read individually, and discuss in groups, the U4 Brief of their choosing.
2. Produce indicators in each of the three categories including:
  - Corruption indicators (directly observable, or proxy indicators)
  - Impact indicators (group-specific, environmental, revenue)
  - Indicators on the existence and functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms (input *and* output)

It may be helpful to apply the distinction between administrative corruption and state capture to understand the various dynamics of corruption in this issue, and to consider the corruption beneficiaries at different levels.

Groups should keep in mind the principles of complementarity and of gender and


poverty-sensitivity when designing this list of indicators. You may wish to refer back to the Module 2 instructions for an illustrative example. Ask participants to note on flipchart paper the indicators they generate for each category.

Next, name all of the potential focus issues that participants may choose:

- Corruption and commercial fisheries in Africa
- Corruption and forest revenues in Papua
- Teachers and taxis: corruption in the education sector in Honduras
- Combating corruption in revenue service: the case of VAT refunds in Bolivia
- Embezzlement of donor funding in health projects
- Political finance: state control and civil society monitoring
- Corruption and doing business in Serbia
- Informal pay and the quality of health care: lessons from Tanzania

(40 minutes)

**PREPARATION NOTE:** You may wish to ask participants to sign up for these groups in advance, in order to know how many photocopies to make of each U4 Brief. Consider making a sign up sheet at the start of the programme. Consider also distributing these briefs in advance so that participants can read them on their own time. See the training resources page of the [Governance Assessment Portal \(GAP\)](#) for the briefs. See *Reference Sheet 34: Commercial fisheries in Africa - Example*.



The plenary debrief for this activity should be kept brief, focusing on technical issues rather than content. Rather than having each group read off its indicators, have groups post their indicators onto the walls, and let participants circulate around the room to read the indicators of other groups. Ask participants:


- Look for three indicators that you would like to take back to improve your group's list.

Groups can then reconvene and decide which indicators they would add or amend. (10 minutes)

## **Activity 2 Case reflection**

### **Format Small groups, individual reflection**

Introduce the activity, explaining that the following case is based on a common experience of using indicators to tackle measurement problems. The story relates to some of the key concepts and themes discussed in the training up to now. Working in small groups, participants discuss the questions that are embedded in the case (*Annex 7*).




The case has been divided into segments, each ending with a question for the group to reflect upon. Logistically, this means the trainer needs to feed portions of the case to a group one at a time, after each time the whole group has read and discussed the questions from a segment. Note that the case is lengthy (7 segments with questions). (1 hour)

After having read the whole case, participants write a page reflection on the case on a paper.

- What are the general lessons we can learn from this case?
- Can you derive any lessons or pieces of advice that are transferable to your own context?

(20 mins)







### **Activity 3      Good practices checklist**

#### **Format      Small groups brainstorm, milling about, trainer input**

Once all group members have finished writing their reflections, ask them to compare lessons and advice they would like to take away from the case. Their task is to brainstorm good and bad practices, and to compile a list on flipcharts that they can take back and offer as a checklist to others designing corruption assessments. Encourage them to think outside of the case, including reflecting on their own experiences of assessment processes. (15 mins)



Ask groups to post their flipchart paper onto the walls, and allow members to mill about the room to view what other groups have written. Leave a marker pen close to each paper, and ask participants to feel free to draw a ☺ next to any points they would add to their own list. (5 mins)



After participants have had a chance to take in the work of the other groups, highlight examples which may have received a lot of ☺'s. Use Powerpoint or *Reference Sheet 35: Check list for finding the most appropriate corruption indicators* to provide alternative checklist questions which draw on the *Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption*. (5 mins)

## Module Thirteen Notes

### Reference Sheet 34: Commercial fisheries in Africa - Example

Potential indicators developed based on the U4 Brief on Commercial Fisheries in Africa.

- Corruption indicators
  - Number of recorded incidents of fishing violations (e.g. fishing in protected parts of the sea, using proscribed fishing gear, underreporting catches, disregarding conservation measures) in relation to number of arrests/ prosecutions and their outcomes
  - Conflict of interest between negotiating obligations and personal fishing interests
  - Bribe payment of port officials and marine inspectors by boat owners
- Impact indicators
  - Domestic per capita consumption of fish
  - Levels of fish stocks
- Integrity indicators \*
  - Decisions on licensing overseen by multi-stakeholder committees
  - Fisheries departments publish details of license agreements, including information on payments, taxes and fines
  - Local fisheries stakeholders included in negotiation of access agreements.
  - Access agreements are regularly audited by independent auditors, and the results are open to public scrutiny
  - Civil society plays a role in the oversight of expenditure of revenues and expenditure from specific access agreements and license fees, and of the fisheries sector more generally
  - Capacity building for fisheries management, including monitoring, surveillance, and law enforcement, is adequately funded.

Secondary sources of information: marine surveillance data, court cases, marine conservation data, administrative data

\* Scales would have to be created against which to judge progress.

## Reference Sheet 35: Checklist for finding the most appropriate corruption indicators

1. Do you know what you want to benchmark, monitor or assess?
  - a) Have you considered what long and medium term objectives do you hope to achieve through a corruption assessment?
2. Have you consulted existing sources of information?
  - a) When consulting indicators, have you avoided the “labelling trap” by digging underneath indicators to understand the questions being asked?
  - b) Have you mapped out the monitoring activities that have already or which regularly take place?
  - c) Have you reviewed qualitative as well as quantitative information sources?
3. Are you designing your anti-corruption strategies in a modest, incremental fashion?
  - a) Have you unpacked the broad concepts you want to track into more measurable, discrete issues?
4. Have you searched for actionable data?
  - a) Do the corruption metrics provide information that enables you to make concrete policy decisions and address a specific problem?
  - b) Have you looked for disaggregated indicators that are effective for operationalising corruption data?
5. Have you considered locally-generated assessments?
  - a) Are you prepared to invest time and resources into generating your own original research if/when existing data sources do not properly address your issues?
  - b) Does the locally-generated assessment draw on the knowledge of multiple stakeholders – including local academics, NGOs, and policymakers – that yield a more participatory framework for discussion?
  - c) Does the planned assessment have a clear focus and an achievable scope?
6. Have you decided to generate your own indicators as part of the assessment?
  - a) Have you considered how to define action-worthy interventions?
  - b) Have you considered how best to develop balanced sets of indicators for a given unit of analysis?
  - c) Since corruption and governance are complex issues, are you using multiple sources of information to obtain a comprehensive understanding, identify possible points of intervention, and reduce bias from a single data source?
7. Have you exercised responsibility in using your measurement tool?
  - a) Are your analyses supported by a rigorous methodology?
  - b) Do you thoroughly understand the data on corruption that you are using and the limits in linking that data to macro-level development outcomes?
8. Is the methodology used in devising your indicators transparent?
  - a) If you can't find the underlying data or questions asked, have you looked for a better source that is more transparent?
9. Are you using pro-poor and gender sensitive indicators?
  - a) Have you identified which population groups are not accounted for in existing indicators and assessments?
  - b) Have you tapped into currently available data sources for constructing indicators which have an explicit focus on the poor, women and other marginalized groups?
  - c) Have you considered using regular household surveys to collect data on citizen's experiences and perceptions of corruption, which could then be disaggregated based on income, gender, ethnicity, residential area etc. of respondents?

## Module 14

### Learning transfer and evaluation

Activities		Time
Activity 1	Plan for applying new knowledge	20 mins
Activity 2	Completion of evaluation	10 mins

#### Overview

A major indicator of success in any learning activity is whether new knowledge or skills are transferred into participants' work or organisation. The purpose of the closing module is to provide participants the space to consider what action they will take when returning to their work, and how they will apply what they have learned. It is also the time for participant to provide feedback on the programme, and for the facilitator to plan next steps for evaluating the wider impact of the training, and to make necessary adjustments to the programme.

## Module 14

## Learning transfer and evaluation

### Objectives

After this module, participants will:

- have devised a personal plan for implementing lessons learned in the programme
- have completed an evaluation form in response to the programme.

### Time

30 minutes

### Description

#### **Overview**


The purpose of the closing module is to provide participants the space to consider what action they will take when returning to their work, and how they will apply what they have learned, and to provide feedback.

#### **Activity 1 Plan for applying new knowledge**

Individual planning, followed by plenary sharing.

#### **Activity 2 Completion of evaluation**

Presentation of evaluation form by trainer, and individual completion.




#### **Activity 1 Plan for applying new knowledge**

##### **Format Individual planning, plenary sharing**

Ask participants to reflect upon the following questions, and to record their answers:

- What have you learned in the programme that is most relevant to your work?
- How will you apply what you have learned?
- And what next steps will you take?
- What questions will you take forward?

After they have finished writing, invite participants to share their reflections and action plans, going around the circle. The facilitator should note individual resolutions for future reference, or make copies of them.



If all participants are working within the same country or institution, it may be useful to give them the option of having a group action plan, followed by individual reflections.

Explain to participants that they will be contacted within a month to remind them of their resolutions. You may wish to circulate an email list at this point, for those who wish to stay in contact. See *Facilitation note 4: Ideas for follow up.* (20 mins)





## **Activity 2      Completion of evaluation**

### **Format          Individual evaluation**

The facilitator should explain the evaluation form (*Annex 8*) prior to distributing it. Mention that information provided will feed into adjustments to the programme, and thank participants for their participation in the programme!

Remember to collect all feedback forms, and to return to the address, fax or email indicated in *Annex 8*.

(10 mins)




# Facilitation notes

## Facilitation note 3: Adult learning

The aim of training is to facilitate change – either in behaviours, skills or attitudes. Often participants in training programmes either do not or are not capable of applying the learning objectives in their day to day work, and this is often due to flawed training design.

This training programme is adjusted to fit the adult learning cycle, which is the model of how adults learn naturally in their day to day lives. It is based on the assumption that adults want to learn, and that they learn best through experience, rather than through traditional classroom based teaching methods which start with theory.



This training therefore uses active learning strategies, such as problem-solving methods that require the active participation of learners. It is also based on the understanding that learners already possess the resources for learning based on their knowledge and experience.

Successful training results are achieved through a combination of factors – a sound programme design, attuned facilitation, and committed participation. While the trainer facilitates the learning process by simulating natural learning conditions and by creating a safe space for sharing and exploring knowledge and experiences, the learner's responsibility is for his/her own learning by arriving prepared, by participating actively in the programme, and by applying new knowledge after the programme has finished.

## Facilitation note 4: Learning retention

Studies show that over a period of three days, learners retained

- 10% of what they read;
- 20% of what they heard;
- 30% of what they saw;
- 50% of what they saw and heard;
- 70% of what they said;
- 90% of what they said as they actively applied the information by, for example, verbally working through a problem .<sup>63</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Pike, R. W. (1989). *Creative training techniques handbook: Tips, techniques, and how-to's for delivering effective training*. Minneapolis, MN: Lakewood Books.

## Facilitation note 5: Training needs analysis

Knowing the participants ahead of time will help you to tailor the programme to their needs, for example by dropping certain modules, or by spending more time on relevant modules and activities, by focusing on certain materials, or by having participants make certain preparations in advance of the training. Preliminary contact with participants will also demonstrate to them that their concerns are taken seriously (as long as they are acted upon!) and can help to build rapport faster once the training gets started.

Some of the information about the participants that you may find useful to know include:

- Professional background – Why are they taking the course? In what way do they relate to monitoring and/or corruption in their work? Do they face specific challenges in relation to corruption assessment?
- Level of knowledge about assessment processes in general, the technical aspects of indicators, corruption
- Interests and objectives – Are there particular sectors or measurement approaches they would like to focus on?
- Overall – Are participants from the same country or institution? Do they know each other? Are they working on projects? Or are they from very mixed contexts? (This could have implications, e.g. for ice-breaking and the length of group discussions)
- Country context – (Where participants are from one country/region) What are principle monitoring activities in the area of corruption? What is the status of UNCAC ratification/implementation review? Which actors are involved in monitoring? Does civil society play a role in monitoring corruption?
- Previous experiences of training

You can gather this information in a number of ways:

- Sending a **brief** questionnaire by email
- Short phone discussions
- Discussing with informed individuals

## Facilitation note 6: Getting feedback during the programme

The trainer may find it helpful to get feedback on the programme at the end of each day, to allow for making adjustments to the programme. It is important that the trainer monitor learning processes and make sure that participants are being engaged. A useful way to get this feedback is to involve the participants themselves.

### *The eyes and ears technique*

Each morning, ask for two volunteers to be the “eyes” and “ears” of the participants. Their job will be to gather feedback on issues and activities throughout the day by talking to their peers and observing. After the programme has ended for the day, they are responsible for attending a brief facilitation meeting with the trainer to report feedback and to discuss potential adjustments to the programme for the next day. Holding the meeting at the end of the day avoids involving “too many cooks” as well as fatigue from participants who may be running low on patience.

### *The parking lot*

The parking lot is a space (e.g. flipchart, whiteboard, paper) where participants can post questions, comments and feedback that cannot be addressed during the training modules. These can be taken up at the end of the day by the facilitator, or answered in the course of the next day. This approach has the potential to backfire if participants feel that their questions are not being addressed, so the trainer shouldn't make this suggestion unless there is a realistic chance that at least some of the questions can be addressed.

### Facilitation tip 7: Using small groups

There are a number of advantages of working in small groups. Small groups are the main format used in active learning because they are ideal for problem-solving, experience sharing and learning from peers.

They provide a safe environment where participants can practice new skills, test out new ideas, and give and receive feedback. In addition, some individuals may feel more comfortable speaking in small groups than in plenary, so using small groups also ensures that everybody talks!

Depending on the specific task, the ideal numbers for small groups will vary. In a group that is too large, not everyone will engage, while a group that is too small will bring together fewer perspectives and is likely to generate less creative exchange. Ideal numbers are anywhere from 4 to 8 people.

Getting groups to work together effectively may require some facilitation. This can be the decision by the group to assign a note-taker or time-keeper. It can also mean instituting rules (normally by the trainer), for example, that require each participant to contribute to the discussion, or that limit everyone's time to talk, as a means of managing reticent and dominant personalities.

In the course this workshop, small groups make and break with great frequency. The trainer should consider when it is best to keep the same groups together (e.g. for the continuity of an exercise) or to mix them up to stimulate new exchanges. Additional considerations when dividing participants into groups include balancing gender, rank, age, experience, nationality or profession etc. There are many ways of dividing groups which may be suitable at different times. Here are a few possibilities:

#### Participant's preference

- **Letting participants choose** which group they want to join, for example when each group has a different assignment focus. In this case the trainer's job is to structure the choice of group by focus areas that are of interest to participants. If a group is oversubscribed, split it. If a group is undersubscribed, it probably isn't a popular topic!

#### Random seating

- For example, by **numbering** participants. Here the trainer would count out participants according to the number of desired groups, assigning each one a number/letter: "1-2-3-4" or "A-B-C-D". Make sure to specify where each group should convene.
- For fun, you can even organize participants on the basis of what **colour** they are wearing. Be creative!

#### Ordered seating

- Participants are seated by **table cards** listing the names in each group. Ideally these should provide a new mix of participants who have not yet worked together. This requires advance preparation.
- Setting **criteria**, for example: groups should include participants from different/the same countries/institutions/municipalities, or that groups should be gender balanced.

## Facilitation note 8: Brainstorming

Brainstorming is a technique used in groups to generate a large number of ideas on a given problem or topic. Creativity can be stifled when the brainstorming process is cut short, and individuals can become inhibited in groups when their ideas are rejected or seen as being off topic.

Here are a few recommended tips for brainstorming effectively:

- start by clearly defining the problem or question
- focus on quantify, generating as many ideas as possible
- encourage people to develop their ideas
- welcome unusual ideas
- withhold judgment and criticism - asking for clarification is ok, but not passing judgement
- combine ideas to create new ones

## Facilitation note 9: Assessing impact and promoting continuous learning

Comparing the baseline information obtained through the training needs analysis with the post-training self-assessment by participants (in the evaluation forms), together with the trainer's observations, provides an insight into what participants have learned. However, this information only tells us the extent to which participants are able to execute the intended objectives *within a classroom setting*. It does not tell us whether the training programme is achieving its intended goal of helping participants to provide advice to stakeholders undertaking corruption assessment in their home countries, and whether this, in turn, is enabling countries to make informed and inclusive decisions about assessment processes that are suited to their needs.

To find this information out, it is necessary for the trainer to follow up with participants several weeks to several months after the training, in order to assess to what extent new knowledge and skills are being applied at work. Consider asking participants:

- whether and how they have applied knowledge or skills gained during the programme
- whether they have carried out the "next steps" they personally committed to at the end of the programme [Module 14, Activity 1], and if not, why not
- new questions and learning needs they have become aware of and would like to address

Feedback can be collected

- By phone
- Face-to-face meetings with participants
- Discussions with employers who may have had a specific purpose for commissioning training
- Brief questionnaires sent by email (preferably not by mail, given the lower response rates. Postage-paid envelopes are necessary)

The feedback can also be used to promote continued learning, for example by planning follow up activities, *as requested* by participants. Follow up learning activities could include:

- An experience sharing or problem solving module
- An email group to promote peer assistance and experience sharing
- A coaching module on the [Governance Assessment Portal](#) (GAP), where participants can access a vast range of resources and can join a global discussion group of practitioners

Trainers are encouraged to contact the Global Programme on Democratic Governance Assessments for advice and to share feedback.

# References

ADB/DFID/UNDP/UNODC/WB. (2007) *Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: A roadmap for strategy and action*, Discussion Paper, [http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti\\_corruption\\_roadmap.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf)

Afghan Civil Servant Corruption Survey questionnaire (2007)

Canadian Parliamentary Centre /World Bank Institute. Indicators of parliamentary performance in the budget process, [http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget\\_process\\_e.php](http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget_process_e.php)

Chêne & Hodess. (2009) Political Economy Analysis of Anti-Corruption Reforms. U4 Expert Answer. Chr. Michelsen Institute, <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=187>

Chêne, Marie & Robin Hodess. (2008) "Drafting a National Anti-Corruption Strategy for Vietnam," U4 Expert Answer, Chr. Michelsen Institute, <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=182>

Chêne, Marie & Robin Hodess. (2008) "Assessing Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures in Burkina Faso," U4 Expert Answer, Chr. Michelsen Institute, <http://www.u4.no/helpdesk/helpdesk/query.cfm?id=158>

Conference of States Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. (2006) *Resolution 1/1 of the Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations Convention against Corruption*, UNODC, <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-session1-resolutions.html>

Developpement Institutions & Analyse de Long terme (DIAL), Module on governance attached to household surveys, (See Annexes at end of country reports)  
[http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial\\_enquetes/dial\\_enquetes\\_modulegouvernance.htm](http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_enquetes/dial_enquetes_modulegouvernance.htm)

DfID. (2007) "Country Governance Analysis," How to note, <http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications/how-to-note-country-gov-analysis.pdf>

Due Process of Law (DPLF)/UNDP. (2007) *A Guide to Rapid Assessment and Policy-Making for the Control of Corruption in Latin American Justice Systems*, <http://www.dplf.org/uploads/1188586969.pdf>

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development /World Bank. Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), Questionnaire (2005) <http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/surveys/beeps.htm>

Global Integrity/UNDP (2008). *A Users' Guide to Measuring Corruption*.  
[http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users\\_guide\\_measuring\\_corruption.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/users_guide_measuring_corruption.pdf)

Global Integrity, Integrity Indicators Scorecards, <http://report.globalintegrity.org/>

Heller, Nathaniel. (2008) *Defining and measuring corruption: where have we come from, where are we, and what matters for the future?* Conference paper,  
<http://www.planejamento.gov.br/hotsites/seges/clad/documentos/hellern.pdf>

Hellman *et al* (2000) *"Seize the State, Seize the Day" State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition*, Policy Research Working Paper 2444, The World Bank/European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

Holloway, Richard. *NGO Corruption Fighter' Resource Book – How NGOs can use monitoring and advocacy to fight corruption*

Husmann & Hechler. (2008) *Anti-corruption policy making in practice: Implications for implementing UNCAC*, U4 Brief, Chr. Michelsen Institute, <http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?2915=anti-corruption-policy-making-in-practice>

International Network on Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, *Environmental Compliance and Enforcement Indicators Glossary*, <http://www.inece.org/indicators/glossary/glossary2.php?cat=k>

Kaufmann, Daniel & Aart Kraay. (2007) *On Measuring Governance: Framing the Issues for Debate*. Issues paper for Roundtable on Measuring Governance Hosted by the World Bank Institute and the Development Economics Vice-Presidency of The World Bank , [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=961624](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=961624)

Knack, Stephen. (2006) *Measuring Corruption in Eastern Europe and Central Asia: A Critique of the Cross Country Indicators*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3968

Loughborough University/DFID. (2007) *A note on Research Methodology for Combating Corruption*, Water, Engineering and Development Centre, <http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/details.php?book=978-1-84380-120-7&keyword=%methodology%&subject=0&sort=TITLE>

OECD. (2005) *Assessing Trends in Corruption and Impact of Anti-Corruption Measures*, Discussion Paper, The Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies 6<sup>th</sup> General Meeting, Istanbul, Turkey. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/62/50/37330934.pdf>

OECD Statistics Glossary <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/search.asp>

Open Budget Initiative, <http://www.openbudgetindex.org>

Pike, R. W. (1989). *Creative training techniques handbook: Tips, techniques, and how-to's for delivering effective training*. Minneapolis, MN: Lakewood Books.

Pope, Jeremy. (2000) *TI Sourcebook, Confronting Corruption: The Elements of a National Integrity System*, Transparency International, <http://www.transparency.org/publications/sourcebook>

Public Affairs Centre, Citizen Report Card, <http://www.pacindia.org/issues/research>

Reinikka & Svensson. (2003) *Survey Techniques to Measure and Explain Corruption*. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3071, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=636433](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636433)

Schultz, Jessica. (2007) *The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Primer for Development Practitioners*, U4 Brief, Chr. Michelsen Institute, <http://www.cmi.no/publications/publication/?2750=the-united-nations-convention-against-corruption>

Sida, *Examples of Corruption*, [http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=439&a=1444&language=en\\_US](http://www.sida.se/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=439&a=1444&language=en_US)

Sohail, M. & S. Cavill. (2007) *Partnering to Combat Corruption in Infrastructure Services: A Toolkit*, Water, Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University, <http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/details.php?book=978-1-84380-125-2&keyword=%infrastructure%20%&subject=0&sort=TITLE>

Swiss Agency for Development. (2008) *Challenging Common Assumptions on Corruption and Democratisation: Key recommendations and guiding principles*, [http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource\\_en\\_170422.pdf](http://www.deza.admin.ch/ressources/resource_en_170422.pdf)

Transparency International, *Corruption Perceptions Index*, [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi)

Transparency International. (2008) *Promoting Revenue Transparency: Report on Revenue Transparency of Oil and Gas Companies*, Annex 4, Questionnaire [http://www.transparency.org/news\\_room/latest\\_news/press\\_releases/2008/2008\\_04\\_28\\_prt\\_report\\_launch](http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_04_28_prt_report_launch)

Transparency International – Crinis Project. (2008) *Guide to Component 1: Data Gathering*

Transparency International/Carter Centre. (2007) *CRINIS Project Report: Money in politics – everyone's concern*, [http://www.transparency.org/regional\\_pages/americas/crinis](http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/americas/crinis)

Transparency International - Kenya, *Kenya Bribery Index 2008*, <http://www.tkenya.org/documents/KenyaBriberyIndex08.pdf>

Transparency International/UNDP. (2006) *Mapping of Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Latin America*, [http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/LAC\\_survey.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/LAC_survey.pdf)

Transparency International/UNDP. (2007) *Mapping of Corruption and Governance Measurement Tools in Sub-Saharan Africa*, [http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/mapping\\_corruption\\_africa.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs08/mapping_corruption_africa.pdf)

U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, "Glossary," <http://www.u4.no/document/glossary.cfm#statecapture>

United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html>

UNDP. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. (2008) *Methodology For measuring the Index of Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability at local level*. <http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/show/E0665B63-F203-1EE9-B2237737A3E4BC48>



UNDP. (2008) *Planning a Governance Assessment: A Guide to Approaches, Costs and Benefits*.  
[http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/UNDP\\_GA\\_Guide\\_070408\\_V4.pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs09/UNDP_GA_Guide_070408_V4.pdf)

UNDP. (2006) *A Framework for Selecting Pro-Poor and Gender Sensitive Indicators*.  
<http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/Framework%20paper%20-%20entire%20paper.pdf>

UNDP. (2006) *A Guide to Measuring the Impact of Right to Information Programmes: Practical Guidance Note*,  
[http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/A%20Guide%20to%20Measuring%20the%20Impact%20of%20Right%20to%20Information%20Programmes%20-%20final%20\(11%2004%2006\).pdf](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre/docs06/A%20Guide%20to%20Measuring%20the%20Impact%20of%20Right%20to%20Information%20Programmes%20-%20final%20(11%2004%2006).pdf)

World Bank. (2000) *Diagnosing and Combating Corruption: A Framework with Application to Transition Economies*, <http://www.u4.no/pdf/?file=/document/literature/Designing-effective-anticorruption-strategies.pdf>

World Bank, Governance Matters 2008, Worldwide Governance Indicators 1996-2007, "Control of Corruption Indicator", <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>

World Bank, Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) Diagnostics,  
<http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,contentMDK:20726148~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:1740530,00.html>

World Bank, Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)  
<http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTPUBSERV/0,,contentMDK:20292627~menuPK:546432~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:477916,00.html>

# ANNEXES

## **ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption**

Activity 1 – Discrepancies in rankings

- Three global corruption indices

Activity 2 – Disaggregation exercise

- Component indicators for each index (World Bank's Control of Corruption; Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, the Global Integrity Index)

Activity 3 – Component indicators

- Component indicators – PowerPoint instructions

Activity 4 – Identifying actionable indicators

- Actionable indicators worksheet
- Actionable indicators answer sheet

## **ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators**

Activity 4 – Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators

- Case and worksheet
- Answer sheet

## **ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators**

Activity 3 – Matching input and output indicators

- Matching input and output indicator cards

## **ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices**

Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

- Integrity indicators worksheet 1,2,3
- Integrity indicators answer sheet 1,2,3

Activity 5 – Developing indicator scales

- Indicator scales worksheet
- Indicator scales answer sheet

## **ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption**

Activity 2 – Appraising assessment methodologies

- Assessment methodology summary sheets and templates

## **ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data**

Activity 2 – Data collection methods

- Data collection method templates

## **ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection**

Activity 2 – Case reflection

- Case study: A government official's story

## **ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation**

Activity 2 – Training programme evaluation

- Trainer's evaluation form
- Participant's evaluation form

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indices of corruption

### Activity 1 – Explaining discrepancies

#### Three global corruption indices

**The objective of this activity is for participants, working in small groups, to observe differences in global ranking indicator sets for a given country.**

Ask participants to get into small groups, and give each group a set of handouts containing 3 global ranking indicator sets related to corruption (2007): 1) the World Bank's Worldwide Corruption Indicators on 'Control of Corruption', 2) Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index, and 3) the Global Integrity Index.

Ask participants to note the position of China on each one. Of course, the ranking of China differs on each index since the total number of countries listed on each index also differs. To compare the 'performance' of China on the 3 different indices, one can see how China is ranking compared to 2 "comparator countries". Ask participants to note the position of Thailand and India on each index.

- Ask each group the question what do you observe?

Groups should agree that the rankings differ from index to index. Continue with the PowerPoint slides to make this discrepancy explicit.

### The Global Integrity Index 2007 Results

*"Measures the existence (in law), effectiveness (in practice), and citizen access to key anti-corruption mechanisms in a country"*

Country	Overall Rating	Overall Score
Bulgaria	Strong	87
United States	Strong	87
Latvia	Strong	84
Spain	Strong	81
Japan	Strong	81
Italy	Strong	81
Romania	Strong	81
Canada	Strong	81
Costa Rica	Moderate	79
France	Moderate	78
India	Moderate	75
Argentina	Moderate	75
Kazakhstan	Moderate	73
Kenya	Moderate	73
Malawi	Moderate	72
Jordan	Moderate	72
Colombia	Moderate	72
Uganda	Moderate	70
Vanuatu	Weak	70
Ecuador	Weak	70
Pakistan	Weak	70
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Weak	69

## **ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption**

Peru	Weak	69
Ukraine	Weak	68
Philippines	Weak	67
Thailand	Weak	65
Azerbaijan	Weak	65
Kyrgyz Republic	Weak	64
Russia	Weak	64
Bangladesh	Weak	64
Mexico	Weak	63
Georgia	Weak	63
Tanzania	Weak	60
Moldova	Weak	60
Nepal	Weak	60
Mozambique	Very Weak	59
Sierra Leone	Very Weak	58
Timor-Leste	Very Weak	58
Sri Lanka	Very Weak	58
Armenia	Very Weak	58
China	Very Weak	55
Burundi	Very Weak	54
Nigeria	Very Weak	54
Cameroon	Very Weak	54
Egypt	Very Weak	53
Tajikistan	Very Weak	53
Algeria	Very Weak	47
Lebanon	Very Weak	45

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### 2007 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX (CPI) by Transparency International

*“Measures corruption in international business transactions – Many sources concentrate on occasions when corruption occurs whilst doing business, such as obtaining export permits”*

country rank	country	2007 CPI score	surveys used	confidence range
1	Denmark	9.4	6	9.2 - 9.6
1	Finland	9.4	6	9.2 - 9.6
1	New Zealand	9.4	6	9.2 - 9.6
4	Singapore	9.3	9	9.0 - 9.5
4	Sweden	9.3	6	9.1 - 9.4
6	Iceland	9.2	6	8.3 - 9.6
7	Netherlands	9.0	6	8.8 - 9.2
7	Switzerland	9.0	6	8.8 - 9.2
9	Canada	8.7	6	8.3 - 9.1
9	Norway	8.7	6	8.0 - 9.2
11	Australia	8.6	8	8.1 - 9.0
12	Luxembourg	8.4	5	7.7 - 8.7
12	United Kingdom	8.4	6	7.9 - 8.9
14	Hong Kong	8.3	8	7.6 - 8.8
15	Austria	8.1	6	7.5 - 8.7
16	Germany	7.8	6	7.3 - 8.4
17	Ireland	7.5	6	7.3 - 7.7
17	Japan	7.5	8	7.1 - 8.0
19	France	7.3	6	6.9 - 7.8

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

20	USA	7.2	8	6.5 - 7.6
21	Belgium	7.1	6	7.1 - 7.1
22	Chile	7.0	7	6.5 - 7.4
23	Barbados	6.9	4	6.6 - 7.1
24	Saint Lucia	6.8	3	6.1 - 7.1
25	Spain	6.7	6	6.2 - 7.0
25	Uruguay	6.7	5	6.4 - 7.0
27	Slovenia	6.6	8	6.1 - 6.9
28	Estonia	6.5	8	6.0 - 7.0
28	Portugal	6.5	6	5.8 - 7.2
30	Israel	6.1	6	5.6 - 6.7
30	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	6.1	3	4.0 - 7.1
32	Qatar	6.0	4	5.4 - 6.4
33	Malta	5.8	4	5.3 - 6.2
34	Macao	5.7	4	4.7 - 6.4
34	Taiwan	5.7	9	5.4 - 6.1
34	United Arab Emirates	5.7	5	4.8 - 6.5
37	Dominica	5.6	3	4.0 - 6.1
38	Botswana	5.4	7	4.8 - 6.1
39	Cyprus	5.3	3	5.1 - 5.5
39	Hungary	5.3	8	4.9 - 5.5
41	Czech Republik	5.2	8	4.9 - 5.8
41	Italy	5.2	6	4.7 - 5.7

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

43	Malaysia	5.1	9	4.5 - 5.7
43	South Africa	5.1	9	4.9 - 5.5
43	South Korea	5.1	9	4.7 - 5.5
46	Bahrain	5.0	5	4.2 - 5.7
46	Bhutan	5.0	5	4.1 - 5.7
46	Costa Rica	5.0	5	4.7 - 5.3
49	Cape Verde	4.9	3	3.4 - 5.5
49	Slovakia	4.9	8	4.5 - 5.2
51	Latvia	4.8	6	4.4 - 5.1
51	Lithuania	4.8	7	4.4 - 5.3
53	Jordan	4.7	7	3.8 - 5.6
53	Mauritius	4.7	6	4.1 - 5.7
53	Oman	4.7	4	3.9 - 5.3
56	Greece	4.6	6	4.3 - 5.0
57	Namibia	4.5	7	3.9 - 5.2
57	Samoa	4.5	3	3.4 - 5.5
57	Seychelles	4.5	4	2.9 - 5.7
60	Kuweit	4.3	5	3.3 - 5.1
61	Cuba	4.2	4	3.5 - 4.7
61	Poland	4.2	8	3.6 - 4.9
61	Tunisia	4.2	6	3.4 - 4.8
64	Bulgaria	4.1	8	3.6 - 4.8
64	Croatia	4.1	8	3.6 - 4.5
64	Turkey	4.1	7	3.8 - 4.5

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

67	El Salvador	4.0	5	3.2 - 4.6
68	Colombia	3.8	7	3.4 - 4.3
69	Ghana	3.7	7	3.5 - 3.9
69	Romania	3.7	8	3.4 - 4.1
71	Senegal	3.6	7	3.2 - 4.2
72	Brazil	3.5	7	3.2 - 4.0
72	China	3.5	9	3.0 - 4.2
72	India	3.5	10	3.3 - 3.7
72	Mexico	3.5	7	3.3 - 3.8
72	Morocco	3.5	7	3.0 - 4.2
72	Peru	3.5	5	3.4 - 3.7
72	Suriname	3.5	4	3.0 - 3.9
79	Georgia	3.4	6	2.9 - 4.3
79	Grenada	3.4	3	2.0 - 4.1
79	Saudi Arabia	3.4	4	2.7 - 3.9
79	Serbia	3.4	6	3.0 - 4.0
79	Trinidad and Tobago	3.4	4	2.7 - 3.9
84	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.3	7	2.9 - 3.7
84	Gabon	3.3	5	3.0 - 3.5
84	Jamaica	3.3	5	3.1 - 3.4
84	Kiribati	3.3	3	2.4 - 3.9
84	Lesotho	3.3	6	3.1 - 3.5
84	FYR Macedonia	3.3	6	2.9 - 3.8
84	Maldives	3.3	4	2.3 - 4.3



## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

84	Montenegro	3.3	4	2.4 - 4.0
84	Swaziland	3.3	5	2.6 - 4.2
84	Thailand	3.3	9	2.9 - 3.7
94	Madagascar	3.2	7	2.5 - 3.9
94	Panama	3.2	5	2.8 - 3.4
94	Sri Lanka	3.2	7	2.9 - 3.5
94	Tanzania	3.2	8	2.9 - 3.4
98	Vanuatu	3.1	3	2.4 - 3.7
99	Algeria	3.0	6	2.7 - 3.2
99	Armenia	3.0	7	2.8 - 3.2
99	Belize	3.0	3	2.0 - 3.7
99	Dominican Republic	3.0	5	2.8 - 3.3
99	Lebanon	3.0	4	2.2 - 3.6
99	Mongolia	3.0	6	2.6 - 3.3
105	Albania	2.9	6	2.6 - 3.1
105	Argentina	2.9	7	2.6 - 3.2
105	Bolivia	2.9	6	2.7 - 3.2
105	Burkina Faso	2.9	7	2.6 - 3.4
105	Djibouti	2.9	3	2.2 - 3.4
105	Egypt	2.9	7	2.6 - 3.3
111	Eritrea	2.8	5	2.1 - 3.5
111	Guatemala	2.8	5	2.4 - 3.2
111	Moldovaa	2.8	7	2.5 - 3.3
111	Mozambique	2.8	8	2.5 - 3.1

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

111	Rwanda	2.8	5	2.3 - 3.3
111	Solomon Islands	2.8	3	2.4 - 3.1
111	Uganda	2.8	8	2.5 - 3.0
118	Benin	2.7	7	2.3 - 3.2
118	Malawi	2.7	8	2.4 - 3.0
118	Mali	2.7	8	2.4 - 3.0
118	Sao Tome and Principe	2.7	3	2.4 - 3.0
118	Ukraine	2.7	7	2.4 - 3.0
123	Comoros	2.6	3	2.2 - 3.0
123	Guyana	2.6	4	2.3 - 2.7
123	Mauritania	2.6	6	2.0 - 3.3
123	Nicaragua	2.6	6	2.3 - 2.7
123	Niger	2.6	7	2.3 - 2.9
123	Timor-Leste	2.6	3	2.5 - 2.6
123	Viet Nam	2.6	9	2.4 - 2.9
123	Zambia	2.6	8	2.3 - 2.9
131	Burundi	2.5	7	2.0 - 3.0
131	Honduras	2.5	6	2.3 - 2.6
131	Iran	2.5	4	2.0 - 3.0
131	Libya	2.5	4	2.1 - 2.6
131	Nepal	2.5	7	2.3 - 2.7
131	Philippines	2.5	9	2.3 - 2.7
131	Yemen	2.5	5	2.1 - 3.0
138	Cameroon	2.4	8	2.1 - 2.7

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

138	Ethiopia	2.4	8	2.1 - 2.7
138	Pakistan	2.4	7	2.0 - 2.8
138	Paraguay	2.4	5	2.1 - 2.6
138	Syria	2.4	4	1.7 - 2.9
143	Gambia	2.3	6	2.0 - 2.6
143	Indonesia	2.3	11	2.1 - 2.4
143	Russia	2.3	8	2.1 - 2.6
143	Togo	2.3	5	1.9 - 2.8
147	Angola	2.2	7	1.8 - 2.4
147	Guinea-Bissau	2.2	3	2.0 - 2.3
147	Nigeria	2.2	8	2.0 - 2.4
150	Azerbaijan	2.1	8	1.9 - 2.3
150	Belarus	2.1	5	1.7 - 2.6
150	Congo, Republic	2.1	6	2.0 - 2.2
150	Cote d'Ivoire	2.1	6	1.7 - 2.6
150	Ecuador	2.1	5	2.0 - 2.3
150	Kazakhstan	2.1	6	1.7 - 2.5
150	Kenya	2.1	8	1.9 - 2.3
150	Kyrgyzstan	2.1	7	2.0 - 2.2
150	Liberia	2.1	4	1.8 - 2.4
150	Sierra Leone	2.1	5	2.0 - 2.2
150	Tajikistan	2.1	8	1.9 - 2.3
150	Zimbabwe	2.1	8	1.8 - 2.4
162	Bangladesh	2.0	7	1.8 - 2.3

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

162	Cambodia	2.0	7	1.8 - 2.1
162	Central African Republic	2.0	5	1.8 - 2.3
162	Papua New Guinea	2.0	6	1.7 - 2.3
162	Turkmenistan	2.0	5	1.8 - 2.3
162	Venezuela	2.0	7	1.9 - 2.1
168	Congo, Democratic Republic	1.9	6	1.8 - 2.1
168	Equatorial Guinea	1.9	4	1.7 - 2.0
168	Guinea	1.9	6	1.4 - 2.6
168	Laos	1.9	6	1.7 - 2.2
172	Afghanistan	1.8	4	1.4 - 2.0
172	Chad	1.8	7	1.7 - 1.9
172	Sudan	1.8	6	1.6 - 1.9
175	Tonga	1.7	3	1.5 - 1.8
175	Uzbekistan	1.7	7	1.6 - 1.9
177	Haiti	1.6	4	1.3 - 1.8
178	Iraq	1.5	4	1.3 - 1.7
179	Myanmar	1.4	4	1.1 - 1.7
179	Somalia	1.4	4	1.1 - 1.7

### Explanatory notes\*

\* **CPI Score** relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).

\*\* **Confidence range** provides a range of possible values of the CPI score. This reflects how a country's score may vary, depending on measurement precision. Nominally, with 5 percent probability the score is above this range and with another 5 percent it is below. However, particularly when only few sources are available, an unbiased estimate of the mean coverage probability is lower than the nominal value of 90%.

\*\*\* **Surveys used** refers to the number of surveys that assessed a country's performance. 14 surveys and expert assessments were used and at least 3 were required for a country to be included in the CPI.

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### World Bank “Control of Corruption” Indicator

*“Measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests”*

0	-1	0
---	----	---

Country	Sources	Year	Percentile Rank * (0-100)	Governance Score (-2.5 to +2.5)	Standard Error
BANGLADESH	15	2007	9.7	-1.05	0.13
BRAZIL	17	2007	52.2	-0.24	0.12
CHINA	16	2007	30.9	-0.66	0.12
EGYPT	15	2007	35.7	-0.58	0.13
ETHIOPIA	14	2007	27.5	-0.70	0.14
FRANCE	13	2007	89.4	+1.32	0.13
GERMANY	12	2007	93.2	+1.80	0.13
INDIA	17	2007	47.3	-0.39	0.12
INDONESIA	19	2007	27.1	-0.72	0.12
IRAN	12	2007	37.2	-0.56	0.14
JAPAN	14	2007	84.5	+1.20	0.13
MEXICO	18	2007	48.8	-0.35	0.12
NIGERIA	17	2007	12.1	-1.01	0.12
PAKISTAN	17	2007	21.3	-0.83	0.13
PHILIPPINES	18	2007	22.2	-0.79	0.12
RUSSIA	18	2007	16.4	-0.92	0.11
THAILAND	17	2007	44.0	-0.44	0.12
TURKEY	17	2007	59.4	+0.04	0.12
UNITED STATES	14	2007	91.3	+1.44	0.13
VIETNAM	18	2007	28.0	-0.69	0.12

**\*Percentile rank:** Indicates rank of country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to the lowest rank, and 100 corresponds to the highest rank.

*The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations.*

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption


### Activity 1 – Explaining discrepancies

#### PowerPoint Instructions

Following the activity where groups compare the ‘performance’ of China, Thailand and India on the three different indices, participants should agree that the rankings differ from index to index. Continue with the PowerPoint slides to make this discrepancy explicit, as illustrated below.

Show participants the following PowerPoint slides, providing explanations as indicated below.


Slide 1: “Corruption in China in 2007: 3 indices, 3 stories...” – this slide illustrates the discrepancy that groups should have observed.




Show slide 2: The “story” gets even more confusing when looking at changes in scores on two indices (Worldwide Governance Indicators and Corruption Perceptions Index) over time:

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

Corruption in China *over time* (2004-06):  
Two indices, two stories...



According to the World Bank, China is doing **better** in 2006 than it was in 2004



According to TI, China is doing **worse** in 2006 than it was in 2004

Oslo Governance Centre  
BDP-Democratic Governance Group

Ask participants to brainstorm on the following question:

- Why might China rank differently on these different indicator sets?

Ask each group to summarize in one sentence its feedback to the group.

## **ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption**

### **Activity 2 – Component indicators**

**Component indicators for the three global corruption indices**



# ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

## World Bank Control of Corruption indicator.<sup>64</sup>

### Individual indicators & corresponding data sources

**Table B6: Control of Corruption**

Code	Concept Measured
<b>Representative Sources</b>	
DRI	Risk Event Outcome non-price: Losses and Costs of Corruption: A 1-point increase on a scale from "0" to "10" in corruption during any 12-month period.
EIU	Corruption
GCS	Public trust in financial honesty of politicians Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: import/export permits Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: public utilities Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to tax payments Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: awarding of public contracts Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: getting favorable judicial decisions Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence government policies impose costs on other firms Undue political influence
GWP	Is corruption in government widespread?
IPD	Corruption
MIG	<i>Corruption.</i> There is an immense variety of activities that may be construed as corrupt. Bribery is the most obvious. However, what is and is not a bribe is a matter of presentation and perception in much the same way as "corruption" itself. Some of the issues that executives should consider include: accounting standards; anti-corruption policy credibility and enforceability; cronyism, nepotism and vested interests; cultural differences; judicial independence; transparency of decision-making.
PRS	<i>Corruption.</i> Measures corruption within the political system, which distorts the economic and financial environment, reduces the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than ability, and introduces an inherently instability in the political system.
QLM	Indirect Diversion of Funds
WMO	<i>Corruption:</i> This index assesses the intrusiveness of the country's bureaucracy. The amount of red tape likely to countered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encountering corrupt officials and other groups.
<b>Non-representative Sources</b>	
ADB	Transparency / corruption
AFR	How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local councilors) do you think are involved in corruption? How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption? How many government officials do you think are involved in corruption? How many border/tax officials do you think are involved in corruption?
ASD	Anti-corruption
BPS	How common is for firms to have to pay irregular additional payments to get things done On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials How often do firms make extra payments to influence the content of new legislation Extent to which firms' payments to public officials to affect legislation impose costs on other firms How problematic is corruption for the growth of your business. Frequency of bribery in utility, permits, procurement, health, fire inspection, environment, taxes, customs and judiciary
BRI	<i>Internal Causes of Political Risk:</i> Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to compromise, etc
BTI	Corruption
CCR	Transparency / corruption
CPIA	Transparency / corruption
FRH	Corruption
GCB	Frequency of corruption Frequency of household bribery
GII	Anti-Corruption Law Anti-Corruption Agency
IFD	Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas
LBO	Have you heard of acts of corruption?
PRC	Corruption Index
VAB	Frequency of corruption among government officials
WCY	Bribing and corruption exist in the economy

<sup>64</sup> To avoid confusion, note that World Bank uses the word "indicator" to refer to what is technically an index. (e.g. Control of Corruption Indicator = Control of Corruption Index)

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### World Bank “Control of Corruption” indicator: Different data sources used over the years

Table 1: Sources of Governance Data Used in 2007 Update of WGI

Code	Source	Type*	Public Coverage	Country Representation												
				1996	1998	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
ADB	African Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments	Expert (GOV)	Partial	52		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
AEO	OECD Development Center African Economic Outlook	Expert (GOV)	Yes	33	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
AFR	Afrobarometer	Survey	Yes	18			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
ASD	Asian Development Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments	Expert (GOV)	Partial	25			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
BPS	Business Enterprise Environment Survey	Survey	Yes	27			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
BRI	Business Environment Risk Intelligence Business Risk Service	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	50	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	120				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
CCR	Freedom House Countries at the Crossroads	Expert (NGO)	Yes	63						x	x	x	x	x	x	x
DRI	Global Insight Global Risk Service	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	142	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
EBR	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Transition Report	Expert (GOV)	Yes	29	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
EGV	Global E-Governance Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	196	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	154	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
FRH	Freedom House	Expert (NGO)	Yes	197	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
GCB	Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer Survey	Survey	Yes	62				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
GCS	World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report	Survey	Yes	125	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
GII	Global Integrity Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	41					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
GWP	Gallup World Poll	Survey	Yes	130	x									x	x	x
HER	Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom	Expert (NGO)	Yes	157	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
HUM	Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale	Expert (GOV)	Yes	192	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
IFD	IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments	Expert (GOV)	Yes	100						x	x	x	x	x	x	x
IJT	iJET Country Security Risk Ratings	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	187	x					x	x	x	x	x	x	x
IPD	Institutional Profiles Database	Expert (GOV)	Yes	85	x									x	x	x
LOB	Latinobarometro	Survey	Yes	18		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MIG	Merchant International Group Gray Area Dynamics	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	156	x				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
MSI	International Research and Exchanges Board Media Sustainability Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	38				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
OBI	International Budget Project Open Budget Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	59							x	x	x	x	x	x
PIA	World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments	Expert (GOV)	Partial	136		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
PRC	Political Economic Risk Consultancy Corruption in Asia Survey	Survey	Yes	12			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
PRS	Political Risk Services International Country Risk Guide	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	140	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
QLM	Business Environment Risk Intelligence Financial Ethics Index	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	115	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
RSF	Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index	Expert (NGO)	Yes	166	x				x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
TPR	US State Department Trafficking in People report	Expert (GOV)	Yes	153	x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
VAB	Vanderbilt University Americas Barometer	Survey	Yes	22					x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
WCY	Institute for Management and Development World Competitiveness Yearbook	Survey	Yes	53		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x
WMO	Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators	Expert (CBIP)	Yes	202	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

\*CBIP -- Commercial Business Information Provider, GOV -- Public Sector Data Provider, NGO -- Non-Governmental Organization Data Provider

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### World Bank “Control of Corruption” indicator: Different types of data source used for each of the 6 indicators

**Table 2: Distribution of Data Points by Type of Data in 2007 WGI**

	Commercial Business Information Providers	Surveys of Firms or Households	Non- Governmental Organizations	Public Sector Organizations	<i>Total</i>
<b><i>Number of Data Points</i></b>					
Voice and Accountability	492	374	751	399	2016
Political Stability/Absence of Violence	1024	186	0	315	1525
Government Effectiveness	840	388	321	393	1942
Regulatory Quality	790	213	282	422	1707
Rule of Law	955	409	439	737	2540
Control of Corruption	954	493	282	393	2122
<b><i>Total</i></b>	<b>5055</b>	<b>2063</b>	<b>2075</b>	<b>2659</b>	<b>11852</b>
<b><i>Shares of Total for Each Indicator</i></b>					
Voice and Accountability	0.24	0.19	0.37	0.20	1.00
Political Stability/Absence of Violence	0.67	0.12	0.00	0.21	1.00
Government Effectiveness	0.43	0.20	0.17	0.20	1.00
Regulatory Quality	0.46	0.12	0.17	0.25	1.00
Rule of Law	0.38	0.16	0.17	0.29	1.00
Control of Corruption	0.45	0.23	0.13	0.19	1.00
<b><i>Total</i></b>	<b>0.43</b>	<b>0.17</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0.22</b>	<b>1.00</b>
<b><i>Weighted Shares of Total for Each Indicator</i></b>					
Voice and Accountability	0.24	0.02	0.62	0.12	1.00
Political Stability/Absence of Violence	0.84	0.03	0.00	0.13	1.00
Government Effectiveness	0.65	0.11	0.06	0.18	1.00
Regulatory Quality	0.63	0.07	0.14	0.16	1.00
Rule of Law	0.67	0.10	0.12	0.10	1.00
Control of Corruption	0.65	0.13	0.11	0.11	1.00
<b><i>Total</i></b>	<b>0.59</b>	<b>0.08</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>0.13</b>	<b>1.00</b>

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Corruption Perception Index: Data Sources

#### Appendix: Sources for the TI Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2007

Number	1	2	3
Abbreviation	ADB	AFDB	BTI
Source	Asian Development Bank	African Development Bank	Bertelsmann Foundation
Name	Country Performance Assessment Ratings	Country Policy and Institutional Assessments	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
Compiled / published	2006/2007	2005/2006	2007/2008
Internet	<a href="http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Performance-Assessment-Exercise/IN76-07.pdf">http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Performance-Assessment-Exercise/IN76-07.pdf</a>	<a href="http://www.afdb.org/portals/page?_pageid=293,158705&amp;_dad=portal&amp;_schema=POR-TAL&amp;focus_item=9912322&amp;focus_lang=us">http://www.afdb.org/portals/page?_pageid=293,158705&amp;_dad=portal&amp;_schema=POR-TAL&amp;focus_item=9912322&amp;focus_lang=us</a>	<a href="http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&amp;L=1">http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&amp;L=1</a>
Who was surveyed?	Country teams, experts inside and outside the bank	Country teams, experts inside and outside the bank	Network of local correspondents and experts inside and outside the organization
Subject asked	Corruption, conflicts of interest, diversion of funds as well as anti-corruption efforts and achievements	Corruption, conflicts of interest, diversion of funds as well as anti-corruption efforts and achievements	The government's capacity to punish and contain corruption
Number of replies	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Coverage	26 countries (eligible for ADF funding)	52 countries	125 less developed and transition countries

Number	4	5	6
Abbreviation	CPIA	EIU	FH
Source	World Bank (IDA and IBRD)	Economist Intelligence Unit	Freedom House
Name	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment	Country Risk Service and Country Forecast	Nations in Transit
Compiled / published	2006/2007	2007	2007
Internet	<a href="http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:20933600~menuPK:2626968~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html">http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:20933600~menuPK:2626968~pagePK:51236175~piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.html</a>	<a href="http://www.eiu.com">www.eiu.com</a>	<a href="http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=84">http://www.freedomhouse.org/index.php?option=com_content&amp;task=view&amp;id=84</a>

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

Who was surveyed?	Country teams, experts inside and outside the bank	Expert staff assessment	Assessment by experts originating or resident in the respective country.
Subject asked	Corruption, conflicts of interest, diversion of funds as well as anti-corruption efforts and achievements	The misuse of public office for private (or political party) gain	Extent of corruption as practiced in governments, as perceived by the public and as reported in the media, as well as the implementation of anticorruption initiatives
Number of replies	Not applicable	Not applicable	Not applicable
Coverage	77 countries (eligible for IDA funding)	166 countries	29 countries/territories

Number	7	8	9
Abbreviation	GI	IMD	
Source	Global Insight, formerly World Markets Research Centre	IMD International, Switzerland, World Competitiveness Center	
Name	Country Risk Ratings	IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook	
Compiled / published	2007	2006	2007
Internet	<a href="http://www.globalinsight.com">http://www.globalinsight.com</a>	<a href="http://www.imd.ch/wcc">www.imd.ch/wcc</a>	
Who was surveyed?	Expert staff assessment	Executives in top and middle management; domestic and international companies	
Subject asked	The likelihood of encountering corrupt officials, ranging from petty bureaucratic corruption to grand political corruption	Bribing and corruption exist/do not exist	
Number of replies	Not applicable	More than 4000	
Coverage	203 countries	53 countries	55 countries

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

Number	10	11	12
Abbreviation	MIG	PERC	
Source	Merchant International Group	Political & Economic Risk Consultancy	
Name	Grey Area Dynamics	Asian Intelligence Newsletter	
Compiled / published	2007	2006	2007
Internet	<a href="http://www.merchantinternational.com">www.merchantinternational.com</a>	<a href="http://www.asiarisk.com/">www.asiarisk.com/</a>	
Who was surveyed?	Expert staff and network of local correspondents	Expatriate business executives	
Subject asked	Corruption, ranging from bribery of government ministers to inducements payable to the “humblest clerk”	How serious do you consider the problem of corruption to be in the public sector?	
Number of replies	Not applicable	More than 1,000	1476
Coverage	155 countries	15 countries	15 countries

Number	13	14
Abbreviation	UNECA	WEF
Source	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	World Economic Forum
Name	Africa Governance Report	Global Competitiveness Report
Compiled / published	2005/2006	2006/2007
Internet	<a href="http://www.unece.org/agr/">http://www.unece.org/agr/</a>	<a href="http://www.weforum.org">www.weforum.org</a>
Who was surveyed?	National expert survey (between 70 and 120 in each country)	Senior business leaders; domestic and international companies
Subject asked	“Corruption Control”. This includes aspects related to corruption in the legislature, judiciary, and at the executive level, as well as in tax collection. Aspects of access to justice and government services are also involved	Undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with various government functions
Number of replies	Roughly 2800	Ca. 11,000
Coverage	28 countries	125 countries

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Global Integrity Index: Data sources and individual indicators

<b>Where to find it?</b>	<a href="http://globalintegrity.org/">http://globalintegrity.org/</a>
<b>Purpose</b>	<p>"To measure the existence (in law), the effectiveness (in practice), and citizen access to key good governance / anti-corruption mechanisms in a country that should ideally prevent, deter, or punish corruption."</p> <p>The Global Integrity framework does <b>not</b> measure corruption. Rather than attempting to measure the "cancer" of corruption, the Global Integrity framework assesses the quality of the "medicine" being applied to fight it: good governance and anti-corruption mechanisms.</p>
<b>Type of data used</b>	Highly specific fact-based indicators (more than 300) supported by objective evidence (laws, official policy documents, newspaper articles, administrative data, independent reports, academic sources, etc.)
<b>Methodology</b>	<p>Original on-the-ground research by in-country experts (leading local NGOs, universities, research institutes), backed by peer-reviewed commentary and references.</p> <p>The questionnaire raises questions on the existence, effectiveness and citizen access to good governance / anti-corruption mechanisms in 6 areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <b>Civil society, public information and media</b></li> <li>2. <b>Elections</b> (<i>voting &amp; citizen participation, integrity of elections, regulations around political financing</i>)</li> <li>3. <b>Government accountability</b> (<i>across the executive, legislative &amp; judicial branches of government, and in budget processes</i>)</li> <li>4. <b>Administration and civil service</b> (<i>civil service regulations, whistle-blowing measures, regulatory processes around procurement &amp; privatization</i>)</li> <li>5. <b>Oversight and regulation</b> (<i>ombudsman, supreme audit, taxes &amp; customs, financial sector regulation, business licensing</i>)</li> <li>6. <b>Anti-corruption and rule of law</b> (<i>anti-corruption agency, access to justice, law enforcement</i>)</li> </ol> <p>Each indicator question is scored on a scale from 0 to 100, based on specific criteria.</p>

### Integrity Indicators Scorecard

#### Category I Civil Society, Public Information and Media

##### I-1 Civil society organizations

*Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?*  
*Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?*  
*Are civil society activists safe when working on corruption issues?*  
*Can citizens organize into trade unions?*

##### I-2 Media

*Are media and free speech protected?*  
*Are citizens able to form print media entities?*  
*Are citizens able to form broadcast (radio and TV) media entities?*  
*Can citizens freely use the Internet?*  
*Are the media able to report on corruption?*  
*Are the media credible sources of information?*  
*Are journalists safe when investigating corruption?*

##### I-3 Public access to information

*Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?*

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

*Is the right of access to information effective?*

Category II	Elections
I-1	<b>Voting &amp; citizen participation</b> <i>Is there a legal framework guaranteeing the right to vote?</i> <i>Can all citizens exercise their right to vote?</i> <i>Are citizens able to participate equally in the political process?</i>
I-2	<b>Election integrity</b> <i>In law, is there an election monitoring agency or set of election monitoring agencies/entities?</i> <i>Is the election monitoring agency effective?</i> <i>Are elections systems transparent and effective?</i>
I-3	<b>Political financing</b> <i>Are there regulations governing political financing?</i> <i>Are the regulations governing political financing effective?</i> <i>Can citizens access records related to political financing?</i>
Category III	Government Accountability
I-1	<b>Executive accountability</b> <i>In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?</i> <i>Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?</i> <i>Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?</i> <i>Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?</i> <i>Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?</i>
I-2	<b>Legislative accountability</b> <i>Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?</i> <i>Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the national legislature?</i> <i>Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature?</i> <i>Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?</i>
I-3	<b>Judicial accountability</b> <i>Are judges appointed fairly?</i> <i>Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?</i> <i>Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the national-level judiciary?</i> <i>Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national-level judiciary?</i>
I-4	<b>Budget processes</b> <i>Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?</i> <i>Can citizens access the national budgetary process?</i> <i>In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?</i> <i>Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?</i>
Category IV	Administration and Civil Service
I-1	<b>Civil service regulations</b> <i>Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?</i> <i>Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?</i> <i>Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?</i> <i>Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior civil servants?</i>
I-2	<b>Whistle-blowing measures</b>



## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

*Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?*

*In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?*

*In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?*

### **I-3 Procurement**

*Is the public procurement process effective?*

*Can citizens access the public procurement process?*

### **I-4 Privatization**

*Is the privatization process effective?*

*Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?*

## **Category V Oversight and Regulation**

### **I-1 National ombudsman**

*In law, is there a national ombudsman, public protector or equivalent agency (or collection of agencies) covering the entire public sector?*

*Is the national ombudsman effective?*

*Can citizens access the reports of the ombudsman?*

### **I-2 Supreme audit institution**

*In law, is there a national supreme audit institution, auditor general or equivalent agency covering the entire public sector?*

*Is the supreme audit institution effective?*

*Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?*

### **I-3 Taxes and customs**

*In law, is there a national tax collection agency?*

*Is the tax collection agency effective?*

*In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?*

*In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?*

*Is the customs and excise agency effective?*

*In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?*

### **I-4 State-owned enterprises**

*In law, is there an agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies?*

*Is the agency or equivalent mechanism overseeing state-owned companies effective?*

*Can citizens access the financial records of state-owned companies?*

### **I-5 Business licensing and regulation**

*Are business licenses available to all citizens?*

*Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?*

*Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?*

## **Category VI Anti-Corruption and Rule of Law**

### **I-1 Anti-corruption law**

*Is there legislation criminalizing corruption?*

### **I-2 Anti-corruption agency**

*In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?*

## **ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption**

*Is the anti-corruption agency effective?*

*Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?*

### **I-3 Rule of law**

*Is there an appeals mechanism for challenging criminal judgments?*

*In practice, do judgments in the criminal system follow written law?*

*In practice, are judicial decisions enforced by the state?*

*Is the judiciary able to act independently?*

*Are judges safe when adjudicating corruption cases?*

*Do citizens have equal access to the justice system?*

### **I-4 Law enforcement**

*Is the law enforcement agency (i.e. the police) effective?*

*Can law enforcement officials be held accountable for their actions?*

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Activity 3 – Component indicators – mini-lecture


#### PowerPoint Instructions

Supplement group ideas from the previous activity on component indicators with the following slides and messages:

Slides 3-4: Measurement tools with similar 'labels' may in fact be assessing very different concepts. It is therefore important to "dig underneath" by asking: What are the underlying questions or component indicators that have gone into generating the index score?

Slide 3 shows "what's under the label" of 3 global corruption indices.

Slide 3



Slide 4

Quick Tip 1: "Ignore an index's label and dig underneath"

- Different scores on 2 different indices does not mean that one index is right and the other is wrong.
- Only that the 2 indices are assessing different concepts
- Quick tip:
  - 1) Know what want to measure
  - 2) Ignore an index's "label"
  - 3) Unpack component questions / indicators
  - 4) Which index really measures what you want to measure?
  - 5) Or do you need to generate your own research?

Oslo Governance Centre  
BDP-Democratic Governance Group

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

Slide 5: While it is well-known that “different indices measure different things”, it is also important to note that even one index is made up of individual indicators that measure very different things. For instance, “what exactly is measured by the CPI?” Difficult to answer with precision with so many second-hand sources!

Slide 6: There is also huge variety in the type of respondents consulted in each index (CPI sources). And in addition, there are differences in the country coverage for each survey. This means that some countries are not included in every survey, and that for these countries, there are fewer sources to make up their overall score. In practical terms, this means that country scores in fact are not all measuring the same things!

Slide 5

### 1. Ambiguities in definition



#### *What is measured by the CPI?*

Surveys ask different questions related to corruption – they do not cover the same issue!

- Political (grand corruption) vs. lower-level bureaucratic corruption?
- Frequency of corruption acts?
- Size of bribes?
- Legal or illegal activities? (What is called “corruption” in one country differs from another country)
- Cost to society?

Slide 6

### 1. Ambiguities in definition (cont.)



#### *What data makes up the CPI?*


Selected sources (out of 14 in 2007)	Subject asked	Respondents	Coverage
World Economic Forum (WEF)	Undocumented extra payments or <b>bribes</b> connected with various government functions	Senior business leaders; domestic and international companies	125 countries
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)	The government's <b>capacity to punish and contain</b> corruption	Network of local experts inside and outside the organization	125 countries
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)	The <b>misuse of public office</b> for private (or political party) gain	Expert staff assessment	166 countries

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

Slide 7: Even when looking at a single index (here, the CPI), variations in one country's CPI score over the years may not necessarily mean an "absolute" variation in this country's corruption situation over the years. Rather, variations in rankings over the years might be caused by several methodological reasons that are NOT related to the corruption situation in the country. Examples of such reasons include:

- 1) Variations in the total number of countries in the list (here: 145 in 2004, 158 in 2005 and 163 in 2006): rankings therefore are relative, not absolute!
- 2) Variations in the total number of data sources (and which ones exactly) used to calculate a country's score over the years (here: 16 surveys in 2004; 14 surveys in 2005; 9 surveys in 2006): if the methodology behind a country's score changes over the years, changes in scores might also be attributed to these changes in methodology (how to know, then, whether changes in yearly scores are truly reflecting *real* changes in the country's corruption situation...?)
- 3) Change in the CPI methodology used in each year: the total number of surveys making up the 'standard CPI methodology' in any given year varies, as well as which surveys are used (18 surveys were used in 2004, 16 in 2006 and 12 in 2007). Comparisons of country scores over the years therefore will also be influenced by such changes in methodology, since "what is being measured" by the CPI each year is different!

Slide 7



So what's the point? You can't rely on global composite indicators to accurately assess the state of corruption in your country.

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Activity 4 – Actionable Indicators<sup>65</sup>

#### Worksheet

**Which of the following indicators or indicator questions is actionable? (Actionable in the sense that it is possible to use this information to inform policy or programme changes.) Are any non-actionable in your view?**

*How often do firms make extra payment to influence the content of new legislation (data collected by Business Enterprise Environment Survey)*

*To what extent can the government successfully contain corruption? (Bertelsmann Transformation Index)*

*Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature? (data collected by Global Integrity)*

- *In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.*
- *In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.*

*How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption (data collected by Afrobarometer)*

*On average, what % of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials? (data collected by Business Enterprise Environment Survey)*

*Does the state provide direct public subsidies to parties for their non-electoral activities? (data collected by the CRINIS Project)*

*In practice, do the parties keep accounting books and a registry of their assets? (Answers should relate to the national party organisation) (data collected by the CRINIS Project)*

---

<sup>65</sup> Individual Indicators (extracted from CPI, WB, GI, CRINIS indices)

## ANNEX 1. Module 4 – Composite and original indicators of corruption

### Activity 4 – Actionable Indicators <sup>66</sup>

#### Answer sheet

Actionable	Non-actionable
<p><i>Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature? (data collected by Global Integrity)</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><i>In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the national legislature.</i></li><li><i>In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a reasonable time period.</i></li></ul> <p><i>Does the state provide direct public subsidies to parties for their non-electoral activities? (data collected by the CRINIS Project)</i></p> <p><i>In practice, do the parties keep accounting books and a registry of their assets? (Answers should relate to the national party organisation) (data collected by the CRINIS Project)</i></p>	<p><i>How often do firms make extra payment to influence the content of new legislation (data collected by Business Enterprise Environment Survey)</i></p> <p><i>How many judges and magistrates do you think are involved in corruption (data collected by Afrobarometer)</i></p> <p><i>On average, what % of total annual sales do firms pay in unofficial payments to public officials? (data collected by Business Enterprise Environment Survey)</i></p> <p><i>To what extent can the government successfully contain corruption? (Bertelsmann Transformation Index)</i></p>

<sup>66</sup> Individual Indicators (extracted from CPI, WB, GI, CRINIS indices)

## ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

### Activity 4 - Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators

#### Case study

##### Measuring the effectiveness of an anti-corruption complaints mechanism

One year ago, the provincial office head of a country's anti-corruption commission introduced anti-corruption complaints mechanisms in each one of the 10 districts in his province. The intention was to provide citizens and/or public servants, victims or witnesses of corrupt practices, with an independent office where they could report such practices (anything from theft of public supplies, absenteeism of teachers and health attendants in village schools and dispensaries, bribes for accelerated service, bribes for commercial permits or exploitation of natural services, etc.) and seek redress. The provincial director also thought that by providing an 'official recourse' to victims of corruption at the district-level, the use of last resort solutions, such as potentially damaging media campaigns or public scandals which were badly affecting people's trust in the government, would decrease.

It has now been one year since the 10 district offices are in operation. The director, disappointed to note that corruption cases are still "making the news" in the provincial newspapers, commissions an evaluation of the performance of the complaint offices to date.

He is intrigued by the conclusion of the report. It is said that the decreasing number of complaints filed every month -- the only statistic provided in the report -- indicates that the incidence of corruption has gone down over the past year, thanks to the deterrent effect of the complaint offices.

The director is sceptical. The unchanged level of media coverage of corruption stories in the local newspapers makes him think that this indicator ("number of complaints filed/month") might not reveal the full story. Wanting to find out more, he calls back his staff and asks them to provide him with a more detailed assessment of the functioning of the district offices. He proceeds to grill his staff members with a series of sensible questions:

*"How can you be sure that the reduction in the number of cases filed over the past year is not caused instead by the malfunctioning of the complaint offices? For instance, do people think that our provincial government is serious about punishing the wrongdoers? Do they trust that the complaints offices are truly independent from all interested parties? Are whistle blowers receiving adequate protection? Are all citizens, men and women, literate and illiterate, employed and unemployed, able to use the complaint mechanisms? Are the offices able to manage complaints within a reasonable time period? Are offices able to enforce redress measures? I need much more detailed information on the functioning of each district office before I can conclude with confidence that they are fulfilling their function!"*

Undeafened by the fact that such data does not already exist, he tasks his staff with the design of an indicator-based monitoring system that will guide the collection of the needed data. But he doesn't stop there. Given the strong relationship between minority ethnicities and social exclusion in his country, this data *must* also take into account the province's ethnic composition if it is to present a truly accurate reflection the accessibility of this service. So the Director asks his staff to pay special attention to collecting data on the distinct experiences of the various ethnic groups.

The staff members begin to realize that there is a need for much richer data in order to find out if the complaints offices are also working *for marginalised groups*. But the task is challenging. They made a start, by creating a table of the "challenges" raised by the Director (e.g. possible reasons explaining the decreasing use of complaints offices), and now need to fill in the actual indicators that will decide what data needs to be collected. What indicators would you suggest the staff use to "measure" the severity of each one of these challenges, *while still accounting for differences between ethnic groups, men and women, and lower/higher income groups?*



## ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

### Activity 4 - Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators

#### Worksheet

Possible challenges faced by a complaint mechanism		Possible pro-poor, gender sensitive indicators
Political will	<p><i>Is there political will to address corruption in the locality?</i></p> <p><i>Is there a genuine commitment within the local government to act upon any disclosures?</i></p>	
Independence	<p><i>Does the complaint mechanism operate independently from all interested parties in order to guarantee fair and impartial treatment of each alleged case of corruption?</i></p> <p><i>Does it have the necessary powers and means to investigate (e.g. can interview witnesses, can access records, etc.)?</i></p> <p><i>Were staff members of the complaint office selected based on the highest standards of integrity, independence and competence?</i></p>	
Whistle-blower protection	<p><i>Are safe channels provided to employees/beneficiaries who file complaints?</i></p> <p><i>Is confidentiality of complainants and witnesses ensured to protect their safety?</i></p>	
Accessibility	<p><i>Is the district office accessible to all stakeholders, irrespective of where they live in the district, of what language they speak, what ethnic group they belong to, their level of education or financial capacity?</i></p>	
Complaints handling	<p><i>Does the district office have adequate resources (financial &amp; human) to receive and investigate complaints within a reasonable amount of time?</i></p>	
Enforcement	<p><i>Does the district office have the power to impose appropriate sanctions / penalties and monitor their enforcement?</i></p>	

## ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

### Activity 4 – Producing poverty and gender sensitive indicators

#### Answer sheet

Possible challenges		Possible pro-poor, gender sensitive indicators
Political will	<i>Is there political will to address corruption in the locality? Is there a genuine commitment within the local government to act upon any disclosures?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ (Yearly) change in expression of public confidence that the district mechanism is willing and able to act upon complaints (disaggregated by income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)</li> </ul>
Independence	<i>Does the complaint mechanism operate independently from all interested parties in order to guarantee fair and impartial treatment of each alleged case of corruption? Does it have the necessary powers and means to investigate (e.g. can interview witnesses, can access records, etc.)? Were staff members of the complaint office selected based on the highest standards of integrity, independence and competence?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Change in public perception of independence of the district mechanism (e.g. do you think that members staffing the complaint mechanism are independent from political and private powers in your community?) (disaggregated by income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Change in perceived consistency of decisions and actions across cases filed (disaggregated by income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Change in perception of equal treatment (disag.)</li> </ul>
Whistle-blower protection	<i>Are safe channels provided to employees/beneficiaries who file complaints? Is confidentiality of complainants and witnesses ensured to protect their safety?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ (Yearly) change in number of cases filed (disaggregated by income, gender, ethnicity, etc.)</li> <li>▪ Change in the spectrum of small claims poor complainants file</li> <li>▪ Change in ratio of perception of problems solved to problems exacerbated among litigants (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Change in perception about whether the complaint mechanism contributes to community safety (disag.)</li> </ul>
Accessibility	<i>Is the district office accessible to all stakeholders, irrespective of where they live in the district, of what language they speak, what ethnic group they belong to, their level of education or financial capacity?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ % citizens in the district who know about the existence of the mechanism, its purpose, what is a complaint, who can file a complaint, and how to access services (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Information related to the complaint mechanism provided in local languages.</li> <li>▪ % citizens who know that a “representative” of affected communities can file a complaint on their behalf (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Access to mechanism provided free of charge</li> <li>▪ % complainants who benefited from free technical and legal assistance to enable</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 2. Module 6 – Poverty and gender sensitive indicators

		<p>them to make their complaints more effectively (disag.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ % citizens who have access to a phone connection (if complaint mechanism is a “hotline”) (disag.)</li> <li>▪ % citizens who believe that complaint boxes are placed in strategic and sufficient locations in the district (disag.)</li> <li>▪ % requests for information about a case fulfilled within 1 month (disag.)</li> <li>▪ % responses to a request for information provided for a fee (e.g. photocopying fee)</li> </ul>
Complaints handling	<i>Does the district office have adequate resources (financial &amp; human) to receive and investigate complaints within a reasonable amount of time?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Does the complaint mechanism have a full-time staff?</li> <li>▪ Does the complaint mechanism receive regular funding? (financial records)</li> <li>▪ Is there a budgetary provision for information campaigns to raise public awareness about the mechanism?</li> <li>▪ Is the staff representative of the local population (disaggregated by gender, ethnicity, etc.)?</li> <li>▪ Change in the professional reputation of members staffing the mechanism (i.e. public perception)</li> <li>▪ Change in time between filing and first hearing (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Change in time from filing to disposition in cases of small financial value (disag.)</li> </ul>
Enforcement	<i>Does the district office have the power to impose appropriate sanctions / penalties and monitor their enforcement?</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ % complaint offices that have systems for recording actions and documenting decisions</li> <li>▪ Change in proportion of complainants who are satisfied with outcomes of filing a complaint (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Change in proportion of cases that are finalized in 12 months (disag.)</li> <li>▪ Change in rates of non-enforcement for poor/vulnerable vs. different groups of (wealthy or otherwise privileged) defendants</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

### Activity 2 - Matching Inputs and Outputs

**The object of this activity is for participants, working in small groups, to match input/de jure indicators with output/de facto ones.**

The indicators are arranged by focus category, listed on the outer left margin. Photocopy these sheets, and cut along the dotted lines to produce individual indicator cards, and discard blank cards. Make sure to keep all indicators in their respective categories. Then split the categories into piles, such that each small group can have 3-4 categories to work with. Before distributing cards to groups, make sure to shuffle each pile.

For an added challenge (and time allowing), give participants only input indicator cards, and have them make up corresponding “in practice” indicators. The output cards can be distributed after for comparison.

The indicators used in this exercise have been developed by Global Integrity. They comprise yes/no questions that are answered by experts with evidential justification and peer reviewed.

Focus	Indicator questions	Input/de jure sub-indicators	Output/ de facto sub-indicators
Civil Society Organisations	Are anti-corruption/good governance CSOs legally protected?	<i>In law, citizens have a right to form civil society organizations (CSOs) focused on anti-corruption or good governance.</i>	
		<i>In law, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs are free to accept funding from any foreign or domestic sources.</i>	
	Are good governance/anti-corruption CSOs able to operate freely?		<i>In practice, the government does not create barriers to the organization of new anti-corruption/good governance CSOs.</i>
			<i>In practice, anti-corruption/good governance CSOs actively engage in the political and policymaking process.</i>
Media	Are media and free speech protected?	<i>In law, freedom of the media is guaranteed</i>	
		<i>In law, freedom of speech is guaranteed.</i>	
	Are citizens able to form print media entities?	<i>In law, where a print media license is necessary, there is an appeal mechanism if a license is denied or revoked.</i>	<i>In practice, the government does not create barriers to form a print media entity.</i>
			<i>In practice, where necessary, citizens can obtain a print media license within a reasonable time period.</i>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

Public Access to Information	Do citizens have a right of access to information?	<i>In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic government records.</i>	
		<i>In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is denied.</i>	
		<i>In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can request government records.</i>	
	Is the right of access to information effective?		<i>In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable cost.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a reasonable time period.</i>
Elections (Political financing)			<i>In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.</i>
	Are there regulations governing political financing?	<i>In law, there are regulations governing private contributions to political parties.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are limits on total political party expenditures.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are requirements for disclosure of donations to political candidates and parties.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of political parties and candidates.</i>	
		<i>In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the political financing process.</i>	
	Are the regulations governing political financing effective?		<i>In practice, the limits on individual donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating an individual's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.</i>
			<i>In practice, the limits on corporate donations to candidates and political parties are effective in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate or political party.</i>
			<i>In practice, the limits on total party expenditures are effective in regulating a political party's ability to fund campaigns or politically-related activities.</i>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

			<i>In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing independently initiates investigations.</i>
			<i>In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring political financing imposes penalties on offenders.</i>
			<i>In practice, contributions to political parties and candidates are audited.</i>
	Can citizens access records related to political financing?		<i>In practice, political parties and candidates disclose data relating to financial support and expenditures within a reasonable time period.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates within a reasonable time period.</i>
Government Accountability (Executive)			<i>In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties and candidates at a reasonable cost.</i>
	Can citizens hold government to account for infringements of their civil rights?	<i>In law, can citizens sue the government for infringement of their civil rights?</i>	
	Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?		<i>In practice, the chief executive gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.</i>
		<i>In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.</i>	<i>In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive</i>
			<i>In practice, the chief executive limits the use of executive orders for establishing new regulations, policies, or government practices.</i>
	Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?	<i>In law, the heads of state and government can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.</i>	
		<i>In law, ministerial-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.</i>	
	Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch?	<i>In law, the heads of state and government are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.</i>	<i>In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment for heads of state and government and ministers are effective.</i>
		<i>In law, ministerial-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch.</i>	<i>In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the executive branch are effective.</i>
		<i>In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the executive branch asset disclosure forms (defined here as ministers and heads of state and government).</i>	<i>In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as ministers and above) are audited.</i>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

		<i>In law, there are restrictions on heads of state and government and ministers entering the private sector after leaving the government.</i>	
	Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government?	<i>In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government.</i>	<i>In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government within a reasonable time period.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the heads of state and government at a reasonable cost.</i>
	Is there a separation between official government functions and the functions of the ruling political party?		<i>In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the functions of the ruling political party.</i>
	Can the legislature provide input to the national budget?	<i>In law, the legislature can amend the budget.</i>	<i>In practice, significant public expenditures require legislative approval.</i>
Government Accountability (Budgetary)			<i>In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and provide input or changes.</i>
	Can citizens access the national budgetary process?		<i>In practice, the national budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the debating stage (i.e. before final approval).</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.</i>
	Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?	<i>In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public funds?</i>	
			<i>In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.</i>
			<i>In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.</i>
			<i>In practice, this committee is protected from political interference</i>
			<i>In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into financial irregularities.</i>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

Administration and Civil Service (Civil Service Regulations)	Are there national regulations for the civil service encompassing, at least, the managerial and professional staff?	<i>In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent and fairly managed civil service.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism, cronyism, and patronage within the civil service.</i>	
		<i>In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.</i>	
		<i>In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.</i>	
	Are the laws governing the administration and civil service effective?		<i>In practice, civil servants are protected from political interference.</i>
			<i>In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.</i>
			<i>In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.</i>
			<i>In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.</i>
			<i>In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.</i>
			<i>In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service positions along with the number of positions actually filled.</i>
			<i>In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.</i>
			<i>In practice, in the past year, the government has paid civil servants on time.</i>
Administration and Civil Service (Whistle Blowing Measures)			<i>In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future government employment.</i>
	Are employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?	<i>In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.</i>	<i>In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.</i>
		<i>In law, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.</i>	<i>In practice, private sector employees who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.</i>
	Are there internal mechanisms (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office)	<i>In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants</i>	<i>In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can</i>



## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

	through which civil servants can report corruption?	<i>can report corruption?</i>	report corruption effective?
			<i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.</i>
			<i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.</i>
			<i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.</i>
			<i>In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.</i>
Administration and Civil Service (Privatisation)	Is the privatization process effective?	<i>In law, all businesses are eligible to compete for privatized state assets.</i>	
		<i>In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization.</i>	<i>In practice, conflicts of interest regulations for government officials involved in privatization are enforced.</i>
	Can citizens access the terms and conditions of privatization bids?	<i>In law, citizens can access privatization regulations.</i>	<i>In practice, privatisations are effectively advertised.</i>
		<i>In law, the government is required to publicly announce the results of privatization decisions.</i>	<i>In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations within a reasonable time period.</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can access privatization regulations at a reasonable cost.</i>
Oversight and Regulation (Taxes and Customs)	Is there an effective national tax collection system?	<i>In law, is there a national tax collection agency?</i>	<i>In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?</i>
	Is the tax collection agency effective?		<i>In practice, the tax collection agency has a professional, full-time staff.</i>
			<i>In practice, the tax agency receives regular funding.</i>
			<i>In practice, are tax laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?</i>
	Is there an effective national customs and excise agency?	<i>In law, is there a national customs and excise agency?</i>	<i>In practice, the customs and excise agency has a professional, full-time staff.</i>
			<i>In practice, the customs and excise agency receives regular funding.</i>
			<i>In practice, are customs and excise laws enforced uniformly and without discrimination?</i>

## ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

Oversight and Regulation (Business Licensing and Regulation)	Are business licenses available to all citizens?	<i>In law, anyone may apply for a business licence</i>	<i>In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) within a reasonable time period</i>
		<i>In law, a complaint mechanism exists if a business license request is denied</i>	<i>In practice, citizens can obtain any necessary business license (i.e. for a small import business) at a reasonable cost</i>
	Are there transparent business regulatory requirements for basic health, environmental, and safety standards?	<i>In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public health standards are transparent and publicly available</i>	
		<i>In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public environmental standards are transparent and publicly available</i>	
		<i>In law, basic business regulatory requirements for meeting public safety standards are transparent and publicly available.</i>	
	Does government effectively enforce basic health, environmental, and safety standards on businesses?		<i>In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public health standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner</i>
			<i>In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner</i>
			<i>In practice, business inspections by government officials to ensure public safety standards are being met are carried out in a uniform and even-handed manner</i>
Anti-corruption and Rule of Law (Anti-Corruption Agency)	Is there an effective independent agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption?	<i>In law, is there an agency (or group of agencies) with a legal mandate to address corruption</i>	
		<i>In law, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference</i>	<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from political interference</i>
			<i>In practice, the head of the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) is protected from removal without relevant justification</i>
			<i>In practice, appointments to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) are based on professional criteria</i>
			<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time</i>
			<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) receives regular funding</i>

### ANNEX 3. Module 7 – Complementarity in the use of indicators

			<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) makes regular public</i>
			<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) has sufficient powers to carry out its mandate</i>
			<i>In practice, when necessary, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) independently initiates investigations</i>
	Can citizens access the anti-corruption agency?		<i>In practice, the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) acts on complaints within a reasonable time period</i>
			<i>In practice, citizens can complain to the anti-corruption agency (or agencies) without fear of recrimination</i>

## **ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices**

### **Activity 2 – Integrity indicators**

#### **Worksheet**

**The object of this activity is for participants, working in small groups, to design anti-corruption mechanisms/standards, and indicators which correspond to a given corruption “hot spot”.**

Indicators are arranged into three themes: urban planning, financial and property management, and public procurement, listed on the outer left margin. Ask participants to form three groups according to these themes. There are eight indicator sets per theme, so each group should have a limit of 8 participants, though the ideal number is four per group.

Distribute enough worksheets (of the same theme) for each group – one worksheet per participant. Participants must work in their groups to complete the worksheets with anti-corruption mechanisms/standards and indicators. Answer sheets can be distributed after most groups have completed the exercise. No plenary needed. The indicators used in this exercise have been drawn from the index of municipal Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) in Macedonia.

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Worksheet 1

Complete the empty cells with anti-corruption mechanisms or standards, and indicators.

	Corruption “hot spot”	Anti-corruption mechanism or standard	Indicator(s)
Urban planning	Development, adoption and amendment of a General Urban Plan (GUP) and Detailed Urban Plan (DUP) without the input of a participatory body	The existence and active participation in the development and amendment of the GUP and DUP of a qualified participatory body	Minutes from the work of the Participative body; Number of negative opinions of competent institutions on proposed versions of GUP and DUP
	Development and adoption of GUP and DUP without a public debate and an opportunity for suggestions by interested parties		
	Limiting the opportunity of interested investors to access the adopted GUP and DUP; unequal treatment of interested investors		
	Unnecessarily complex procedure for obtaining a construction permit, in order to create the possibility for extorting bribes		
	Favourable treatment in the calculation and collection of the fee to Develop designated construction land (communal taxes)		
	Issuance of construction permits without the participation of all competent officers or managers in the procedure for issuance of construction permit		
	Issuance of construction permits that are not in accordance with the GUP and DUP, or refusal to issue construction permits despite requests in accordance with the GUP and DUP		
	Failure to monitor, or selective monitoring of the progress and standards of construction for which a construction permit was issued		

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Worksheet 2

Complete the empty cells with anti-corruption mechanisms or standards, and indicators.

	Corruption “hot spot”	Anti-corruption mechanism or standard	Indicator(s)
Financial and property management	Incomplete and selective collection of local taxes, charges and fees for which the municipality passes acts for collection	Non-selective and complete collection of all local taxes, charges and fees in accordance with the acts issued for that purpose	Instruments for calculation and non-selective collection, as well as for the rate of collection of projected taxes, charges and fees
	Realization of investments in the municipality without a plan for development and public investments adopted by transparent procedure		
	Development and adoption of a municipal budget that is not consistent with the municipal investment plan and projected needs of the municipality		
	Non-transparent procedure for development and adoption of the municipal budget, without the participation of the public and experts		
	Development and adoption of a budget that is not clearly broken down by items and has no clearly defined responsible parties and individuals responsible for its enforcement		
	Spending above the planned budget items due to a lack of oversight into its enforcement		
	Lack of, or irregular internal and external control over the financial operations of the municipality		
	Reversal of the budget to cover expenses that are not in accordance with the adopted budget, particularly in the area of investments and public procurements		
	Renting and disposing of municipal property without criteria, price lists or public invitations		

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Worksheet 2

Complete the empty cells with anti-corruption mechanisms or standards, and indicators.

	Corruption “hot spot”	Anti-corruption mechanism or standard	Indicator(s)
Public Procurement	Planning and realization of public procurements that are not in accordance with the budget and the municipality development plan		
	Failure of the municipality to submit the annual public procurement plan to the Central Public Procurement Office for approval		
	Division of larger procurements into smaller parts, to avoid the obligation to organize a public tender		
	Defining the criteria for awarding points in a way that favours a certain supplier		
	Implementation of a public procurement without previous research of the market, prices and features of the goods and services to be procured		
	Publication of and invitation for bids is done in a way that limits the number of bidders are informed about it		
	Selection of a bid at a lower price and under terms and conditions that do not completely adhere to pre-defined selection criteria		
	Changing the agreements with annexes in order to retroactively amend the price, quality of the goods or services, and/or the terms of the public procurement		

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Answer sheet 1

	<b>Corruption “hot spot”</b>	<b>Anti-corruption mechanism or standard</b>	<b>Indicator(s)</b>
Urban planning	Development, adoption and amendment of a General Urban Plan (GUP) and Detailed Urban Plan (DUP) without the input of a participatory body	The existence and active participation in the development and amendment of the GUP and DUP of a qualified participatory body	Minutes from the work of the Participative body; Number of negative opinions of competent institutions on proposed versions of GUP and DUP
	Development and adoption of GUP and DUP without a public debate and an opportunity for suggestions by interested parties	Timely publication and posting up of GUP and DUP, obtaining a positive opinion from competent institutions	Public invitation to provide input and comments on GUP and DUP; Number of versions annulled by the court competent for overseeing the administrative procedure
	Limiting the opportunity of interested investors to access the adopted GUP and DUP; unequal treatment of interested investors	Unlimited opportunity to for interested investors, other entities and citizens access the GUP and DUP	Proportion between the total number of requests to access the GUP and DUP and the number of requests granted; Number of complaints of refused access to the GUP and DUP
	Unnecessarily complex procedure for obtaining a construction permit, in order to create the possibility for extorting bribes	All interested parties must be clearly and precisely informed of the course and duration of the procedure and of all documents required	Existence of a system for informing parties through written notices posted up or obtainable at the windows or from a clerk
	Favourable treatment in the calculation and collection of the fee to Develop designated construction land (communal taxes)	The fee to develop designated construction land is to be calculated and collected equally for all parties requesting permits, on the basis of the municipal acts	Number of deviations from the defined zoning; Amount of fees and manner of payment of fees for developed construction land
	Issuance of construction permits without the participation of all competent officers or managers in the procedure for issuance of construction permit	The final documentation for issuance of each individual permit is to be signed (endorsed) by each officer and manager who took part in the procedure	Existence of a rulebook defining the obligation for a signature (endorsement) of each of the participants in the procedure for issuing construction permits
	Issuance of construction permits that are not in accordance with the GUP and DUP, or refusal to issue construction permits despite requests in accordance with the GUP and DUP	Consistent and maximum respect for the DUP and GUP, as well as for the rules regulating the issuance of construction permits	Number of positive and negative decisions on complaints passed by the municipality, second-instance committees, or competent courts
	Failure to monitor, or selective monitoring of the progress and standards of construction for which a construction permit was issued	Conduct required inspections on the construction site for each license issued and recording of minutes for each of those inspections	Disproportionate difference in the number of inspections conducted in the case of certain construction permits issued for buildings of similar size and type



## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Answer sheet 2

	<b>Corruption “hot spot”</b>	<b>Anti-corruption mechanism or standard</b>	<b>Indicator(s)</b>
Financial and property management	Incomplete and selective collection of local taxes, charges and fees for which the municipality passes acts for collection	Non-selective and complete collection of all local taxes, charges and fees in accordance with the acts issued for that purpose	Instruments for calculation and non-selective collection, as well as for the rate of collection of projected taxes, charges and fees
	Realization of investments in the municipality without a plan for development and public investments adopted by transparent procedure	Transparent development and adoption of a plan for investments and development of the municipality at a defined pace and specifying implementation priorities	Official annual, mid-term and long-term framework plan for development and public investments of the municipality
	Development and adoption of a municipal budget that is not consistent with the municipal investment plan and projected needs of the municipality	The municipal budget is in accordance with its annual, mid-term and long-term development and investment plan	Compliance of the municipal budget with the development and public investments plan of the municipality for the period for which the budget is planned and adopted
	Non-transparent procedure for development and adoption of the municipal budget, without the participation of the public and experts	Participation of the public and experts in the process of planning and development of the municipal budget, as well as public and expert consultations	Attendance records Level of participation of the public and experts in the development of the budget and access to budgetary information
	Development and adoption of a budget that is not clearly broken down by items and has no clearly defined responsible parties and individuals responsible for its enforcement	Adoption of a budget with clear goals, indicators, allocations, and expected results and parties and individuals responsible for its enforcement	The budget contains clear goals, indicators, allocations, and expected results and specifies parties and individuals responsible for its enforcement
	Spending above the planned budget items due to a lack of oversight into its enforcement	Introduction and functioning of a computerized financial system for monitoring budget expenditure	Existence and use of a computerized system for monitoring budget expenditure
	Lack of, or irregular internal and external control over the financial operations of the municipality	Regular audits by the internal auditor of the municipality and by the State Audit Office	Audits regularly conducted; findings from such audits; recommendations; and evidence that recommendations are acted upon
	Rebalance of the budget to cover expenses that are not in accordance with the adopted budget, particularly in the area of investments and public procurements	Budget rebalance is accompanied by explanations and rebalance is done in line with the municipal investment and public procurements plans	Documented justification of budget rebalance which are in line with the municipal investment and public procurement plans

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

	Renting and disposing of municipal property without criteria, price lists or public invitations	The municipal property is rented out and sold solely on the basis of acts and price lists of the municipality	Existence of and degree of adherence with acts on the basis of which the municipal property is rented and sold
--	---	---	--

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 2 – Integrity indicators

#### Answer sheet 3

	Corruption hot spot	Anti-corruption mechanism or standard	Indicator(s)
Public Procurement	Planning and realization of public procurements that are not in accordance with the budget and the municipality development plan	All public procurements of the municipality are to be in accordance with its budget and development plan	Existence and level of adherence to the annual public procurement plan, which itself is in accordance with the budget and the municipality development plan
	Failure of the municipality to submit the annual public procurement plan to the Central Public Procurement Office for approval	The annual public procurement plan is to be submitted to the Central Public Procurement Office for approval	The annual public procurement plan is received by the Public Procurement Office
	Division of larger procurements into smaller parts, to avoid the obligation to organize a public tender	Procurements of the same type over the year are to be carried out as a bulk, through a public tender	Implementation of procedures for small value procurement of the same type of goods and services in the course of one year
	Defining the criteria for awarding points in a way that favours a certain supplier	The evaluation criteria contain clear and detailed sub-criteria for the way in which points are awarded to the bids	Existence of precise criteria for evaluation and sub-criteria for awarding points to the bids; documentation of evaluation of bids according to pre-defined criteria
	Implementation of a public procurement without previous research of the market, prices and features of the goods and services to be procured	The previous market research provides orientation as to the price and features of the goods and services, which is of assistance in the decision-making process	Documentation of previously conducted market research in terms of the prices and quality of the goods and services to be procured
	Publication of and invitation for bids is done in a way that limits the number of bidders are informed about it	The public procurements, particularly those of a larger value, should be published in a daily newspaper of a larger circulation, instead of in newspapers of small or insignificant circulation	Number and value of public procurements advertised in papers of large circulation
	Selection of a bid at a lower price and under terms and conditions that do not completely adhere to pre-defined selection criteria	The public procurement agreement is to be signed validating prices, technical specification and conditions that are identical to those in the selected bid	Proportion of agreements stating no price, containing insufficient elements regarding quality and/or delivery terms or with terms and conditions different from those offered in the selected bid, to agreements adhering to terms of the selection criteria
	Changing the agreements with annexes in order to retroactively amend the price, quality of the goods or services, and/or the terms of the public procurement	The price, quality and terms of the agreement may only be changed as an exception, and only with a reasonable explanation for the reasons justifying such a change	Number and value of procurements where the price, features and terms of the public procurement have been changed by an annex to the initial agreement, in proportion to the total number of procurements

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 5 – Developing indicator scales

#### Worksheet

**The object of this activity is for participants to practice scoring indicators. This activity can be done in pairs, but should be completed individually on worksheets.**

Indicators	Scales
1) Existence of a logbook for compiling signatures of each member of the 'construction permit committee' upon approval of the issuance of a construction permit (to official record the endorsement of each committee member)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is a logbook, and all committee members sign regularly (2 points)</li></ul>
2) Participation by the public and independent experts in budget preparation, and public access to budget information	
3) Number and value of public procurement tenders publicized in a large-circulation daily newspaper	

## ANNEX 4. Module 8 – Developing integrity indicators and indices

### Activity 5 – Developing indicator scales

#### Answer sheet

Indicators	Scales
4) Existence of a logbook for compiling signatures of each member of the 'construction permit committee' upon approval of the issuance of a construction permit (to official record the endorsement of each committee member)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• There is a logbook, and all committee members sign regularly (2 points)</li><li>• There is a logbook, but committee members do not sign regularly (1 points)</li><li>• There is no logbook and no obligation for committee members to sign (0 points)</li></ul>
5) Participation by the public and independent experts in budget preparation, and public access to budget information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• The budget preparation is publicized, and there is participation by the public &amp; independent experts (2 points)</li><li>• The budget preparation is publicized, but there is no participation by the public (1 point)</li><li>• The budget preparation is not publicized (0 point)</li></ul>
6) Number and value of public procurement tenders publicized in a large-circulation daily newspaper	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Most public tenders are publicized in a large-circulation newspaper (2 points)</li><li>• A portion of public tenders are publicized in a large-circulation newspaper (1 point)</li><li>• Most public tenders are publicized in a small-circulation newspaper (0 point)</li></ul>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

### Typology of corruption & integrity assessment tools and methodologies

Instrument / methodology	Thematic focus	Assessing corruption	Assessing integrity
<b>Assessment of revenue transparency of oil and gas companies, Transparency International</b>	Revenue transparency in extractive industries		x
<b>Citizen report card</b>	Public services and utilities/ Corruption experiences and perceptions	x	
<b>The CRINIS Project</b>	Political party finance		x
<b>DIAL governance module attached to household surveys</b>	Public services and utilities/ Corruption experiences and perceptions	x	
<b>Global Integrity Report</b>	Key anti-corruption mechanisms in a country (multi-sectoral focus)		x
<b>A Guide to Rapid Assessment and Policy-making for the Control of Corruption in Latin American Justice Systems*</b>	Judicial corruption	x	x
<b>Indicators of parliamentary performance in the budget process (Canadian Parliamentary Centre &amp; World Bank Institute)</b>	Parliament's role in the budget process		x
<b>Kenya Bribery Index</b>	Corruption experiences and perceptions	x	
<b>Macedonia Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index</b>	Public procurement, financial management and urban planning at the local level		x
<b>Open Budget Assessment Framework</b>	Budget transparency		x
<b>Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)</b>	Public service delivery (health, education)	x	x
<b>WEDC/ DFID research methodology</b>	Public services and utilities	x	x

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Assessment of revenue transparency of oil and gas companies (by Transparency International)</b>
Template	<b>Questionnaire</b>
Purpose	“To evaluate oil and gas companies in three areas relevant to revenue transparency: payments to host governments, company operations and corporate anti-corruption programmes.” Ensuring access to information about how much money governments receive from extractive industry revenues empowers citizens to hold their governments accountable, monitor how the money is spent and lobby for responsible public spending.
Type of data used	<b>Objective</b> data only. The questions focus on whether or not the information relevant to revenue transparency is disclosed and available in the public domain (websites, annual reports, etc.) They do not seek to test the quality or accuracy of the information disclosed, nor to evaluate the efficacy of any reported practices, the impact of performance, or whether companies fulfil legal requirements.
Methodology	<p>The framework consists of a <b>questionnaire</b> with approx. 50 indicators relating to existing standards of revenue transparency drawn from international sources (EITI principles, IMF Guidelines for Revenue Transparency, UNCAC, TI’s Business Principles for Countering Bribery) The questionnaire analyses reporting practices in 3 key areas for international oil companies (and a 4<sup>th</sup> one for national oil companies):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <b>Payments</b> to host governments on a country-to-country basis (e.g. royalties, taxes, fees)</li> <li>2) <b>Operations</b> on a country-to-country basis (e.g. publicly available information on scale of operations, contracts, production volumes)</li> <li>3) <b>Anti-corruption programmes</b>, i.e. company disclosure of anti-corruption policies and practices and the scope of these</li> <li>4) For <i>national</i> companies only: an evaluation of regulatory and procurement issues.</li> </ol> <p>For each of the 4 “areas” listed above, three aspects of implementation are considered:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <b>Policy:</b> looks at whether the company has policies commitments or rules for revenue transparency.</li> <li>2) <b>Management systems:</b> looks at whether the company has allocated resources and created the systems needed to achieve revenue transparency.</li> <li>3) <b>Performance:</b> looks at whether the company is disclosing information on payments, operations and its anti-corruption efforts.</li> </ol> <p>The data-gathering process involves <b>desk-based research</b> into information that is made publicly available by the company. In addition to the material on company websites, each company has the opportunity to provide other printed information available in the public domain, such as annual reports, policy statements, codes of conduct, country-specific reports, reports on corporate responsibility, etc. Points are awarded based on yes (1) and no (0) answers (based on clearly defined criteria), sometimes based on a scale to account for partial disclosure.</p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Assessment of revenue transparency of oil and gas companies (by Transparency International)</b>											
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects:	<b>Few</b> questions cover issues implicitly pro-poor / gender sensitive, such as “Does the company publicly provide evidence of engagement with stakeholders on issues of revenue transparency?” (“stakeholders” include government and civil society)											
Actionability	<p><b>Yes</b>, the results of the assessment can be used by civil society, host governments and development advocates to identify where exactly are the bottlenecks to revenue transparency, distinguishing between lack of adequate disclosure rules and policies, lack of capacity and/or resources to achieve revenue transparency, and lack of efforts to disclose information in practice.</p> <p>This framework is also an ‘actionable’ complement to the EITI, since it encourages companies to go beyond payments disclosure to support other <i>enabling conditions</i> for increased transparency and accountability, such as anti-corruption policies and practices, revenue management and expenditure, contract transparency, accounting practices and regulatory issues.</p>											
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/ outputs)	Questions address both revenue transparency “ <b>inputs</b> ”, i.e. assessing the existence of transparency policies and effectiveness of management systems required to implement such policies, and transparency “ <b>outputs</b> ”, i.e. assessing whether the company is indeed disclosing information on payments, operations and its anti-corruption efforts. Questions therefore ask about both the rules “ <b>on the book</b> ” and what occurs <b>in practice</b> .											
Example indicators	<table><tr><th colspan="3">Payments</th></tr><tr><th>Policy</th><th>Management systems</th><th>Performance</th></tr><tr><td>Has the company made a public declaration committing itself to (1) the transparency of revenue payments into relevant categories (i.e. royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.) and (2) the disclosure of material payments in cash or in kind to parties related to contracts?</td><td>Does the company publicly provide evidence of the assignment of responsibility for transparency of revenue payments at the board or senior management level?  Do the company's contracts in the country permit the disclosure of revenue payments information?</td><td>Are payments from the company to the government publicly disclosed, and are they broken down into royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.? ...and broken down into other transfers in cash or in kind to or on behalf of any governmental body?</td></tr></table>			Payments			Policy	Management systems	Performance	Has the company made a public declaration committing itself to (1) the transparency of revenue payments into relevant categories (i.e. royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.) and (2) the disclosure of material payments in cash or in kind to parties related to contracts?	Does the company publicly provide evidence of the assignment of responsibility for transparency of revenue payments at the board or senior management level?  Do the company's contracts in the country permit the disclosure of revenue payments information?	Are payments from the company to the government publicly disclosed, and are they broken down into royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.? ...and broken down into other transfers in cash or in kind to or on behalf of any governmental body?
Payments												
Policy	Management systems	Performance										
Has the company made a public declaration committing itself to (1) the transparency of revenue payments into relevant categories (i.e. royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.) and (2) the disclosure of material payments in cash or in kind to parties related to contracts?	Does the company publicly provide evidence of the assignment of responsibility for transparency of revenue payments at the board or senior management level?  Do the company's contracts in the country permit the disclosure of revenue payments information?	Are payments from the company to the government publicly disclosed, and are they broken down into royalties, dividends, profit taxes, etc.? ...and broken down into other transfers in cash or in kind to or on behalf of any governmental body?										
URL	Annex 4, Questionnaire <a href="http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_04_28_prt_r_eport_launch">http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2008/2008_04_28_prt_r_eport_launch</a>											



## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Citizen Report Card</b>
Template	<b>Questionnaire</b>
Purpose	“Simple but powerful tool to provide public agencies with systematic feedback from users of public services.” Citizen Report Cards (CRC) are used to pinpoint areas prone to corruption (e.g. in the provisions of health, education, police services) and to devise measures to combat the same. CRC address themes such as access to services, quality and reliability, transparency in service provision such as disclosure of service quality standards and norms, costs incurred in using a service including ‘hidden costs’ such as bribes or private resources spent to compensate for poor service provision.
Type of data used	Both <b>objective</b> data (experience-based questions about actual incidence of petty corruption, type of transactions and services involved, amount actually paid, etc.) and <b>subjective</b> data (e.g. perceptions about the extent of petty corruption, on public confidence in various institutions, on satisfaction levels about service provision, etc.)
Methodology	<p>Usually, a prominent local NGO takes the lead in initiating the CRC. An independent consortium consisting of government, civil society, academics and media can also lead the process. It is important to secure the buy-in of the service providers as well.</p> <p>A <b>focus group discussion</b> involving both service providers and users is organized in order to help identify the services (one or more) and aspects of service delivery (availability, access, quality of service, incidence and resolution of problems and complaints, interaction with staff, corruption) that should be included in the CRC.</p> <p>A useful practice is to break the <b>questionnaire</b> into different modules that are answered by different members of the household (depending on who is the main user of a particular service)</p> <p>Data is collected through a random, representative sample of respondents. Typically, respondents give information on aspects of government services on a numerical scale (e.g. 1 to 7).</p> <p>The exercise is expected to be repeated regularly. Results should be widely disseminated through the media and a follow-up meeting between the citizens and service providers should be held to engage in an evidence-based dialogue to identify ways to improve service providers’ performance.</p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Citizen Report Card</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<b>Strong.</b> Results are usually disaggregated into poor and non-poor categories, and by gender, in order to demonstrate inequalities in the level of access and quality of service provided to the poorer and marginalized sections of the community (e.g. general households vs. slum dwellers) This allows for anti-corruption and governance reform policies to be targeted to specific groups.
Actionability	<b>Yes:</b> In addition to evaluating the most corrupt institutions and the groups who are most vulnerable to corruption, questions can be asked to assess the effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms, such as whether a receipt is issued as proof of payment, whether citizens know how to access a 'redress mechanism' if needed, etc. Furthermore, by organizing a focus group discussion with service users in the preparatory phase to inform the design of the survey, the likelihood that the data generated by the CRC will be actionable is increased.
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	Questions address both anti-corruption " <b>inputs</b> " (e.g. clear guidelines on how to complete payment transactions, existence of an effective redress mechanism accessible to all citizens, etc.) and corruption " <b>outputs</b> " (asking citizens about their perceptions of and experiences with corruption). Questions assess the <b>de facto</b> effectiveness of anti-corruption measures.
Example indicators	CRC on the payment system for drinking water services: <i>Is clear information given in the town hall on where to pay? On how to pay? On who can receive the payment? On where to go for inquiries on the statement of accounts?</i> <i>Are official receipts issued as proof of payment?</i> <i>How long does it take to complete your payment transactions?</i> <i>Are you generally satisfied with the payment system?</i>
URL	<a href="http://www.pacindia.org/issues/research">http://www.pacindia.org/issues/research</a>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>The CRINIS Project</b>
Template	11 role-based questionnaires, available through an online data gathering and index-generating tool
Outputs	A Crinis index for each country; reform proposals; publications detailing both of the above
Purpose	<p>The stated goal of the Crinis project is to help increase public trust in democracy and political parties by promoting transparency and accountability in political financing. The Crinis Index allows a thorough evaluation of the current situation in each country under review, as well as comparisons between countries for sharing of best practices.</p> <p>The Crinis methodology combines an assessment of a country's legal framework and practice in the area of political party financing, with advocacy for specific reforms to enhance transparency. It has been developed by Transparency International and the Carter Centre, and has been implemented in 8 Latin American Countries, and is now being extended to countries in Africa and Asia.</p>
Type of data used	Primarily <b>objective</b> data (e.g. the legal framework, accounting practices, experience-based questions about the ease of accessing finance data), with some <b>subjective</b> data (e.g. asking elected representatives about beliefs concerning the public's right to information).
Methodology	<p>Transparency International oversees the implementation of Crinis projects. Research is carried out by a small research team, led by a locally renown specialist in the area of political finance; and is verified by a local professional. Hiring is done by Crinis coordinators based at the TI Secretariat in Berlin. Local TI Chapters follow all stages of research component, and are responsible for implementing a plan to promote reforms.</p> <p><b>Data sources</b> include:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>laws and regulations and other <i>administrative data</i> such as corruption cases and the activities of civil society organisations in this area;</li> <li><i>interviews</i> with insiders (electoral magistrates and judges, political party staff, journalists and members of civil society);</li> <li>a <i>survey</i> of key actors on political reporting and dissemination and monitoring is carried out (e.g. party accountants, elected politicians, electoral management body auditors, judges, businesspeople, and members of civil society watchdog groups) ;</li> <li><i>field tests</i> are conducted to evaluate ease of citizen with varying levels of knowledge in accessing political finance data, as well as the response rates among bodies and institutions responsible for providing this information. Tests are conducted first two groups with different backgrounds and levels of know how, for the sake of comparison – first by the local research team and second by a group of volunteers (10 students, 5 journalists 15 citizens).</li> </ol> <p>Data collected by the research team is fed into a series of eleven online questionnaires. Questionnaires are to be completed by:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Leader of research team – on the legal framework, practice and public debate on political finance in the country</li> <li>Research team – on the legal framework that regulates the political parties' and electoral campaigns' finance</li> <li>Research team – on compliance with laws and the identification of practices related to parties and campaign finance</li> <li>Research team – to verify the responsiveness of different stakeholders to requests of information on political finance from field tests</li> <li>Citizens, students and journalists - to verify the responsiveness of different stakeholders to requests of information on political finance from field tests</li> </ol> <p>Questionnaires 6-11 are designed for interviewing insiders:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Accountants of political parties</li> <li>Elected representatives</li> <li>Auditors</li> <li>Government agencies</li> <li>Private sector</li> <li>Experts on political finance</li> </ol>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

	<p>The online database into which this information is input then generates the <b>index</b>. The Crinis index is calculated by averaging 10 equally weighted dimensions of political party transparency.</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1) Political parties' internal book-keeping</li><li>2) Reporting to the electoral management body</li><li>3) Disclosure of information to the public</li><li>4) Comprehensiveness of reporting</li><li>5) Depth of reporting</li><li>6) Reliability of reporting</li><li>7) Prevention</li><li>8) Sanctions</li><li>9) State control</li><li>10) Public oversight</li></ol> <p>The first three dimensions reflect the different stages of transparency that can exist in political finance systems, the next three dimensions illustrate the characteristics of the data, and the last four dimensions focus on oversight mechanisms.</p> <p>These 10 dimensions are broken down into more than 140 individual indicators, standardised with scales of 0 to 10, where 10 indicates that a country fulfils all criteria expected in terms of transparency and accountability, and 0 means no criteria are fulfilled. Indicators are weighted differently, for example, within the comprehensiveness of the reporting dimension (4), the private donation indicator is worth twice that of government subsidies.</p> <p>Research questions distinguish between three different types of political financing: 1. non-electoral party finances, 2. party finances during election campaigns used to mobilise and communicate with voters, and 3. finances raised by candidates during election campaigns.</p>
--	--

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	The CRINIS Project
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<p>The regulations and processes governing the disclosure of political party finance do not have any obvious gender or poverty sensitive dimensions to be evaluated.</p> <p>The inclusion of field tests to assess the ability of non-experts to access political finance information is implicitly gender sensitive, and has the potential to be implicitly pro-poor where steps are taken to ensure representation of individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds. (Project guidelines stipulate that the group of citizens should be representative of the country's population demographics in terms of gender, age, and education level. While education levels can be a proxy for poverty, the additional stipulation that for a group composition of 10 students and 5 journalists might counter this potential in some contexts.)</p>
Actionability	<p><b>Yes:</b> Diagnoses the functioning of accountability mechanisms at a highly specific level that enables the identification of targeted reforms.</p> <p>The index is built on <i>de jure</i> and <i>de facto</i> indicators, comprising 3 dimensions: levels of transparency (internal book-keeping of parties, reporting of state agency, disclosure to the public); quality of data (comprehensiveness, depth and reliability of reporting), and effectiveness of control mechanisms (preventive measures, sanctions, public oversight).</p> <p>Problems such as a lack of oversight for private donations, scarce accountability by candidates, unreliable data delivered by parties, or cases where political finance data is not made public are revealed, enabling corrective action.</p>
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	<p>The method integrates both <i>de jure</i> and <i>de facto</i> measures. It evaluates regulatory systems separately from their application in practice. In terms of regulations, it compares national laws against universal criteria. In terms of practices, it uses indicators to compare experiences in the country against universal standards and attendant local provisions. The study then asks, i) based on universal standards, how accessible the data is to citizens; and ii) if existing sanctions in each country are applied in accordance with current legislation.</p>
Example indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Book-keeping <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <i>Is book-keeping mandatory?</i></li> <li>b. <i>Are party accountants certified, by law?</i></li> <li>c. <i>How professional is party staff, in practice?</i></li> <li>d. <i>Party accounting practices: what is the regularity of book-keeping?</i></li> </ol> </li> <li>2. Does the state disclose information on public subsidies? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <i>Direct public subsidies</i></li> <li>b. <i>Indirect public subsidies</i></li> <li>c. <i>Tax exemptions</i></li> </ol> </li> <li>3. How responsive were stakeholders in terms of disclosure of information requested? <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. <i>How responsive is the EMB?</i></li> <li>b. <i>How responsive are elected office holders?</i></li> <li>c. <i>How responsive are parties?</i></li> <li>d. <i>How responsive are donors?</i></li> <li>e. <i>How responsive are media companies?</i></li> </ol> </li> </ol>
URL	<a href="http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/americas/crinis">http://www.transparency.org/regional_pages/americas/crinis</a>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>DIAL module on governance attached to household surveys</b>
Template	Questionnaire
Purpose	To exploit the potential of household surveys carried out by National Statistical Offices as a statistical tool for constructing and monitoring governance and anti-corruption indicators.
Type of data used	Both <b>objective</b> data (the governance part of the survey asks experience-based questions about actual incidence of petty corruption, type of transactions and services involved, amount actually paid, etc.) and <b>subjective</b> data (e.g. perceptions about the extent of petty corruption, on public confidence in various institutions, on satisfaction levels about how institutions are run, etc.)
Methodology	<p>By appending a governance module to the official household survey, a national statistical office can carry out the governance survey on a regular basis and policymakers can access timely and methodologically reliable governance data to inform public policies.</p> <p>The governance module must be tailored to local particularities and centres of interest (existing modules developed with the support of DIAL in 12 African and Latin American countries can be used as references.) For instance, the set of questions on corruption can include “socially accepted” forms of corruption or forms imposed by social hierarchies.</p> <p>A key advantage of collecting governance data through household surveys is that it comes at a low marginal cost if the survey has already been planned by the national statistical office, thus facilitating the sustainability of the exercise. Other advantages include the representativeness of collected information allowing for easy quantification of governance phenomena, and the ability to compare indicators across time and measure progress in a more systematic fashion, since statistical household surveys are conducted at regular intervals.</p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>DIAL module on governance attached to household surveys</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<b>Strong.</b> Since the governance module is attached to household surveys, survey results are easily disaggregated by income groups, gender, regions (rural/urban), ethnicity, etc. This allows for anti-corruption and governance reform policies to be targeted to specific groups.
Actionability	<b>Yes:</b> In addition to evaluating the most corrupt institutions and the groups who are most vulnerable to corruption, questions can be asked to assess the extent of the population's resistance to corruption (refusal to pay), whether they file a complaint with the authorities if they encounter corruption, and the reasons for not reporting corruption (e.g. fear of reprisals, inaction by public authorities, lack of information as to how and where to file a complaint, etc.) This information is useful to inform policymaking around anti-corruption mechanisms.
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	Questions mainly about corruption " <b>outputs</b> " (asking citizens about their perceptions of and experiences with corruption), and assessing the <b>de facto</b> effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (e.g. asking citizens what are the main problems of the administration: absenteeism, corruption, politicisation, incompetence, inadequate regulations, etc.)
Example indicators	Do you have confidence in the following institutions (using a scale from 1 to 4): administration, judiciary, police, army, public health system, parliament, etc.? Have you been victim of corruption in your interactions with public servants in the past year? What was the occasion? Which institution was involved? What is the total amount your household had to pay over the past year due to corruption? In your opinion, has corruption increased or decreased over the past year? (petty corruption vs. grand corruption) Do you think that the following measures could improve public service quality / efficiency? 1. Performance-based wages or 2. Sanctions (e.g. dismissal of civil servants for misconduct)
URL	For examples of governance modules appended to household surveys in French-Speaking Africa (national reports available in French): <a href="http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_enquetes/dial_enquetes_modulegouvernance.htm">http://www.dial.prd.fr/dial_enquetes/dial_enquetes_modulegouvernance.htm</a>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Global Integrity Assessment Scorecard</b>
Purpose	<p>"To measure the existence (in law), the effectiveness (in practice), and citizen access to key good governance / anti-corruption mechanisms in a country that should ideally prevent, deter, or punish corruption." The Global Integrity framework does <i>not</i> measure corruption. Rather than attempting to measure the "cancer" of corruption, the Global Integrity framework assesses the quality of the "medicine" being applied to fight it: good governance and anti-corruption mechanisms.</p>
Type of data used	Highly specific fact-based indicators (more than 300) supported by <b>objective</b> evidence (laws, official policy documents, newspaper articles, administrative data, independent reports, academic sources, etc.)
Methodology	<p>Original on-the-ground research by in-country experts (leading local NGOs, universities, research institutes), backed by peer-reviewed commentary and references.</p> <p>The questionnaire raises questions on the existence, effectiveness and citizen access to good governance / anti-corruption mechanisms in 6 areas:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>7. <b>Civil society, public information and media</b></li> <li>8. <b>Elections</b> (<i>voting &amp; citizen participation, integrity of elections, regulations around political financing</i>)</li> <li>9. <b>Government accountability</b> (<i>across the executive, legislative &amp; judicial branches of government, and in budget processes</i>)</li> <li>10. <b>Administration and civil service</b> (<i>civil service regulations, whistle-blowing measures, regulatory processes around procurement &amp; privatization</i>)</li> <li>11. <b>Oversight and regulation</b> (<i>ombudsman, supreme audit, taxes &amp; customs, financial sector regulation, business licensing</i>)</li> <li>12. <b>Anti-corruption and rule of law</b> (<i>anti-corruption agency, access to justice, law enforcement</i>)</li> </ol> <p>For each question, a scale is provided with detailed scoring criteria.</p>



## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	Global Integrity Assessment Scorecard
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<p>Several “indicator questions” are pro-poor and gender sensitive; others can easily be adapted to address the specific challenges faced by disadvantaged groups in any given country.</p> <p>For example (<i>Category 6 - Rule of law</i>):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>In practice, citizens earning the median yearly income can afford to bring a legal suit.</i></li> <li>○ <i>In practice, a typical, small retail business can afford to bring a legal suit.</i></li> <li>○ <i>In practice, all citizens have access to a court of law, regardless of geographic location.</i></li> </ul>
Actionability	<p><b>Yes:</b> The “de facto” indicators are particularly actionable, with a focus on availability of human, financial and other resources required for the anti-corruption mechanisms to be effective, thus allowing policymakers to detect instances where resources are lacking. Other “de facto” indicators measure the performance of these mechanisms (e.g. time required to obtain information, to complete an investigation, etc.), thus allowing policymakers to monitor the effectiveness of mechanisms, and to identify bottlenecks that need to be addressed.</p>
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	<p>Assesses both the existence of anti-corruption mechanisms “<b>in law</b>”, and their functioning “<b>in practice</b>”, including an assessment of citizen access to these mechanisms. Since the focus of the assessment is on anti-corruption mechanisms, indicators are <b>input</b>-based.</p>
Example indicators	<p>To assess whistle-blowing measures (<i>Category 4 - Administration &amp; Civil Service</i>):</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) <b>In law</b>, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption?</li> <li>2) <b>In practice</b>, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a professional, full-time staff.</i></li> <li>○ <i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives regular funding.</i></li> <li>○ <i>In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on complaints within a reasonable time period.</i></li> <li>○ <i>In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption initiates investigations.</i></li> </ul> </li> </ol>
URL	<p><a href="http://globalintegrity.org/">http://globalintegrity.org/</a></p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Indicators of parliamentary performance in the budget process (Canadian Parliamentary Centre &amp; World Bank Institute)</b>
Template	<b>Questionnaire</b>
Purpose	“To assess parliament's role in the budget process to prevent and combat corruption.” The objective is to provide parliamentarians, parliamentary staff and others who study parliament with practical means to evaluate parliamentary performance against general standards adapted to the circumstances of each country. The framework can be useful in preparing baseline studies, establishing benchmarks of progress and making comparisons between sub-national parliaments and of a given parliament over time.
Type of data used	<b>Objective</b> data only. All of the questions were constructed with the intention that they should capture easily observable phenomena. Researchers and peer reviewers completing the questionnaire must provide evidence for their responses, such as a reference to a budget document, a law, a public statement by a government official, or a face-to-face interview with a government official.
Methodology	<p>The assessment of parliamentary performance in the budget process is conducted against five “performance tests”, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• level and range of activity</li> <li>• openness and transparency</li> <li>• participation</li> <li>• accountability</li> <li>• policy and programme impact</li> </ul> <p>The first and last of these tests represent the traditional concerns about how busy and how influential parliament is while the other three tests judge the contribution of parliament to core values of good governance.</p> <p>The questionnaire consists of a total of 37 questions (indicators) and is answered by a multi-stakeholder group (incl. members of the National Assembly, Senators and representatives of Civil Society) Indicators are ranked on a scale that ranges from "not present at all" to "strongly present".</p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Indicators of parliamentary performance in the budget process (Canadian Parliamentary Centre &amp; World Bank Institute)</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<p><b>Some</b> questions cover issues specific to the poor or women:</p> <p><i>Does parliament ensure that the poor are able to participate when it reviews the government's diagnosis of poverty and setting of priorities?</i></p> <p><i>Does parliament consult the poor in carrying out its evaluations of poverty reduction programmes?</i></p> <p><i>Does parliament employ gender analysis in seeking to influence budget priorities? In monitoring the budget?</i></p> <p><i>Does parliament consult women's groups during the budget process? Does parliament consult civil society organizations and business in its review of the budget?</i></p>
Actionability	<p><b>Yes</b>, the results of the assessment can be used by civil society and development advocates to identify priorities in strengthening parliament's role in the budget process to combat corruption. However, <b>a more specific diagnostic will be required</b> for identifying the causes underlying a poor performance as measured by any indicator (i.e. questions are mainly of "yes/no" type, but do not investigate "why") Also, a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate standard of performance can reduce the validity of results (for e.g. what qualifies as being a score 5, i.e. "strongly transparent" vs. a score 4?)</p>
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	<p>Questions address mainly anti-corruption <b>"inputs"</b>, i.e. assessing the existence of policies and effectiveness of mechanisms for effective participation and oversight by parliament in the budget process. Furthermore, questions ask about what occurs <b>in practice</b>, rather than about the requirements that may be in law.</p>
Example indicators	<p>Level and range of activity: <i>Does serious, substantive debate about the overall budget take place in parliament?</i></p> <p>Openness and transparency: <i>Does parliament receive timely information from internal audits conducted by the government?</i></p> <p>Participation: <i>Does parliament ensure that the poor are able to participate when it reviews the government's diagnosis of poverty and setting of priorities?</i></p> <p>Accountability: <i>Does parliament have a public accounts committee (PAC) or equivalent that examines past expenditures?</i></p> <p>Policy and programme impact: <i>Does parliament set conditions for budget reporting?</i></p>
URL	<p><a href="http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget_process_e.php">http://www.parlcent.ca/indicators/budget_process_e.php</a></p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Kenya Bribery Index</b>
Template	Questionnaire
Purpose	<p>The Kenya Bribery Index aims to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Capture the bribery experiences encountered by ordinary citizens in their interaction with officials in both public and private organisations</li> <li>▪ Raise awareness</li> <li>▪ Support and advocate for the reforms</li> </ul>
Type of data used	Experience and perception based data
Methodology	<p>The Kenya Bribery Index is carried out on annual basis and the field work is usually done between late November and early December so as to capture the experiences of the public during the year. In greater detail, the methodology of the Kenya Bribery Index follows two stages:</p> <p>A <b>survey</b> is carried out on the basis of a structured questionnaire administered through personal and/or telephone interviews. Respondents are asked to provide information on the organisations where they have encountered bribery during the year, where they have paid bribes, how much and for what.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A random sampling method (with province as unit from 2002 onwards) is used. The 2001 edition (Kenya Urban Bribery Index) was only conducted in urban areas (6 towns) with a sample size of 1,164 individuals. Covering all the eight provinces, 2,321 individuals (1,461 urban and 860 rural) were interviewed in the 2002 edition, 2,407 (1,160 urban and 1,247 rural) in the 2004 edition, 2,398 (906 urban and 1,492 rural) in the 2005 edition, 2,405 (1,103 urban and 1,302 rural) in the 2006 edition, 2,399 (1,103 urban and 1,302 rural) in the 2007 edition, and 2,400 in the 2008 edition (1,107 urban and 1,293 rural).</li> <li>▪ Bribes are categorized into 5 purposes: law enforcement (i.e. avoiding consequences of wrong doing and/or harassment by the relevant authority), regulatory compliance (e.g. trade licenses), access to services (e.g. health, education, utilities), business (e.g. obtaining contracts, expediting payments, etc.) and employment matters (e.g. securing jobs, promotions, transfers, training, etc.).</li> </ul> <p>The second step is the construction of the <b>index</b>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Six indicators are constructed: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>incidence</i> - This provides a measure of the opportunity for and propensity of officials in an organization to ask for or to accept bribes.</li> <li><i>prevalence</i> - The proportion of the survey respondents who are victims of bribery in an organization (i.e., respondents who report paying a bribe or were badly treated or not served for failing to do so;</li> <li><i>severity</i> - The frequency of denial of service if bribes are not paid. This provides a measure of the deleterious impact of this form of corruption on the public's ability to access that to which it is entitled</li> <li><i>frequency</i> - The average number of bribes paid per client (in terms of four numerical categories). This provides a measure of the scale of bribery activity in an organization among those who interact with it</li> <li><i>cost</i> - The average expenditure on bribery per person (calculated among all clients of a particular institution). This is indicative of the extra "tax burden" that results from such practices.</li> <li><i>size</i> - The average size of bribes paid (as based on the reported amounts of each 'one-off' bribe. This figure is indicative of the premium that citizens put on a particular service or cost/penalty avoided or, conversely, the value that those demanding/receiving such bribes believe their 'services' (transacted on that basis) are worth.</li> </ul> </li> <li>▪ It is an aggregate index as an unweighted average of the 6 indicators with a value range from 0 (no bribery) to 100 (worst possible performance). 52 institutions were ranked in 2001, 50 in the 2002 edition, 38 in the 2004 edition, 34 in the 2005 edition, 33 in the 2006 edition, and 41 were part of the 2007 edition.</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	Kenya Bribery Index
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<p>Survey data can be disaggregated according to socio-economic data: gender, education level, employment status, monthly household income, and rural/urban. Disaggregating this data from a nationally representative sample of the population makes it possible to observe trends among marginalised groups in relation to the rest of the population.</p> <p>Disaggregating, for example by income, could reveal the institutions that low-income groups interact with the most. It could also be possible to check for correlations between the prevalence of bribery and the interaction of certain sub-groups of the population, to find out what proportion of bribes are paid by the poor, in general or for a given institution.</p> <p>Questions about the amount and frequency of bribes paid when contrasted with average income levels can reveal implicitly poverty sensitive information, and can be used to find out what proportion of their income the poor lose to bribery payments.</p> <p>The questionnaire does not include specific gender sensitive and pro-poor questions.</p>
Actionability	<p><b>Yes:</b> An organisation's score can indicate worsening or improving corruption situation, and a corresponding need for change, or that existing anti-corruption measures are having an effect.</p> <p>The survey can also be used to capture important information about the culture of (in)tolerance of corruption. For instance trends in the number of people willing to report bribery demands compared to those who remain silent can say something about the accessibility or effectiveness of complaint mechanisms. In addition, corruption perceptions, also captured in the questionnaire, can reveal whether public opinion is in step with reforms, when seen in the context of anti-corruption reforms and media reporting.</p> <p><b>Limitations:</b> The institutions appearing in the survey are included based on the sample's respondents having had a sufficient number of interactions with them.</p>
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	<p>Questions are focused on <i>de facto</i>/output based information, by asking about front-line interactions with public and private organisations.</p>
Example indicators	<p>The purpose of the most frequently paid bribes (e.g. law enforcement – based on interaction with police); purpose of bribes having the largest size (e.g. employment).</p> <p>Percentage of respondents who have perceived the corruption situation to be greatly improved/moderately improved/unchanged/slightly worse/greatly worsened.</p> <p>Percentage of those who have reported a bribery demand situation, including for a given organisation.</p> <p>Organisation for which there is the highest level of compliance in paying bribes/ highest level of passivity in reporting bribes.</p>
URL	<p><a href="http://www.tikenya.org/publications.asp?DocumentTypeID=10">http://www.tikenya.org/publications.asp?DocumentTypeID=10</a></p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index</b>
Template	Data gathering table and index development table
Outputs	A sub-national index of local transparency and accountability in the areas of public procurement, financial management and property, and urban planning, which can be disaggregated by municipality
Purpose	The RTA Index is a sub-national ranking of municipalities, which measures their progress in combating corruption in the areas of public procurement, local planning and financial management and property. The index is part of a programme to enhance capacity for combating corruption at the local level.
Type of data used	<b>Objective</b> data only
Methodology	<p>The RTA methodology has been developed in the framework of the UNDP'S Good Governance &amp; Decentralization programmes. The framework identifies the most vulnerable points to corruption in FYR Macedonia and provides mechanisms on how to address these vulnerabilities.</p> <p>The methodology was designed to meet the needs of a very polarized political climate, in which there is little trust in perception based indicators of corruption. As such, and in order to generate buy-in from stakeholders, it was deemed necessary that any instrument for assessing the state of corruption be clear and generate indisputable results, simple to administer to the non-expert, and impartial.</p> <p>Qualitative data obtained through administrative data sources and interviews feeds into questionnaires and is converted into quantitative scores for the index, in a 4-part process:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. defining corruption hot-spots</li> <li>6. matching anti-corruption mechanisms and hot-spots</li> <li>7. assessing the existence and functioning in practice of those mechanisms</li> <li>8. quantification</li> </ol> <p>Integral to the methodology is the stakeholder involvement. Three categories of stakeholders (local self-government representative, institutions in charge of their work, and users of municipality services) were interviewed about their perceptions and experiences of corruption challenges concerning units of local self-government, to define the hot spots within each process. Anti-corruption mechanisms were defined with institutions in charge of coordinating and monitoring the work of local self-governments. Finally, a team of local stakeholders including NGO and media representatives are trained to implement the instrument.</p>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Macedonia's Responsibility, Transparency and Accountability (RTA) Index</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	The corruption hot-spots and corresponding anti-corruption mechanisms covered in Macedonia's RTA index do not include poverty or gender sensitive aspects, either in the indicators or in the research design for data collection.
Actionability	<b>Yes:</b> Highly specific indicators are quantified according to the optimal functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms, and therefore indicate the need for corrective action when they score below a defined benchmark.
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	Indicators are primarily <i>de facto</i> , assessing the existence in practice and functioning of transparency and accountability mechanisms.
Example indicators	<p>Existence of a system for informing parties through written notices posted up or obtainable at the windows or from a clerk.</p> <p>Number of positive and negative decisions on complaints passed by the municipality, second-instance committees or competent courts on the issuance of construction permits that are not in accordance with the General Urban Plan.</p>
URL	<a href="http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/show/E0620423-F203-1EE9-B51C6ED0ACE75957">http://europeandcis.undp.org/governance/show/E0620423-F203-1EE9-B51C6ED0ACE75957</a>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Open Budget Initiative</b>
Template	<b>Questionnaire</b>
Purpose	“It is intended to provide citizens, legislators, and civil society advocates with the comprehensive and practical information needed to gauge a government’s commitment to budget transparency and accountability.” Armed with this kind of information, national stakeholders can identify meaningful budget reforms to combat corruption.
Type of data used	<b>Objective</b> data only. All of the questions were constructed with the intention that they should capture easily observable phenomena. Researchers and peer reviewers completing the questionnaire must provide evidence for their responses, such as a reference to a budget document, a law, a public statement by a government official, or a face-to-face interview with a government official.
Methodology	<p>The OBI <b>questionnaire</b> is to be completed by independent, non-governmental experts (from academia or NGO), reviewed by OBI staff, with the final version reviewed again by 2 anonymous peer reviewers. The questionnaire contains a total of 122 multiple-choice questions: 91 questions evaluate public access to budget information. The remaining questions cover topics related to accountable budgeting, including the ability of key institutions of government to hold the executive accountable.</p> <p>The criteria used to assess what information should be publicly available and the timing of its release are based on generally accepted good practices related to public financial management</p> <p>The Open Budget questionnaire groups questions into 3 sections:</p> <p><b>1) The Availability of Budget Document</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Budget year of documents used in completing the questionnaire</li> <li>• Internet links for key budget documents</li> <li>• Distribution of documents related to the Executive’s proposal</li> <li>• Distribution of enacted budget and other reports</li> </ul> <p><b>2) The Executive’s Budget Proposal</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Estimates for the budget year and beyond</li> <li>• Estimates for years prior to the budget year</li> <li>• Comprehensiveness</li> <li>• The budget narrative and performance monitoring</li> <li>• Additional key information for budget analysis &amp; monitoring</li> </ul> <p><b>3) The Budget Process</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Executive’s formulation of the budget</li> <li>• Legislative approval of the budget</li> <li>• Executive’s implementation of the budget</li> <li>• Executive’s year end report and the Supreme Audit Institution</li> </ul>



## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Open Budget Initiative</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects:	<b>Few.</b> Questions are input-based: they assess policies, practices and legislation, therefore cannot be disaggregated by gender or income. As such, questions seldom cover issues specific to the poor or women (some exceptions include the following: “Does the executive’s budget or any supporting budget documentation present information on policies in at least the budget year that are intended to benefit directly the country’s most impoverished populations?”)
Actionability	<b>Yes:</b> The results of the assessment can be used by lenders, development advocates and aid organizations to identify meaningful budget reforms needed to combat corruption.
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	Questions address mainly anti-corruption “ <b>inputs</b> ”, i.e. assessing the existence and effectiveness of mechanisms for budget transparency and accountability. The majority of the questions ask about what occurs <b>in practice</b> , rather than about the requirements that may be in law.
Example indicators:	<p>From the section on <i>Legislative approval of the budget</i>:  <i>Does the executive present more details or provide a better explanation of any budget proposal, if members of the legislature (including from minority parties) request such information?</i></p> <p>From the section on the <i>Executive’s formulation of the budget</i>:  <i>Does the executive release to the public its timetable for its budget preparation process?</i>  <i>Does the executive’s budget or any supporting documentation explain how the proposed budget is linked to government’s stated policy goals, by administrative unit (or functional category), for the budget year?</i></p>
URL:	<a href="http://www.openbudgetindex.org">http://www.openbudgetindex.org</a>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)</b>
Purpose:	Government resources often pass through several layers of government bureaucracy (and the banking system) before reaching service facilities, which are charged with the responsibility of exercising the spending. Information on actual public spending is seldom available in developing countries. A PETS tracks the flow of resources through these strata in order to determine how much of the originally allocated resources reach each level.
Type of data used:	Mainly <b>objective</b> (e.g. quantitative data from financial and other administrative records), complemented by some <b>subjective</b> data (e.g. perceptions and satisfaction levels from beneficiaries)
Methodology:	<p>PETs are <b>surveys</b> of service providers. Data are collected both through <b>interviews</b> with managers and staff and from the service provider's <b>records</b>. In some cases, beneficiaries are also surveyed. Data are then triangulated to allow cross-validation of information. A PETS focuses on service provider behaviour, incentives, and relationship between providers, policy-makers and users. Key stakeholders, including government agencies, donors and civil society organizations, are involved in the design.</p> <p>While each PETS is designed for the country situation, six core elements for all facility questionnaires have been identified:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Characteristics of the facility</i>: the size, ownership, years of operation, hours of operation, catchment population, competition from other service providers, access to infrastructure, utilities and other services, and range of services provided.</li> <li>• <i>Inputs</i>: monetary values or quantities.</li> <li>• <i>Outputs</i>: such as numbers of inpatient and outpatients treated, enrolment rates, and numbers of pupils completing final exams.</li> <li>• <i>Quality</i>: such as staff behaviour and composition, availability of crucial inputs, and provision of certain services, such as laboratory testing.</li> <li>• <i>Financing</i>: sources of finance, amounts, and type (in-kind versus financial support).</li> <li>• <i>Institutional mechanisms for accountability</i>: information on supervision visits, management structures, reporting and record-keeping practices, parent or patient involvement, and audits.</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS)</b>																						
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	<p>Inherently pro-poor because survey looks at what benefits reach the end-user.</p> <p>Subgroups of particular interest (for example, rural and private facilities) can be more intensively sampled than others.</p> <p>Specific questions can also be designed to be pro-poor and gender sensitive (e.g. Are the poor/vulnerable groups extensively exposed to the information campaign about transfers of flows down to points of service delivery? For e.g. are monthly transfers of public funds to the districts published in local newspapers? Are other means of communication used to make this information accessible to the illiterate?)</p>																						
Actionability	<p><b>Yes:</b> Analysis of the flow of resources through many layers of bureaucracy helps identify the location and extent of obstacles to resource flows (financial, staff, equipment);</p> <p>Also assesses effectiveness of anti-corruption mechanisms when collecting information on “institutional mechanisms for accountability” (e.g. data on supervision visits, management structures, reporting and record-keeping practices, parent or patient involvement, and audits.)</p> <p>User designs the survey to fit their need, thus allowing for context-specific actionability.</p>																						
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	<p><b>Yes:</b> PETS are often used to quantify the incongruity between budgetary and real assignments of staff and to determine the degree of attendance at work. This can be done using central government information sources (such as central government payroll data, which indicates each employee’s place of work) and comparing this <i>de jure</i> data with a nationally representative sample of frontline facilities in health and education. Such a survey would enable the collection of <i>de facto</i> data on 1) the number of “ghost workers” (public employees that don’t really exist), 2) absenteeism (employees who are not putting in full hours of work), and 3) migration of posts (employees who are not working where they are supposed to be working).</p>																						
Example indicators:	<table><tr><td colspan="3"><b>Sample questions for a PETS on the education sector</b> (<i>designated teacher has been selected through sampling</i>)</td></tr><tr><td>Question</td><td colspan="2">Unit</td></tr><tr><td>How much does this teacher receive in salary each month?</td><td colspan="2">currency figure</td></tr><tr><td>How much is deducted from each payslip automatically?</td><td colspan="2">currency figure</td></tr><tr><td>Who pays the teacher’s salary?</td><td colspan="2">1 = Nat’l gov’t; 2 = school; 3 = community; 4 = other</td></tr><tr><td>Prices and wages vary considerably across different parts of this country. What is a typical hourly wage for a manual labourer in this area?</td><td colspan="2">Currency figure</td></tr><tr><td>Do you think it is possible to support a family only on the salary that this teacher earns?</td><td colspan="2">1 = Yes; 2 = no</td></tr></table> <p>Source: Ritva Reinikka and Nathanael Smith, ‘Public expenditure tracking surveys in education,’ International Institute for Educational Planning, 2004.</p>		<b>Sample questions for a PETS on the education sector</b> ( <i>designated teacher has been selected through sampling</i> )			Question	Unit		How much does this teacher receive in salary each month?	currency figure		How much is deducted from each payslip automatically?	currency figure		Who pays the teacher’s salary?	1 = Nat’l gov’t; 2 = school; 3 = community; 4 = other		Prices and wages vary considerably across different parts of this country. What is a typical hourly wage for a manual labourer in this area?	Currency figure		Do you think it is possible to support a family only on the salary that this teacher earns?	1 = Yes; 2 = no	
<b>Sample questions for a PETS on the education sector</b> ( <i>designated teacher has been selected through sampling</i> )																							
Question	Unit																						
How much does this teacher receive in salary each month?	currency figure																						
How much is deducted from each payslip automatically?	currency figure																						
Who pays the teacher’s salary?	1 = Nat’l gov’t; 2 = school; 3 = community; 4 = other																						
Prices and wages vary considerably across different parts of this country. What is a typical hourly wage for a manual labourer in this area?	Currency figure																						
Do you think it is possible to support a family only on the salary that this teacher earns?	1 = Yes; 2 = no																						
URL:	<p>For an overview, see <a href="http://go.worldbank.org/AGLWH0RV40">http://go.worldbank.org/AGLWH0RV40</a> or <a href="http://go.worldbank.org/1KIMS4I3K0">http://go.worldbank.org/1KIMS4I3K0</a>. For a detailed description, see <a href="http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/12933_chapter9.pdf">http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/12933_chapter9.pdf</a></p>																						

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Methodology for combating corruption in infrastructure services Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC), Loughborough University - DFID</b>
Templates	Generic templates for household questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, observation checklist, focus group discussion issues, corruption diary, and flow chart
Outputs	Country case report
Purpose	<p>A methodology for diagnosing corruption and the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives in infrastructure services (water and sanitation, drainage, solid-waste management, the provision of access roads and paving, transport, street lighting ect ), focusing on pro-poor outcomes. It comprises a set of complementary research instruments and techniques, rather than a single template.</p> <p>The methodology was piloted in 6 countries including in South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Georgia, Ukraine and Nepal in 2005-2006.</p> <p>The outcome of research is a case study report, which is then disseminated through local expert networks for uptake into policy work and action at the national and community levels.</p>
Type of data used	A combination of objective as well as subjective data.
Methodology	<p>A case study approach that utilizes qualitative and quantitative data from a range of desk and field methods including: document/article review, questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions (guided by checklist), direct observations (guided by checklist), and corruption diary.</p> <p>The methodology draws upon a wide range of stakeholders as partners in research planning, consultation and dissemination, and as sources of information, including service providers as well as users. Because there is an emphasis on feeding back research findings and recommendations into local and national plans, case studies are selected where there are already anti-corruption initiatives and research taking place.</p> <p>The research project is guided by several main questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ What are the causes of corruption in infrastructure delivery?</li> <li>▪ What impact does it have on the livelihood of the poor?</li> <li>▪ What are the experiences of those who are corrupt?</li> <li>▪ What accountability arrangements are, or should be put in place?</li> </ul>

## ANNEX 5. Module 11 – Instruments for assessing corruption

Instrument / methodology	<b>Methodology for combating corruption in infrastructure services Water, Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC), Loughborough University - DFID</b>
Pro-poor/gender sensitive aspects	The methodology is based on a poverty-sensitive research strategy that prioritizes low income neighbourhoods, and integrates a gendered perspective into guiding research questions and recommendations.
Actionability	The use of a comprehensive analysis is not aimed at producing indicators, but can help to identify action-worthy information, by providing insights into the strengths and weaknesses of operations and effectiveness of service delivery and producing recommendations.
Complementarity (de jure/de facto; inputs/outputs)	No specific focus on generating indicators, though it is the nature of the case study methodology to use multiple data collection methods to validate findings, and to look in particular at gap between the impact of corruption in infrastructure and service delivery.
Example indicators	This methodology is geared towards obtaining a holistic picture, rather than towards quantifying performance of accountability mechanisms. However, survey questionnaires, if used, offer a source of quantitative information which can be adapted to this purpose. For example, <i>Number of people who faced a regular problem in accessing water services in the past 6 months.</i>
URL	<a href="http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/log_pubs2.php">http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/log_pubs2.php</a>

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### Activity 2 – Data collection methods

#### Data collection templates<sup>67</sup>

**Table 1. Stakeholder levels and relative tools and techniques**


Levels	Tools
State-level service providers	Semi-structured interview / informal discussion
Civil society-level service providers	Semi-structured interview / informal discussion
State-level policy actors	Informal discussion / consultation
Civil society-level policy actors	Informal discussion / consultation
Service recipients	Structured interview and focus group discussions

**Table 2. Link between four key research questions and instruments**

	Document / article review	Questionnaires	Semi- structured interviews	Focus group discussions	Direct observations
Causes of corruption in Infrastructure delivery	•		•		
Effects of corruption on the livelihoods of the poor		•		•	•
Experiences of those who were corrupt	•		•		
Remedies for corruption and informal remedies for corruption	•		•	•	

<sup>67</sup> Templates in this module from *A note on Research Methodology for Combating Corruption*, Water, Engineering and Development Centre, Loughborough University/DFID, 2007, <http://wedc.lboro.ac.uk/publications/details.php?book=978-1-84380-120-7&keyword=%methodology%&subject=0&sort=TITLE>

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data



**Figure 1. An example of a flow chart illustrating instances of corruption in service delivery.**

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### Corruption diary

Date:

What happened? Was the bribe asked for or was the bribe offered?

Who asked for / accepted the bribe?

How much money did you pay?

What was the background – in what context did you encounter this person (specify problem)?

How many times have you faced this problem in the last six months (regularly / 'now and then' / rarely?)

Was the problem resolved satisfactorily by paying the bribe?

What do you think would have happened if you hadn't paid? For example, would it have made no difference, would there have been threats / harassment, a delay or denial of service, bad service etc?

How did you feel about the corruption experienced? For example, frightened, intimidated, powerless, embarrassed or unaffected?

### Observation checklist

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS OF THE AREA				
Description of housing	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Kinds of materials used for construction				
Maintenance of common open spaces	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Provision of public telephones	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Provision of mail boxes	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Do houses have numbers	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No		
Checklist for specific services				
WATER				
Do households have piped connections?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Do households have booster pumps?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Do households use water filters?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Do households have water tanks?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Are there standpipes in area?				
Is there evidence of illegal water connections?				



## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### Observation checklist continued....

<b>SEWERAGE</b>				
Is there evidence of households with undesirable arrangements (latrines emptying into drains, open defecation, overflowing septic tanks / blocked sewers, smells etc.)?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Are there communal latrines?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Have there been attempts to clear blockages / improve sanitation?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
<b>ACCESS AND PAVING</b>				
Separate vehicular and pedestrian traffic	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Frequency of pedestrian movement	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Frequency of traffic	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Comment on vehicle type				
Condition of pavements	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Condition of roads	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Comment on quantity of roads serving the community				
<b>STREET LIGHTING / POWER</b>				
Do households have an electricity connection?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Are there electricity meters?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Is there adequate provision of street lighting?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
<b>SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT</b>				
Are rubbish bins (public and private) provided?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Is street cleaning frequent?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Are street cleaners visible?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Has rubbish been dumped in open areas?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Is there evidence of regular waste collection?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Is there evidence of recycling?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
<b>COMMUNITY BUILDINGS</b>				
Are community buildings available?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
What is the condition of the community building?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Is the community building frequently used?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### Observation checklist continued....

DRAINAGE				
Are there adequate arrangements for drainage?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Have arrangements been made for street paving?	<input type="checkbox"/> Good	<input type="checkbox"/> Fair	<input type="checkbox"/> Poor	<input type="checkbox"/> None
Are the drains cleaned frequently?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Is there flooding in the street?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
Is there flooding inside houses?	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes	<input type="checkbox"/> No	<input type="checkbox"/> Don't know	
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS				

### Focus group discussions: issues for debate

#### Service delivery

- What is service provision like?
- What happens in informal / illegal residential areas?
- What do you think about service quality?
- Are there any problems with supply?
- If you have a problem, to whom do you speak?
- Is there community involvement in service delivery? Do you have 'a voice' in service delivery?
- Do you trust service providers?

#### Corruption

- Are bribes required, offered or demanded for service provision?
- Do you use bribes to obtain services? In what area(s) specifically?
- Do you use bribes to speed up service delivery? What services specifically?
- How do you avoid paying bribes? – That is, what informal strategies do people have for combating corruption?
- What happens if you don't pay bribes?
- What is the bribe amount that you usually pay?
- How often do you pay bribes?
- Which services do you usually pay bribes for?

- Why do you think corruption happens in infrastructure service delivery?
- How do you think corruption (in service delivery and in general) can be stopped?
- What do think about XXXX accountability initiative?

#### Livelihoods

- What are the costs of this kind of corruption for you? – That is, financial costs (in terms of income, impacts on employment / enterprises etc.); social costs (in terms of violence or harassment, gender relations, household relations, levels of trust / co-operation in society etc.); human costs (in terms of health, information, skills etc.); natural costs (in terms of access to land, water resources and so on); and physical costs (in terms of access to infrastructure services etc.)
- Does corruption provide any benefits for you?

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### **Semi-structured interviews for infrastructure service providers**

#### *Ethics*

- Is there a code of conduct for staff? If so, does it specifically address corruption? Is it effective?
- Is the integrity of staff monitored?
- Is there protection for whistle-blowers? Are informants protected against retaliation?
- Are there any pro-poor policies in place?
- Are staff members required to report attempts to bribe, induce or undermine their impartiality and independence?
- Are policies and procedures clear to employees?
- How do you punish corruption? What sanctions are applicable to staff for accepting or procuring bribes?
- What improvements could you suggest to current arrangements?
- Are there any NGOs or independent actors to monitor services?

#### *Complaints*

- Is there a complaints office? If so, is it widely known? Is it used?
- Are there complaints procedures?
- What happens if a complaint about corruption is valid? And what happens if it is unfounded?

#### *Procurement*

- Is there a fair system for procurement?
- Are there competitive principles for tendering?
- Is there monitoring of procurement activity?
- Do you disqualify contractors who have attempted to bribe an official?

#### *Human resources*

- Is there a fair system for recruiting, disciplining and promoting staff?
- Are pay and benefits for staff fair / reasonable?
- How do you ensure transparency?
- Are the public involved in shaping service delivery, for example, in terms of budget priorities?
- Are regulations and policy guidelines publicly available? If so, where and how?

#### *Corruption*

- Is there a commitment to fight corruption within the agency?
- Please describe briefly any anti-corruption regulations that relate to service delivery.
- What is the agency's policy on personnel accepting or soliciting bribes, gifts, benefits or hospitality? Are such practices forbidden, accepted or do they depend on the situation?
- Do you provide specific training on integrity issues?

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

### Household questionnaire

#### Personal

<b>Q1. Gender</b>	
Male	
Female	
<b>Q2. Into which age group do you fall?</b>	
Younger than 24 years	
25 - 34 years	
35 - 49 years	
50 - 59 years	
60 years or older	
Refuse to answer	
<b>Q3. Do you have a religious faith?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Not sure	
Refuse to answer	
<b>Q4. What is your highest academic qualification?</b>	
Primary	
Secondary	
Diploma	
Degree	
Refuse to answer	

#### Livelihoods

<b>Q5. What are the different sources of livelihood for your household?</b>	
Micro-enterprise / self-employed	
Labourer	
Agriculture	
Migration	
Saving / remittances /pension	
NGO	

Business	
Public sector (government)	
Other (please specify)	
<b>Q6. Do you think you have a voice in decisions about how the city is run?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q7. Do you have adequate number of meals every day?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q8. Do you feel safe where you live? (physical security)</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q9. Are there health risks where you live?</b>	
Yes (please specify)	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q10. Have you experienced threat of removal from land or a house – by landlords, property developers or landowners?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q11. Is your house near employment, transport links, healthcare, education and other social services and civic amenities?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

<b>Q12. Do you have access to credit and loans?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q13. In the past, how have you coped with a crisis such as losing a job?</b>	
Sale of household assets	
Ask for help from extended family	
Ask for help from friends and neighbours	
Contact influential people in the community	
Find other jobs	
Contact community groups	
Don't know	

### Service delivery

Q14.	Access and use of service	Are you satisfied with this service?
Water		
Sanitation		
Electricity		
Transport		
Street lighting		
Railways		
Roads and paving		
Drainage		
<b>Q15. Have you approached any of the service providers with a problem?</b>		
Yes (please specify which agency)		
No		
Don't know		
<b>Q16. Why did you contact this agency?</b>		

<b>Q17. How many times have you faced this problem in the last 6 months</b>	
Regularly	
Now and then	
Rarely	
<b>Q18. How did you contact the agency?</b>	
Personal visit	
Telephone	
Wrote a letter	
<b>Q19. Did you have a contact or reference to help you approach the agency?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q20. Did you have to pay your contact for his or her help?</b>	
Yes (how much?)	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q21. Was your problem resolved satisfactorily by the agency?</b>	
Yes (please specify how)	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q22. How satisfied were you with the speed with which your problem was solved?</b>	
Satisfied	
Dissatisfied	
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	
<b>Q23. Were you happy with the behaviour of staff?</b>	
Yes (please specify why)	
No	
Don't know	

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

<b>Q24. How satisfied are you with this agency after your experience with it?</b>	
Satisfied	
Dissatisfied	
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	
<b>Q25. Do you think you have enough information about infrastructure services?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	

### Corruption in society

<b>Q26. What do you understand by the word 'corruption'?</b>	
<b>Q27. Can you think of an example of corruption?</b>	
<b>Q28. Do you think corruption is a bigger problem in the public, NGO or the private sector?</b>	
Public sector	
Private sector	
NGO	
About the same	
Don't know	
<b>Q29. Do you think corruption is a serious problem in any particular area of society? If so, which?</b>	
Business	
Education	
Community organizations	
Church	
Sport	
Other (please specify)	

<b>Q30. What do you think is the main cause of corruption in society?</b>

### Corruption in infrastructure delivery

<b>Q31. In terms of the various infrastructure services, which would you say has the greatest levels of corruption?</b>	
Water	
Sanitation	
Electricity	
Transport	
Street lighting	
Railways	
Roads and paving	
Drainage	
<b>Q32. During the past year, has any service provider asked you, or anyone you know, to pay a bribe for his or her service?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q33. If yes, what happened?</b>	
The service provider asked for the payment	
The offer was made by the citizen	
Everyone knows you have to pay something extra	
Don't know	
<b>Q34. What do you think would happen if you or the person you know didn't pay?</b>	
It would make no difference to the service	
I would get a bad service	
There would be threats / harassment	
There would be delay / denial of the service	

## ANNEX 6. Module 12 – Collecting data

<b>Q35. How often do you think the average person pays a bribe to someone?</b>	
Every day	
Every week	
Every month	
Every year	
<b>Q36. How much do you think the average person typically pays?</b>	
<b>Q37. What do you think should happen to service providers found guilty of corruption?</b>	
Lose their jobs and go to prison	
Lose their jobs and have to pay a fine	
Lose their jobs	
It depends on what they did	
There should be no punishment for corruption	
Don't know	
<b>Q38. What impact does paying bribes have on you and your household?</b>	
<b>Q39. How do you feel about the kinds of corruption you experience? For example, frightened or intimidated, powerless, embarrassed, unaffected etc.?</b>	
<b>Q40. Do you have any of these in your home?</b>	
Underground tank	
Overhead tank	
Handpump / well	
Water filter	
Emergency lights	
Generator(s)	
Water purifier	

<b>Q41. Would you be willing to pay more for a better service?</b>	
Yes	
No	
Don't know	
<b>Q42. What improvements could be made to service delivery?</b>	
Staff present at desks	
Staff behaviour improved	
Staff more helpful	
Jobs completed faster	
Fewer demands for 'speed' money	
Information more accessible	
Information more clearly displayed	
Forms more easily available	
Service time reduced	

### Fighting corruption

<b>Q43. Do you think the following ways of fighting corruption are effective or ineffective?</b>
More prosecutions and longer sentences for corruption
More information about the way government works and spends taxes
News investigations of corruption
Campaigns to raise public awareness of the extent and costs of corruption
Codes of conduct to promote professional ethics
Promoting moral values in everyday life
Increase salaries of public employees
More ways for citizens to report corruption
More protection for people who report corruption
Establish a government agency dedicated to fighting corruption
Action taken by businesses to fight corruption

Thank you for completing this questionnaire.

## ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection

### Activity 1 – Case study reflection

**In preparation, photocopy enough copies of the case for each participant. Each case needs to be cut into segments (along the dotted line) and distributed sequentially (each segment is numbered). Participants read the following case individually, and discuss reflection questions as a group. Wait until after group discussions have taken place to distribute each instalment of the case.**

✂-----

*While you read the case, take note of the themes covered in the first part of the training programme: (e.g. actionability, objective and subjective data, poverty and gender sensitive data, complementary)*

#### A government official's challenge

1

Elsa is a civil servant in a Latin American government tasked with understanding her country's performance on international corruption and governance metrics in order to inform the country's new anti-corruption strategy. Her government has been challenged by a bilateral aid donor to improve anti-corruption performance, as measured by the World Bank Institute's *Worldwide Governance Indicators*.

Her role as the lead analyst of governance metrics was created in response to this donor's challenge, which explicitly links performance on anti-corruption indicators to future aid. Elsa passionately believes that her country needs fair, accountable government, but she also knows that her job is, to a large extent, simply to keep that aid money flowing. To do that, her country's performance on international assessments of corruption needs to improve. She is responsible for making policy recommendations to improve these scores.

Elsa starts by directing her team in a careful reading of the World Bank Institute's methodology. They know that the index is drawn from various third-party surveys. Upon looking at those component surveys closely, they find that the source material can vary dramatically from year to year. Elsa reads the reports of her research staff with concern: survey questions were generally directed at perceptions of corruption, but the target audience, the phrasing of questions, and the time periods studied seemed fairly random because the index depends on third party survey data that have varying methodologies or objectives. Some look only at bribery, others look at corruption in the courts, while still others seek to assess regulatory hurdles and inefficiencies in the bureaucracy. Additionally, surveys from the past several years were combined into a single year's index result. As a result, any outlier data, such as a particularly unflattering survey result, did not appear as a one-year dip in a noisy pattern, but as part of a smooth multi-year trend.

*What does this mean for Elsa's ability to make policy recommendations to improve the country's anti-corruption score on the Worldwide Governance Indicators?*

*What question(s) should she be asking at this point? Of whom?*



## ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection

✂-----

2

This is not particularly good news for Elsa and her policy recommendations. It appears to her that international perceptions of the government's anti-corruption performance impacted index results at all times. That meant that whatever steps the government decided to take to combat corruption, they needed to be popular among donors. Their policies needed to reinforce the image that the government could be trusted and that corruption was well under control.

Elsa decides to put her reports down and takes a walk around the humid capital city. If she could assume, for a moment, that any policy recommendations she proposed would be adopted (and given the amount of aid money at stake, this was not a bad assumption), what could she do to influence these ratings? She realizes it all hinges on international perceptions of rather unspecific "corruption" issues. It was clear that the citizens of her country were frustrated with corruption. But what would they like to see done about it?

She stops into a small cafe to get something cool to drink. On a whim, she asks her waiter if he thinks corruption is a problem. He is surprised at the question but assures her that, yes, corruption is a terrible blight on the country. Elsa then asks him what he would like to see done about it. "I'd like to see the people responsible exposed, and sent to jail! Forever!" he says. Several cafe patrons nod their heads at this exchange.

Their enthusiasm was hard to miss. Elsa thinks about this as she sips her drink. Perhaps some high profile prosecutions would be enough to improve the public's mood. A focus on strong investigations and aggressive law enforcement would give shape to her proposal—she wonders whether a basket of policy reforms to advance the goal of more high profile prosecutions would do the trick.

*What do you think of Elsa's plan?*

*How might this course of action affect corruption perceptions inside and outside the country?*

✂-----

3

The next week, Elsa presents her plan to a meeting of the ruling party leadership: the government needs to catch a big fish and send a message that no one is above the law. The key ministers receive this recommendation in silence. However, a particularly ambitious Member of Parliament immediately begins speculating about who exactly would be likely to be prosecuted. Soon, the ministers' aids are brainstorming deserving candidates for a highly public humiliation. Elsa cannot help but notice that the "big fish" are all members of the opposition party.

Finally, the Minister of the Interior cuts off the debate. Speaking slowly, as if to children, he addresses the room. "Aid money is very important to this country. Our aid money depends on the international corruption rankings. Our performance on these metrics is dependent on international perception of the level of corruption in government. Your solution is to have some big public trials," he said. "When you do," the minister continued, "you will fill

## ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection

every radio station, every newspaper, every cafe in this country with talk of corruption. And when the next survey happens, and the international businessmen are asked if there is corruption in our country, what do you think they will say? And what do you think will happen to that index score?"

The minister then gently suggests that Elsa develop some new recommendations and consider metrics that focus on addressing some of the fundamental problems that are causing corruption in the country rather than on manipulating public opinion.

*Is the Minister's concern about high profile prosecutions justified?*

*What should Elsa do next?*

✂-----

4

Elsa leaves the meeting knowing she needs some new indicators. Perhaps another index might be more helpful in understanding the country's score, and taking steps to improve its anti-corruption performance. She and her team embark on a review of existing corruption literature and research but don't find much that directly applies to her country. They spend the remainder of the day exploring other corruption indices and assessment methods.

Some indices, such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, are like the WGI, in that they can't be unpacked into more actionable information and are based on the views of outsiders. Elsa comes to the conclusion that perhaps there is no comprehensive assessment of corruption. The team continues to map out research methods both from within the country and the region. They learn that there are several years' worth of data from a national bribery survey conducted by Transparency International, and that a neighbouring country is working on a project to monitor political finance with the CRINIS method. They observe that indicators produced in both the CRINIS method and Global Integrity's Integrity Scorecards seem to provide a possible solution because they focus not on corruption itself but on disaggregated anti-corruption mechanisms – asset disclosure practices, auditing capacities, campaign finance reporting, and so on – and their practical implementation in a country. But unfortunately no data is available for her country. But perhaps they can build on some of these existing resources?

*What could Elsa do next?*

✂-----

5

Else has a sense that part of the problem with the Worldwide Governance Indicators and other external assessments of her country is that they focus so much on external sources that they are out of touch with what was really happening in the country, and that they didn't provide a detailed enough picture of corruption as well as all of the ongoing efforts to combat it.

## ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection

She decides to convene a meeting of national stakeholders, inviting key members of civil society corruption watchdogs, journalists and experts in the area to discuss how to proceed. These civil society representatives come to the table with different concerns – corruption in the education and health sectors, grand and political corruption, corruption with the judiciary and police, and all share their frustration of by the frustrations involved in accessing official information.

The participants also offer many different approaches to resolving the problem. Some suggest targeting anti-corruption efforts on a specific sector or institution to track the leakage of funds. Others would like a more preventive approach focusing on closing corruption loopholes, rather than doing “post-mortem” assessments. One of the journalists believes that “naming and shaming” the worst offending institutions would be the most effective approach, agreeing with what Elsa had heard earlier in the coffee shop, that prosecutions would deter further corruption. One young researcher suggests that what is necessary is to begin with a systemic analysis of corruption weaknesses and anti-corruption capacities for a more strategic approach to combating corruption. Elsa adds the government’s desire to track its progress using an index, but that the global indices consulted thus far have been inadequate for the purpose of planning reforms.

One of the team members shares some of the indicator question templates that he suggests could serve as a starting point for an anti-corruption policy wish list. They begin to develop a list of possible options.

*What do you think is the benefit of holding such a meeting at this early stage?*

*Do you see any drawbacks to this approach?*

✂-----

6

One approach which holds broad appeal in the meeting, and that has been used in a number of other countries in the region, is the use of custom-designed reporting programmes to track implementation of existing anti-corruption policies across different areas of the civil service. Each programme was designed to provide incentives to departments and ministries to better implement a specific area of anti-corruption policy, such as improving whistle-blower protections or more closely monitoring outside business interests of civil servants. When these programmes identified the best performers, they served as local case studies that other ministries could replicate. In light of her earlier meeting with the Minister, Elsa begins to appreciate the appeal of this indirect, less volatile approach.

A consensus begins to form that a systemic study of the country’s integrity structures would be useful for informing where to focus reforms, and that a national index designed for the purpose could provide a benchmark for tracking progress towards the implementation of policy goals. This would be complemented by regular public surveys – whether general or tied to a particular service would be decided at a later stage.

Elsa proposes to draft a proposal based on the conclusions of the meeting, when another voice adds a new concern. “We have forgotten an important issue. Who will be charged with collecting the data? Will there be a transparent process for reviewing it? Surely an

## ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection

assessment of corruption and integrity reforms in the country has to have transparent and replicable methods, with findings that are validated by experts and understandable to the general public!" Heads around the room are nodding. Elsa couldn't agree more - this isn't a project the Ministry can credibly undertake on its own if the public and donors are to trust the findings.

The meeting ends with the consensus that it is essential that the research design and findings be approved by qualified independent reviewers. It is agreed that, pending ministerial approval, the group will reconvene at a later date to review the research strategy proposal and to plan a dissemination strategy.

*What are the merits of the current proposal, compared to her previous one? What are the potential tradeoffs?*

3<-----

7

The Minister has strong reservations about this proposal. "Do you realize the cost implications of this strategy? There is no way we can fund the sort of data collection this entails. We just can't justify it. "

Elsa had predicted this sort of reaction. She continues her sales pitch, challenging the Minister: "What cannot be justified is spending on anti-corruption reforms that we don't know work. And besides", she adds, " Not all of these data collection methods have to be prohibitively costly. We can design a research plan that falls within the budget, especially if we make use of existing government data collection. Don't we have a census coming up next year? And besides, we don't have to reinvent the wheel. I know of a few countries where the national anti-corruption coalitions are also involved in monitoring corruption in local service delivery that could provide us with a model."

"If it can be done within the budget. Perhaps we can also get some funding to cover it – or investigate whether parts of it can be integrated into other projects. That's your next challenge. "

Soon her team is gathering data from across the civil service and from different regions of the country, and the process is closely being followed by the national anti-corruption coalition. The coalition is also now contributing to local level monitoring, with the assistance from expertise provided from sister coalitions in the region. After validating the results with a group of independent experts and publishing results in the form of agency and regional rankings, Elsa is surprised to see how much media attention the initiative received. She expected the rankings to put pressure on the worst performers, but is pleasantly surprised to see the better performers energized by the results as well - soon there is healthy competition developing across agencies and regions.

Mindful of the aid money that is based on favourable international perceptions of the fight against corruption, Elsa still dedicates some of her team's efforts to broadcasting the work that they were doing, and occasionally her team's efforts make their way into the media as positive stories.

It isn't clear how the new initiative is going to impact the international assessments of corruption, but Elsa (and her Minister) no longer spend her time worrying about the next batch of international rankings. Instead, she is overwhelmed with reports and data from regions and ministries from each new reporting programme that her team puts into place.

## **ANNEX 7. Module 13 – Application and reflection**

This data was local, up-to-date, directly relevant to the performance of her country's institutions, and seen as legitimate by a wide range of national stakeholders.

*What are the general lessons we can learn from this case?*

*Can you derive any lessons or pieces of advice that are transferable to your own context?*

**Write a reflection based on the last two questions in the worksheet provided.**

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

### Activity 2 – Training programme evaluation

#### Evaluation forms

Dear Trainer,

As you know, this training programme has not yet been tested and we have yet to establish the quality of the content and methods ***in practice!*** Because of this reason, both the trainer's and participants' evaluation forms are more detailed than normal, in order to help us apprehend the feedback we need to improve the programme. We would appreciate if you could kindly explain this to the participants as well, before distributing the forms.

Please also be sure to **send us the forms**, by any of the following ways:

Fax: +47 23 06 08 21

E-mail (scanned copies): [noelle.rancourt@undp.org](mailto:noelle.rancourt@undp.org) or to [marie.laberge@undp.org](mailto:marie.laberge@undp.org)

Post: UNDP Oslo Governance Centre  
Postboks 2881, Tøyen  
N-0608 Oslo, Norway

Many thanks for your help!

UNDP Oslo Governance Centre

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

### Trainer's Evaluation Form

Trainer's name:

Contact information (email, phone):

1. Context			
Please provide some background information on the training held.			
a. Country and organisation hosting/delivering the training programme:			
b. Please provide the dates of programme, and specify whether it was run as a full day programme, or by regular timeslot.			
c. Briefly provide your technical and/or pedagogical background.			
d. Briefly describe the participant group, including number and professional background(s).			
e. Was the group mixed or homogenous in terms of what they hoped to gain from the programme?			
f. How were participants selected? (by organisation, individual basis; voluntary participation or obligatory)			
2. Course activities			
	No	Partially	Yes
a. Were the activities effective in promoting the sharing of experience among participants?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Comments			
c. Were the activities effective in linking theory and practice?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
d. Comments			
e. Was the combination of presentation and group work appropriate?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
f. Comments			

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

g. Was the time estimated/allotted for activities throughout the programme adequate? <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		
h. Comments		
3. Programme Modules		
<p>We would like to find out about the quality and relevance of <b>content</b> to participants. Consider the following questions -</p> <p>Quality: Were explanations clear? Did the programme cover a sufficient number of assessment approaches and corruption focus areas? Was sufficient detail provided? Did activities help to clarify the content?</p> <p>Relevance: Did participants recognize challenges and opportunities from their own contexts? Did they find the skills and tools to be transferable to their own context? Did the module provide them with new information?</p> <p>Please score each module on quality and relevance in the boxes provided: 0=very poor, 1=poor, 2=good, 3=very good</p>		
a. Module 2 Defining corruption	Quality of content	Relevance to participants
b. Comments		
c. Module 3 Why measure corruption?		
d. Comments		
e. Module 4 Composite and original indicators of corruption		
f. Comments		
g. Module 5 The challenges of measuring corruption		
h. Comments		
i. Module 6 Poverty and gender sensitive indicators		
j. Comments		



## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

k. Module 7 Complementarity in the use of indicators		
l. Comments		
m. Module 8 Developing integrity indicators and indices		
n. Comments		
o. Module 10		
p. Comments		
q. Module 11, Collecting data		
r. Comments		
4. Trainer's manual and materials		
	No	Partially Yes
a. Were the instructions clear and easy to execute?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
b. Did you make use of Reference Sheets or PowerPoint slides for delivering presentations and making substantive inputs?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
c. Comments		
5. Overall evaluation		
d. What aspects of the training programme did you find <b>most</b> useful?		
e. What aspects of the training programme did you find <b>least</b> useful?		
f. What major adjustments, if any, did you make to the programme? Please elaborate why, how and with what effect.		
g. What changes would you recommend for future programmes?		

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

### Participant's Evaluation Form

Dear participant,

As you know, this training programme has not yet been tested and we have yet to establish the quality of the content and methods ***in practice!*** Because of this reason, your evaluation form is more detailed than normal, so that we can get the feedback we need to improve the programme.

Thank you for your participation!

UNDP Oslo Governance Centre

Name (optional):

Profession:

Date of training:

Name of trainer:

A. Did we meet the programme objectives?				
Objectives	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
1. I can focus the objectives of corruption assessments.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
2. I can design three types of indicators for assessing corruption and anti-corruption interventions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
3. I can effectively utilize global composite indicators and original data (both qualitative and quantitative).	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
4. I can assess methodological, political and operational challenges involved in carrying out corruption assessments.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

5. I can design indicators and assessments that capture the experiences and perspectives of marginalised groups.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
6. I can provide advice on developing a national index and develop scales for quantifying integrity indicators.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
7. I can select balanced sets of indicators.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
8. I can provide advice on the relevance of carrying out a systemic diagnosis of corruption.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
9. I can appraise different instruments for assessing corruption and adapting them to country needs.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
10. I can select appropriate data collection methods.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Please explain your answer.				
B. Overall evaluation				
11. Was this programme what you expected? Please explain:	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>	
12. What did you find <b>most</b> useful about the programme?				

## ANNEX 8. Module 14 – Learning transfer and evaluation

13. What did you find <b>least</b> useful about the programme?			
14. Reflect on what you found most useful. If you could apply any content or techniques you learned from this programme tomorrow, what would it/they be? Please explain.			
15. Have you changed your perceptions/ideas in any of the areas discussed as a result of what you learned in the programme? Please explain.	No <input type="checkbox"/>	Somewhat <input type="checkbox"/>	Yes <input type="checkbox"/>
16. Other comments.			



United Nations Development Program  
Democratic Governance Group  
Oslo Governance Center  
Borgatta 2B  
N-0650 Oslo, Norway

[www.undp.org/oslocentre](http://www.undp.org/oslocentre)